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Preface 
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ranked as one of the most dangerous occupations in the world. This situation 
triggered my interest in the field and the research presented in this thesis.  
I need to thank several people for their contribution during the process of 
completing this PhD. First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor Ole A. 
Engen for his encouragement, help, and support throughout this process. I 
would also like to thank my colleague Doctor David McArthur for helping me 
with statistical problems as well as useful comments and suggestions while 
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during my research. Thanks to his engagement in the maritime industry, I was 
able to receive funding for five more years of research—something that I 
appreciate tremendously. I would like to mention Captain Vigleik Storesund, 
who has been a great help in enabling me to understand the maritime industry 
and life at sea. Last, but not least, Chief Officer Johanne Marie Trovåg, 
Professor Knud Knudsen, and Professor Preben Hempel Lindøe all made 
tremendous efforts in reading through my final work. 
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for helping me get in touch with their members. Although they cannot all be 
mentioned by name, I wish to thank the shipping companies who volunteered 
to participate and all the seafarers who—despite a hectic working situation—
found time to contribute with their views. In addition several companies have 
enabled me to sail on their vessels and in other ways participate in their daily 
operations. 
I would also like to thank Dr. Nick Bailey and Professor Helen Sampson at 
the Seafarers International Research Centre (SIRC) in Cardiff, Wales, for 
making my research stay there possible. 
My apologies to all of you who have not been mentioned. I cannot mention 
you all, but no one has been forgotten. During my research, I have gained 
valuable and useful contributions from many people of different nationalities, 
including academics, practitioners, seafarers, and shore personnel working in 
all parts of the shipping industry. 
Finally, I would like to thank my family for their encouragement and support. 
I also want to apologize to my two young children who have had a mum 
preoccupied with research for such a long time. I have spent long periods 
away from home and, when staying at home, I have been mentally absent. I 
hope I can now make up for the lost time. It would not have been possible to 
complete this thesis without the support of my incredibly patient and 
supportive husband Mikal. Thus, I dedicate this thesis to them—Mikal and 
our two exceptional and wonderful children, Jørgen and Elene. 
Haugesund, April 2011, Helle A. Oltedal  
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Summary 
This research focuses attention on safety challenges within the Norwegian 
shipping industry. A status picture of the shipboard safety culture and the 
interrelationships with safety management and organizational factors is given. 
Three research questions are explored: (1) What characterizes safety culture 
and safety management within the shipping industry? (2) What is the 
relationship between safety culture and safety performance within the 
shipping industry? (3) What characterizes shipping companies’ application of 
the safety management concept? In order to explore these research questions, 
four aims were defined to guide this work: (1) to outline and discuss the 
application of safety culture and safety management within merchant 
shipping; (2) to outline and discuss relevant theories of safety culture and 
safety management and analyze the relationship between safety culture and 
safety management; (3) to support the use of a methodological framework for 
the assessment of safety culture in relation to safety management; and (4) to 
assess safety culture within merchant shipping and analyze the relationship 
with safety management and actual performance. The research questions are 
further examined and specified in six journal articles. 
The thesis is divided into two main parts. Part I includes the overall 
framework in relation to research aims. Part II presents the six journal articles. 
In part I, chapter 1, a general introduction and a status picture of risk, safety 
management, and safety culture within the shipping industry are presented, 
which gives reason for the research aims and questions introduced in the 
chapter. Chapter 2 outlines the safety responsibilities within the industry at 
the international, national, and company levels. Emphasis is placed on the 
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International Safety Management (ISM) Code, which provides the minimum 
standards and guidelines for operational safety management. Chapter 3 
provides theoretical clarification and framing with regard to safety culture and 
safety management. This chapter also introduces a general working model 
used in the studies of safety culture and safety management in this thesis. 
Chapter 4 presents the methodological approach. The thesis builds upon a 
mixed method approach where both qualitative and quantitative techniques 
are used. The main results are briefly summarized in Chapter 5, followed by a 
discussion in Chapter 6 and concluding remarks in Chapter 7. The concluding 
remarks concern study limitations, implications, and suggestions for future 
research. 
The thesis draws upon theory from both the socio-anthropological and 
organizational psychological directions. In accordance with the organizational 
psychological perspective, a survey was carried out. A safety culture 
questionnaire developed by Studio Apertura, a constituent centre of The 
Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), in collaboration 
with the Norwegian DNV and the research institution SINTEF was used. In 
total, 1,574 questionnaires were distributed to 83 tanker and bulk/dry cargo 
carriers, with 1,262 being returned from 76 of the vessels. The vessels were 
initially randomly selected from the Norwegian Shipowners’ Association 
member list, but as participation was voluntary, some withdrawal occurred. 
Statistical analysis involves descriptive statistics, factor analysis, regression 
analysis, and structural equation modeling. The statistical survey results were 
complemented by qualitative data obtained through document studies, case 
studies including two tanker companies and two bulk/dry cargo companies, 
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interviews, participating observations and field studies at sea, and 
participation in other maritime forums. 
The study results indicate several deficiencies in all parts of a traditional 
safety management system defined as: (1) the reporting and collection of 
experience data from the vessel; (2) data processing, summarizing, and 
analysis; (3) the development of safety measures; and (4) implementation. 
The underreporting of experience data is found to be a problem, resulting in 
limitations related to the data-processing process. Regarding the development 
of safety measures, it is found that the industry emphasizes the development 
of standardized safety measures in the form of procedures and checklists. 
Organizational root causes related to company policies (e.g., crewing policy) 
is to a lesser degree identified and addressed. 
The most prominently identified organizational influential factors are the 
shipping companies crewing policy, which includes rotation systems, crew 
stability, and contract conditions, and shipboard management. The 
companies’ orientation toward local management, which includes leadership 
training, educational, and other managerial support, are also essential. The 
shore part of the organization is identified as the driving force for 
development and change in the shipboard safety culture. Thus, safety 
campaigns should to a larger degree include and be directed toward shore 
personnel. 
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Part I 
1 General background and introduction 
“Never before have so few done so much for so many.” When opening the 
Year of the Seafarer in 2010, these brave words—a quotation paraphrased 
from one of Winston Churchill’s most famous speeches—were similarly 
strikingly declared by Efthimios E. Mitropoulos, Secretary General of the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO). Few people seem to understand 
the importance of seafarers and shipping in our society. The worldwide 
population of seafarers serving in international trade is estimated to be 
approximately 1,187,000 people from virtually every nationality. Worldwide, 
about 50,000 ships carry about 90% of the world’s trade; thus, these more 
than one million seafarers are transporting goods for the benefit for the 
world’s population of almost 7 billion. The seafarers’ and shipping industry’s 
global importance is commonly highlighted by the phrase “without shipping, 
half the world would starve and the other half would freeze.” 
The current research is conducted in light of safety challenges within 
merchant shipping. During the first five years of the previous decade (i.e., 
2000 to 2005), an average of 18 ships collided, grounded, or caught fire every 
single day, and two vessels were sinking every day (Gregory & Shanahan, 
2010). Merchant shipping and seafaring are traditionally perceived as a risky 
industry—a risk partly induced by its situational characteristics. Work at sea 
is demanding as both work and leisure time happens within a small group, at 
the same place, for a long period of time and with few possibilities to interact 
with the surrounding world. The seafarer’s only alternative whereabouts when 
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at sea is the sea itself, where harsh conditions prevail. Seafarers and their 
vessels are constantly exposed to forces beyond their control, such as storms, 
freak waves, and strong currents. Being far from port most of the time, the 
seafarer must handle critical situations with little or no support from others, 
with only their own competence and expertise to rely on. 
1.1 Safety  culture  and  safety  management  within 
shipping 
Human error is associated with the vast majority of accidents and incidents 
within shipping. An estimated 75% to 96% of marine casualties are caused—
at least in part—by some form of human error (Anderson, 2003; Rothblum, 
2000; Wagenaar & Groeneweg, 1987). However, within recent safety 
management theories, human error is not seen as a cause of accidents and 
incidents, but rather as something shaped and provoked by upstream 
organizational factors. Thus, human error is not an explanation per se, but 
something that needs further explaining (Hollnagel, 2004; Reason, 2001). 
Possible explanatory factors may be related to seafarers’ cognitive system 
(e.g., human information processing, training, motivation, and fear), social 
system (e.g., social pressure, role, and life stress), and situational system (e.g., 
physical stress, environmental stress, and ergonomic aspects), which are all 
assumed to be mutually interdependent (Wagenaar & Groeneweg, 1987). It is 
also widely accepted that individual factors are inextricably linked to 
organizational factors and decisions (Hollnagel, 2004; Reason, 2001; Schager, 
2008).  
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Safety at sea is regulated by the UN’s agency for maritime affairs, the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO). From the IMO perspective, safety 
management and human error are closely intertwined with the industry’s 
definition and application of the safety culture concept, regulated through the 
International Safety Management (ISM) Code (IMO, 2010a; Lappalainen, 
2008; Mitroussi, 2003). The ISM Code, which became mandatory for all 
merchant vessels from July 1998 to July 2002, formally introduced the idea of 
safety culture in shipping:  
The application of the ISM Code should support and encourage the 
development of a safety culture in shipping. Success factors for the 
development of a safety culture are, inter alia, commitment, values 
and beliefs (IMO, 2010a, p. 35). 
However, despite the implementation of the ISM Code, recent statistics 
indicate that losses are continuing to increase, resulting in a heavy loss of life 
and serious damage to the environment (Soma, 2010). The statistics in Figure 
1 illustrate the frequency of navigational accidents (collisions, contacts, and 
wrecked/stranded vessels) from 1993 to 2009. 
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Figure 1: Navigational accident frequency in relation to the world fleet size, 
1993-2009 (Source: Lloyds’ Fairplay, 2010) Fleet size in number of crude oil 
tankers over 100,000 dwt, chemical tankers over 10,000 dwt, containers over 
20,000 dwt, RoRo cargo over 10,000 dwt, bulk over 50,000 dwt. 
As shown in Figure 1, the frequency of serious navigational accidents has 
increased significantly since 2002. It is also interesting to note that, since the 
first introduction of the code in 1998, none of the subsequent years show 
lower accident frequency than before the code was introduced. This statistical 
trend raises a fundamental question: Why do we have such an increase in the 
accident rates despite the introduction of the ISM Code, emphasis on safety 
culture, and lower tolerance for non-conformities? Three possible 
explanations have been put forth: 
1. Shipping companies’ implementation of the ISM Code and 
understanding of safety management are inadequate. The IMO 
assessment of the effectiveness of the ISM Code (IMO, 2005) 
indicates that implementation has resulted in more administrative 
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work, procedures, checklists, and other means in order to control 
human behavior. However, is safety best ensured by controlling and 
restricting human behavior? 
2. The ISM Code’s underlying theoretical rationale of linear causality is 
inadequate. Is it possible to prevent future accidents by learning from 
past events? Are there any causal links between near misses, minor 
incidents, and major accidents? When dealing with future events 
evolving in an unforeseen and complex pattern, are other rationalities 
more adequate? 
3. The ISM Code’s assumption of a relationship between safety culture 
and actual safety performance and outcome is inadequate. What is 
organizational safety culture and what determines its relations to 
safety management, organizational practices, and safety performance? 
This thesis provides an account of these three possible explanations. 
Empirical data are collected from the Norwegian controlled liquid and dry 
cargo shipping industry for this purpose. The data are analyzed and discussed 
in light of theory on safety management and safety culture. The seafarers’ 
perspective and their operative experiences are emphasized. The analyses and 
discussion will be consistent with the scope of the research aims and 
questions, as formulated in the following sections.  
1.2 Research aims and research questions 
Although shipping is known to be a risky industry, surprisingly little research 
has been done within this area. In recent years, a few articles and doctoral 
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theses on maritime safety culture and climate have been published (e.g., 
Antonsen & Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet. Institutt for 
sosiologi og statsvitenskap, 2009; Christophersen, 2009; Ek, 2006; Håvold & 
Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet. Institutt for industriell 
økonomi og teknologiledelse, 2007; Lamvik, 2002; Østreng, 2007). In light of 
the discussed situation, it is important to get a better understanding of what 
characterizes safety culture within shipping and how shipboard safety culture 
relates to safety management and human error. Thus, the following four 
research aims have been developed in order to provide direction for this 
thesis: 
1. To outline and discuss the application of safety culture and safety 
management within merchant shipping. 
2. To outline and discuss relevant theories of safety culture and safety 
management and analyze the relationship between safety culture and 
safety management. 
3. To give reason for a methodological framework for assessment of 
safety culture in relation to safety management. 
4. To assess safety culture within merchant shipping and analyze the 
relationship with safety management and actual performance. 
In order to pursue these aims, a questionnaire survey was carried out within 
merchant shipping along with field studies, case studies, interviews, and other 
qualitative methods. The population is defined within the Norwegian 
controlled shipping industry as liquid tankers and dry cargo carriers above 
500 gross ton. Norwegian controlled is defined as vessels owned by 
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Norwegian parties where the owners’ safety management department is 
located in Norway. In the study, the seafarers’ perspective is emphasized.  
Based on the four research aims previously described, three research 
questions were developed for the purpose of the thesis: 
1. What characterizes safety culture and safety management within the 
shipping industry? 
2. What is the relationship between safety culture and safety performance 
within the shipping industry? 
3. What characterizes shipping companies’ application of the safety 
management concept? 
1.3 Aims of articles 
The thesis includes six separate studies with their own main aims. All aims 
for each study are discussed in this section. 
1. Local management and its impact on safety culture and safety within 
Norwegian shipping: 
The first study uses survey data collected in 2006. The data cover all sailing 
personnel on 76 Norwegian controlled liquid tankers and dry cargo carriers. 
The aims of the study are to: 
 Explore and analyze the shipboard characteristics of safety culture; 
 Identify which factors affect the shipboard safety culture; and 
 Get results in order to set direction for further studies. 
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2. Risk perception in the Norwegian shipping industry and 
identification of influencing factors: 
This second article makes use of the same survey data. In this study, the 
catering personnel and captains are excluded. Risk perception is used as an 
indicator for shipboard safety. The aims of the study are to: 
 Assess the relationship between risk perception and dimensions of 
safety culture; and 
 Explore the influence of organizational structural variables. 
3. The use of safety management systems within the Norwegian tanker 
industry and whether they really improve safety: 
The third study involves both quantitative survey data and qualitative data. 
The sub-sample dry cargo carriers are excluded. The data and analyses are 
organized in accordance with the sub-components and information flow of a 
traditional safety management system. The aims of the study are to: 
 Describe the status of safety management within the liquid tanker 
sector; and 
 Identify organizational structural factors that influence the safety 
management performance. 
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4. Tanker versus dry cargo regarding the use of safety management 
systems within Norwegian dry cargo shipping: 
The fourth study is a follow-up of the third, and follows a similar structure 
related to the sub-components and information flow of a traditional safety 
management system. The study includes both quantitative survey data and 
qualitative data. The sub-sample liquid cargo carriers are excluded. The aims 
of the study are to: 
 Describe the status of safety management within the dry cargo sector; 
 Identify organizational structural factors that influence the safety 
management performance; and 
 Compare current situations between the two sectors—namely, dry and 
liquid cargo carriers. 
5. Reporting practices in merchant shipping and the identification of 
influencing factors: 
The fifth study involves quantitative survey data. Both the third and fourth 
study identified underreporting of experience data as a substantial problem. 
The reporting of experience data is regarded as a main cornerstone in a safety 
management system. Thus, the aims of the article are to: 
 Assess the relationship between reporting practices and the dimensions 
of safety culture; 
 Explore the influence of local management; and 
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 Further explore differences between the dry and liquid cargo carrier 
sectors. 
6. Safety management in shipping and making sense of limited success: 
The sixth study involves both quantitative survey data and qualitative data. As 
the previous studies (i.e., three through five) point to a substantial weakness in 
current safety management practices, the aim of this study is to: 
 Explore and identify reasons for the gaps between safety ambitions 
inherent in traditional safety management systems and operational 
practices.  
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2 Safety responsibilities in maritime industry 
This section is, in accordance with specified research aim 1, formulated as 
follows: 
1. To outline and discuss the application of safety culture and safety 
management within merchant shipping. 
The development of international trade and shipping in today’s globalized 
market has to a large degree determined the regulative structure of the 
industry. The international regulative system is of high importance for the 
safety of ships and crew sailing the seven seas, as every shipping company is 
required to relate to this during daily operations. In order to gain proper 
understanding of safety management within shipping, knowledge of the most 
important laws and the international regulative framework is necessary. Thus, 
some of the historical mainlines and the present situation related to safety 
management and the regulatory system will be further presented. An overview 
of the international regulatory system, maritime administration, and 
conventions (conventions in bold) related to safety management are shown in 
Figure 2 (next page). 
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Maritime Administrations         
(Flag and Costal States) 
United Nations (UN) 
International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) 
United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
Convention for the Safety of Life 
at Sea (SOLAS) 
The International Safety 
Management (ISM) Code 
As shown in Figure 2, the maritime administrations’ (flag and coastal states) 
safety responsibilities are determined by the UN through the Convention on 
the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS). Although UNCLOS sets the broad regulative 
framework, the task of developing and maintaining workable regulations on 
ship safety within this framework is delegated to the UN agency the IMO, 
which is now responsible for 35 international conventions and agreements. 
For the purpose of this thesis, the most relevant is the Convention for the 
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) chapter IX, management for the safe operation 
of ships, and the guidelines for SOLAS IX—namely, the ISM Code.  
Figure 2: The maritime international regulatory system related to safety
management 
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2.1 The International Safety Management (ISM) Code 
The ISM Code became mandatory for all merchant vessels above 500 gross 
tons in two waves, depending upon type of vessel—namely, July 1, 1998, and 
July 1, 2002. Until the adoption of the ISM Code, IMO had attempted to 
improve shipping safety largely by improving the hardware of shipping (e.g., 
the construction of ships and their equipment). By comparison, the ISM Code 
focuses on the way shipping companies are managed. The ISM Code is the 
first to provide regulations and guidelines to promote the development of 
sound management and operating practices in order to ensure crew safety and 
avoid damage to the environment. The shipping industry is known to have a 
reactive approach toward safety as the process of regulating the activity has 
evolved primarily as a response to maritime disasters. Development of the 
ISM Code was also based upon a growing recognition that loss of life at sea 
and environmental pollution are influenced by the way in which companies 
manage their fleets. Table 1 (next page) summarizes some of the accidents’ 
precursory to the ISM Code (Anderson, 2003). 
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Table 1.  
Accidents Precursory to the ISM Code 
1987 Herald of Free Enterprise capsized off Zeebrugge; 190 people lost their 
lives. 
1987 Donna Paz ferry collided with a tanker in the Philippines; an estimated 4,386 
people were killed. 
1989 Exxon Valdes ran aground off the coast of Alaska, spilling 37,000 tons of oil 
and causing extensive environmental damage. 
1990 Scandinavian Star caught fire; 158 people lost their lives. 
1991 Agip Abruzzo, with 80,000 tonnes of light crude on board, was in a collision 
with the ro-ro ferry Moby Prince off Livorno, Italy. Fire and pollution 
occurred, and 143 people died. 
1991 Have experienced fire and explosion off Genova, spilling 50,000 tons of 
crude oil; 6 people were killed. 
1991 The Egyptian ferry Salem Express struck a reef and sank; 470 people were 
killed. 
1991 Aegean Sea broke in two off La Coruna, Spain, spilling about 74,000 tons of 
crude oil; extensive pollution occurred. 
1993 Braer driven onto the Shetland Island, carrying about 84,700 light crude oil; 
extensive pollution occurred. 
1994 Estonia ro-ro passenger ferry sank after the bow door fell off during heavy 
weather at sea; 852 people lost their lives. 
 
A common factor appearing in these accidents was human error, which could 
be traced back to poor safety management and organizational practice. By 
introducing the ISM Code, IMO intended to adopt a proactive approach 
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toward safety, where future accidents should be prevented by learning from 
and reflecting upon previous mistakes and experiences. 
The ISM Code requires shipping companies to develop, implement, and 
maintain a safety management system, which includes the following 
functional requirements: (1) a safety policy; (2) instructions and procedures to 
ensure safe operations of ships in compliance with relevant international and 
flag state legislation; (3) defined levels of authority and lines of 
communication between and amongst shore and shipboard personnel; (4) 
procedures for reporting accidents and non-conformities with the provision of 
the ISM Code; (5) procedures to prepare for and respond to emergency 
situations; and (6) procedures for internal audits and management reviews. In 
the code’s guidelines, emphasis is placed on near-miss reporting and how to 
create an organizational atmosphere in which people are willing to report 
accidents and non-conformities by developing a just culture. The concept of a 
just culture is also known to be a fundamental element in James Reason’s 
theory of safety culture and safety management (Reason, 2001). Moreover, in 
order to achieve the development of an organizational safety culture, IMO 
identifies three key elements: (1) recognizing that accidents are preventable 
by following correct procedures and establishing best practices; (2) constantly 
thinking about safety; and (3) seeking continuous improvement. IMO’s 
approach and perspective to safety culture is apparently instrumental, where 
safety culture is seen as something that may be engineered by an 
organization’s structures and control systems in order to produce desired 
behavioral norms and accompanying safety outcomes. 
Safety management, as described in the ISM Code, is founded on a linear 
causality, in which future events are attempted, predicted, and prevented by 
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analyzing past operational experiences. Thus, a critical system requirement is 
reliability and accuracy of input data—the experience, near miss, and accident 
reports ; as long as the input is reliable, the overall system presupposes the 
possibility of developing efficient standardized measures in order to control 
operational safety (Kjellen, 2000). One underlying assumption is that serious 
injuries and accidents may be prevented by learning from and reflecting upon 
incidents with no injury or damage. This idea is frequently illustrated as a near 
miss-accident pyramid. However, previous research does not support this 
theory (Anderson, 2003). Moreover, IMO recognized that near misses are 
underreported (IMO, 2007c), and the input system requirement is not met. 
This also provides a reason to question the underlying theory of linear 
causality, especially if near misses, small-scale accidents, and more serious 
events have the same causal chain (Rundmo, 1996).  
In 2005, IMO provided a report assessing the impact and effectiveness of 
implementation of the ISM Code (IMO, 2005). Based on the data collected, 
IMO concluded that—when the ISM Code and safety cultural development is 
embraced as a positive step—tangible positive benefits are evident. It was also 
recognized that ISM Code compliance could be made easier through a 
reduction in the administrative processes by, inter alia, the reduction of 
paperwork, increased reporting of operational experience data, and greater 
involvement of seafarers in the development of ISM manuals, the procedural 
system, and checklists. In the industry, it seems to be a common 
misconception that the ISM Code requires large quantities of paperwork and 
administration to function and that ticking boxes and checklists would replace 
good training and seamanship (Anderson, 2003).  
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Although the national maritime government is responsible for implementation 
of the ISM Code, the coastal state is responsible for enforcement of the code, 
and each shipping company has the primary responsibility for safe operations. 
However, these responsibilities are challenging as shipping today has 
become—more than ever before—a globalized industry. For example, a 
vessel may have owners in one state, be registered in a second state, be 
chartered by a company from a third state, and be transporting goods whose 
owners belong to a fourth state. To make it even more complicated, the vessel 
is sailing between ports in different states and is manned with a multinational 
and culturally diverse crew, who are managed by a company in yet another 
state. These sector-related circumstances have resulted in specific challenges 
with regard to the administration and enforcement of international regulations, 
as outlined in the following section. 
2.2 Maritime administrations and responsibilities 
A maritime administration may have two different roles: a flag state and a 
coastal state. The coastal states’ responsibility for the enforcement of 
international regulations is done through inspections and Port State Control 
(PSC) of vessels entering their own coastal territorial waters, regardless of 
which flag the vessel is flying (Stopford, 2009). The coastal state may be the 
same as the flag state, but this is far from always the rule. Any ship owner is 
free to register a vessel in any of the world’s flag states.1 The term flag state 
                                                     
1 The definition of a flag state is not straightforward. A myriad of descriptions of flag states have evolved, 
including traditional maritime nation, embedded maritime nation, national flag, classis register, open 
register, opportunist register, international open register, international register, closed register, second 
register, dependent territory register, offshore register, and flag of convenience (Mansell & SpringerLink, 
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(or administration) is used to refer to a country that maintains a vessel’s 
registry. The flag state has the overall responsibility for ensuring compliance 
with international regulations. This responsibility encompasses the operation 
of the ship, the physical status of the ship, the activities of the ship owners, 
and the working conditions of the seafarers. The flag administration, in the 
first instance, underwrites the safe operation of those ships under its flag.  
The flag state  
Each flag state may have a national register, second register, and/or open 
register. A national register is reserved to vessels with national ownership. 
Second registers, which are additional to national registers, are mostly open 
registers. In an open register, ships owned by foreign entities may register. 
The creation of second registers is a response to intensified competition in the 
market for ship registration. In the early 1980s, the shipping market 
experienced a severe depression. Since the late 1980s, a number of states have 
created second registers in addition to their first national register in order to 
provide some or all of the advantages of an open register as a result of the 
economic crisis. A common motivation for establishing such second registers 
are to attract shipowners or prevent shipowners from flagging out by 
providing other or more relaxed application of the international IMO 
regulations (Alderton, 2004). Income in the form of tonnage taxation fee is 
also a motivation for some nations to establish a register when they do not 
necessarily have the means, will, or competence to meet their responsibilities 
as a flag state. According to Alderton (2004), low barriers to entry into the 
                                                                                                                              
2009). In this thesis, flag state refers to an open international register where any shipping owner is free to 
register a merchant vessel. 
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flag market exist, with minimal start-up cost or time being required. This 
situation has led to competition among some maritime administrations, 
which—in order to encourage registration of vessels under their flag—permits 
less bureaucratic control along with relaxed requirements. 
International regulations adopted by IMO intend to provide a harmonized set 
of rules for the industry. The previously described situation has resulted in 
variations among maritime administrations in performance and application of 
the international regulations (Alderton, 2004). Alderton (2004) distinguishes 
between three types of administrations:  
(1) Regulatory efficient states in which the state seeks to regulate the full 
extent of maritime operations.  
(2) Regulatory inefficient states; the main distinction between this 
category and the first lies in the treatment of labor issues.  
(3) Unregulated states, in which the regulatory environment within these 
registers is almost non-existent.  
Many of today’s safety-related criticisms are related to ship registration and to 
which flag the vessels fly. Although substandard shipping is mostly associated 
with regulatory inefficient and unregulated states, even administrations 
regarded as being regulatory efficient may have defective performance. An 
audit of the Norwegian Maritime Directorate, which is regarded as being 
regulatory efficient, revealed that the administration does not have, inter alia, 
adequate operational control with its own working procedures and that the 
administrated regulations are not comprehended in unison, which may result 
in misinterpretations and erroneous decisions (Riksrevisjonen, 2010).  
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As long as the flag states benefit from running open registries and shipowners 
can benefit from it, the situation will most likely never change. Moreover, the 
lack of flag state control, as evident in several countries, has made PSC even 
more important.  
The Port State Control 
In the wake of some major maritime disasters in the European area (e.g., 
accidents with the Erika in 2000 and Prestige in 2002, which both occurred 
after the implementation of the ISM Code), it was realized that the PSC and 
ParisMOU2 could and should take a more determined stance against 
substandard shipping in order to ensure better enforcement of the international 
regulations. 
The Prestige was a Greek-operated oil tanker, officially registered in the 
Bahamas, but with a Liberian corporation registered as the owner. The 
                                                     
2 The ParisMOU (Memorandum of Understanding) on Port State Control is the official document in which 
the 27 participating maritime authorities agree to implement a harmonized system of PSC. The MOU 
consists of a the main body in which the authorities agree on: 1) their commitments and the relevant 
international conventions, 2) the inspection procedures and the investigation of operational procedures, 3) 
the exchange of information, and 4) the structure of the organization and amendment procedures. The 
current member states of the ParisMOU region are, in alphabetical order, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden and The United Kingdom. Following the foundation built by the ParisMOU, several other regional 
MOUs have been signed, including the Tokyo MOU (Pacific Ocean), Acuerdo Latino or Acuerdo de Viña 
del Mar (South and Central America), the Caribbean MOU, the Mediterranean MOU, the Indian Ocean 
MOU, the Abuja MOU (West and Central Atlantic Africa), the Black Sea MOU, and the Riyadh MOU 
(Persian Gulf). In this thesis, due to its geographic area, references will be made to the ParisMOU 
(http://www.parismou.org/). 
 
Safety responsibilities in maritime industry 
21 
ownership of the Prestige was unclear, and it was difficult to establish 
responsibility for the accident, which resulted in the spill of more than 60,000 
tons of heavy fuel oil. Prior to the accident, the Prestige set sail without being 
properly inspected, although a previous captain had complained about 
numerous structural deficiencies.  
The oil tanker Erika also experienced structural failure. Although the 
structural failures were visible, the vessel was found to be seaworthy by the 
classification society. The Erika was sailing under a Maltese flag and 
chartered by a shipping company registered in the Bahamas on behalf of a 
French oil company. With regard to the Erika, it was also difficult to establish 
responsibilities (CPEM, 1999). The Erika accident resulted in a spill of about 
19,800 tons of heavy fuel oil. 
Although both accidents involved structural failures, they can also be 
characterized as stemming from a non-functional ISM system. In a functional 
safety management system, such structural failures should have been detected 
and handled appropriately by the shipping company. In the case of Prestige, 
the captain had even notified the company about structural deficiencies that 
had not been handled properly. In the aftermath of these accidents, the 
response from ParisMOU came in form of developing a harmonized vessel 
detention policy, guidelines for operational PSC, and others (ParisMOU, 
2007). One of the strategies was naming and shaming. Today, all inspection 
results and detentions, with detailed information about the company, vessel, 
and flag, are registered in a public database (at parismou.org). Information 
about banned vessels and “rust buckets” are also made public. A more recent 
initiative includes a list for the performance of flag states (MARISEC, 2008; 
MARISEC, 2006; Winchester, Alderton, & Seafarers International Research 
Centre, 2003). On this list, each flag state is evaluated and ranked based on 
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their performance on certain aspects, as PSC records ships flying their flags 
along with the implementation and enforcement of important international 
treaties, such as the ISM Code. Flag state performance is then ranked and 
placed on a black list (poor performance), grey list (mediocre performance), 
and white list (good performance). The black, grey, and white lists for 2009 
included a total number of 82 flags, 24 on the black list, 19 on the grey list, 
and 39 on the white list (ParisMOU. 2010). 
Despite ParisMOU’s intention to make shipping safer, the current inspection 
system has inherent weaknesses. ParisMOU’s target is to inspect 25% of all 
vessels calling port. The ships are selected based on criteria as previous 
inspections reports from the MOU region. A vessel flying a poor performance 
black-listed flag is more likely to be selected for an inspection than others. 
These criteria for the selection of vessels are understandable; however, they 
disregard the fact the some of the ships flying a poor performance flag are 
owned by companies that take their responsibilities for the safe operation and 
crew welfare seriously. As a result, PSC resources may be used inefficiently. 
It is widely known that vessels in bad shape continue to be operational, 
without getting caught by the inspection net (Corbett, 2009; Tradewinds, 
2007). In order to improve the current system, the ParisMOU introduced a 
new inspection system in January 2011, whereby each ship is ranked as high, 
standard, or low risk; this will determine the frequency of inspections. These 
changes intend to prevent low-risk vessels from being overly inspected in 
order to release resources for more frequent inspections of high-risk vessels. 
With the implementation of this new system, it remains to be seen if it will 
capture those vessels that deliberately avoid inspections.  
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The company and crew management 
Although the overall responsibility for ensuring compliance with international 
regulations belongs to the flag state, each shipping company has the primary 
responsibility for the safety of their ships and crews. The ISM Code requires 
shipping companies to develop, implement, and maintain a safety 
management system for this purpose. However, safety management is not 
only a system property; system efficiency is determined by its human 
interrelationships. On board the vessels, the crew is the ultimate asset to 
ensure safety at sea, which is dependent on their experience and competence. 
The recession of the 1980s brought about several structural changes apart 
from flagging out—namely, the establishment of manning and crewing 
agencies. Crew management normally involves finding, organizing, paying, 
and training crews. In order to survive financially, some companies turned to 
managing ships for other owners as a means of utilizing spare management 
capacity. Others found it necessary to turn to crew managers in order to hire 
cheaper crew in other and unfamiliar parts of the world. This has resulted in 
ships being crewed by mixed nationalities working under different contracts 
and employment terms. The sudden switch to employing seafarers from 
nations without maritime traditions is claimed to result in a reduction in 
standards of competence, except from those relatively unusual cases where 
the shipowners invest in training.  
In addition, within crew management, there is variability in performance. At 
one end are those who have become seriously involved in training, some with 
their own training facilities and with established systems of testing crew 
competence (Alderton, 2004). On the other end are those who do not—nor 
intend to—perform such control over crew competence, which is quite a 
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problem, as fraudulent certificates of competence are an issue within the 
industry (IMO STW 41/4, 3, 2009). As pointed out by Anderson (2003), one 
might question if crew from manning agents takes the companies’ (safety) 
goals and objectives to heart due to a lack of ownership and short 
employment. When crew management is carried out by an external party, the 
shipowner will lose control over assessing and ensuring qualifications, 
training, and competence. The shipowner then depends on third-party 
qualifications, thoroughness, and follow-up when providing crew.  
2.3 When  the  regulatory  framework  and  safety 
management fails 
Major accidents are valuable sources of information about the regulatory 
framework, organizational practices, and cultures and in which way these 
impact safety. In order to illustrate how the regulatory system may fail, the 
explosion and sinking of the chemical tanker Bow Mariner is further outlined. 
The Bow Mariner was one out of four3 chemical tankers that exploded during 
a six-month period between December 2003 and June 2004. The Bow 
Mariner case is interesting for several reasons. First, the accident occurred 
after the introduction of the ISM Code. Second, the accident investigation of 
Bow Mariner indicated that safety culture and poor safety management are 
explanatory factors of the accidents. Finally, what happened aboard the Bow 
Mariner is a driving force for further amendments of the international 
regulations, concerning shipboard leadership and managerial skills (IMO, 
2007a; IMO, 2007b). Based on this situation, the Bow Mariner is seen as a 
                                                     
3 The other three were the tankers Sun Venus, Panama Serena, and NCC Mekka. 
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case suitable for the purpose of understanding and exemplification. All factual 
information derives from the official accident investigation report (United 
States Coast Guard, 2005). 
On February 28, 2004, the chemical tanker Bow Mariner exploded and sank 
in the seas outside Virginia, United States, causing the death of 21 
crewmembers. The Bow Mariner, owned by the Norwegian company Odfjell 
Tankers, was flying a Singaporean flag, was operated by the Greek company 
Ceres, and was manned by Greek officers and Filipino crew. The vessel had a 
valid Safety Management Certificate (SMC). As part of the investigation, the 
vessel’s inspection history for a five-year period before the explosion were 
reviewed and found to be unremarkable. However, during an internal audit in 
June 2003, 25 observations were recorded, including one pertaining to the 
failure to complete an enclosed space entry permit and another for failure to 
record training. These latter non-conformities were also present during the 
accident and pointed to as possible influencing factors to what happened. The 
accident investigators point to numerous indications that the ISM Code 
requirements were not fully implemented or functional aboard the vessel, 
despite apparent documentation of full compliance with the code. These ISM 
non-conformities were found to contribute to the accident. Amongst others, 
no crew familiarization with the vessel was conducted.  
It is also explicitly stated that the shipboard social culture and safety culture 
contributed to the occurrence of the accident. This included poor shipboard 
management. Aboard the Bow Mariner, the Greek captain had—in 
accordance with the company policy—full authority over all personnel. Such 
full authority is not unusual aboard a seagoing vessel. However, at the Bow 
Mariner the distinctions between Greek and Filipino nationality were 
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remarkable. Filipino officers did not take their meals in the officers’ mess, and 
the Filipino crew were given almost no responsibility and were closely 
supervised in every task. The Filipino crew were simply doing what they were 
ordered to do. As a result, they gained little knowledge about important 
aspects of their jobs. The lack of technical knowledge and fear of the Greek 
senior officers provide an explanation as to why the Filipino crew did not 
question the masters’ unsafe order to open all the empty tanks, which was a 
significant breach of normal safe practices for such ships. If the tanks had 
remained closed, the explosions would not have occurred. However, as stated 
in the company policy, the captain’s orders should never be questioned, and 
the failure to obey orders was a reason for disciplinary actions. Investigations 
of the accident leave no question that such fear of the ship management or 
senior officers can lead to a shipboard culture where safety takes a backseat to 
preserving one’s employment. Interviews with crew from another Ceres 
vessel indicate that this poor culture was the general rule in the entire Ceres 
company. 
With the case of Bow Mariner, it is evident that the ISM Code did not 
generate the intended outcome—namely, safe operations and a good safety 
culture—as a result of reasons not necessarily related to shortcomings in the 
ISM Code itself. This situation can also be related to the lack of ability to 
reveal the onboard conditions, which are related to coastal administration and 
inspections. Despite documentation and certification confirming full 
compliance with the code, the accident investigators pointed to numerous 
indicators that the code was neither fully implemented nor functional aboard 
the vessel. The onboard situation is created by organizational factors (e.g., 
crewing and shipboard management policies). The accident investigators also 
regarded commercial pressure as a contributory factor to what happened.  
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2.4 Safety responsibilities  in the maritime  industry—
a summary 
Thus far, the safety responsibilities in the maritime industry have been shortly 
outlined and analyzed. The situation is summarized in the following: 
 With the UN delegation of authority, IMO is responsible for 
developing and maintaining workable safety regulations and laws 
regulating ship safety. 
 The maritime administrations encompass flag state and coastal state. 
The coastal state is responsible for enforcing maritime regulations 
while the flag state is responsible for ensuring compliance with 
international regulations. 
 The shipping companies have the primary responsibility for the safe 
operations of ships and crew safety. Safety management is regulated 
through the ISM Code, which is developed by IMO. 
 The crew is the ultimate asset for ensuring safety at sea. Shipping 
companies may ensure safe operations by investing in crew training 
and competence and ensuring that crew experience is made use of in 
the company safety management system. 
When ensuring operational safety, the crew relates to and is influenced by all 
these actors and levels of authority. National and international legislations 
represent minimum standards. Beyond the minimum standards, each shipping 
company determines the crew’s working conditions. On each vessel, the 
framework given by the shipping company is moderated by the ship’s 
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management. Safety culture and safety management in theory and practice are 
further elaborated in the following chapter.  
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3 Safety  culture  and  safety  management  in 
theory and practice  
This section focused on specified research aims 2 and 3, formulated as 
follows: 
2. To outline and discuss relevant theories of safety culture and safety 
management and analyze the relationship between safety culture and 
safety management. 
3. To give reason for a methodological framework for assessment of 
safety culture in relation to safety management. 
The concept of safety culture as a term and an explanatory factor in an 
accident investigation was first used by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) 
following the Chernobyl accident that occurred on April 26, 1986 (IAEA, 
1991). The Chernobyl accident occurred while a test was being performed on 
a turbine generator during a normal, scheduled shutdown of one of the 
reactors. At the time, written test procedures were unsatisfactory from a safety 
point of view. In addition, serious violations of basic operating safety rules 
were present, as the operators deliberately withdrew most control rods from 
the core and switched off important safety systems (The United Nations 
Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, 1988). Both safety 
management and the interrelationship with the human factors and human error 
were brought into the safety culture concept and safe operations. Safety 
culture was defined as both attitudinal as well as structural, relating to both 
the organizational framework and structures along with the attitude of 
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employees at all levels in responding to and benefitting from the framework 
(IAEA, 1991).  
More recently, several diverse definitions of the safety culture concept have 
abounded in the safety research and organizational literature (Guldenmund, 
2000; Sorensen, 2002; Wiegmann, Zang, von Thaden, Sharma, & Mitchell, 
2002a). In general, all the conceptual definitions can be placed in two broad 
categories: the socio-anthropological and the organizational psychology 
perspective (Wiegmann et al., 2002b). One difference between these 
perspectives concerns the conceptual definition, which is also reflected in 
methodology. From the socio-anthropological perspective, it is argued that a 
superficial research model of culture should be avoided in order to build 
cultural research on a deeper, more complex anthropological model. From an 
anthropological perspective, the practice of ethnography and fieldwork, 
qualitative in-depth studies with data deriving from interviews, observations, 
and/or participation is commonly accepted as appropriate research methods. 
Within this scientific direction, culture is described in text with an emphasis 
on the organizational member’s subjective interpretation and sense making. 
From the organizational psychology perspective, it is argued that culture can 
be described with a limited number of dimensions, usually sought through 
large organization-wide questionnaire surveys. From this latter perspective, 
the culture concept is assumed to express itself through an organizational 
climate—a set of perceptually based psychological attributes (Guldenmund, 
2000). 
Another important difference between the two directions concerns their view 
toward cultural change. The socio-anthropological direction considers 
organizational culture to be an “evolved construct” deeply rooted in history, 
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collectively held, and sufficiently complex to resist any attempt at direct 
manipulation (Mearns & Flin, 1999; Wiegmann et al., 2002b). In contrast, the 
organizational psychologists regard culture as changeable and tend to focus on 
its functional significance and the means by which it may be manipulated to 
improve productivity and safety (Wiegmann et al., 2002b). The organizational 
psychology perspective provides a conceptual bridge between safety culture, 
safety behavior, and organizational safety management systems, with the aim 
of controlling, guiding, or directing first-line operators’ attitude and behavior 
toward safe operations.  
The concept of safety culture—and climate—has over time been a theme of 
heated discussion, with little theoretical consensus emerging on the 
ontological, epistemological, and methodological questions relating to the 
subject. The main differences in these questions seem to be: (1) What is the 
scope of safety culture and the relationship between culture and climate? (2) 
How does the concept relate to other organizational aspects and outcome? (3) 
Which methods are most suitable for measurement? (Peterson, Ashkanasy, & 
Wilderom, 2000). These fundamental questions have already been elaborated 
upon by many researchers (e.g., Antonsen & Norges teknisk-
naturvitenskapelige universitet. Institutt for sosiologi og statsvitenskap, 2009; 
Cooper, 2000; Glendon & Stanton, 2000; Guldenmund, 2000; Håvold & 
Nesset, 2009; Olsen, 2009; Sorensen, 2002; Tharaldsen, 2011; Wiegmann et 
al., 2002a; Wiegmann et al., 2002c; Zhang, Wiegmann, von Thaden, Sharma, 
& Mitchell, 2002). Based on his review, Guldenmund (2000) pointed out that 
most of the characteristics given to culture equally apply to climate, and 
within recent research it is more commonly accepted that climate is a 
reflection of an underlying culture. Hale (2000) even proposed that one should 
stop talking about safety culture completely and instead talk about 
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(organizational) cultural influences on safety (Hale, 2000). In order to grasp 
as many facets as possible of the safety culture concept, a multi-method 
approach is needed. As the safety culture-climate debate seems to be settling 
down and has already been thoroughly discussed by many, the concept will in 
this thesis only be touched upon in brief. 
A general working model used in the studies of safety culture and safety 
management in this thesis is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: The general working model used in the studies of safety culture and 
safety management 
 
With reference to Figure 3, organizational culture/climate is seen as an 
integrated concept subject to change by organizational management practices 
and structures. It is assumed that both organizational cultural and managerial 
features influence safety, which is defined as safety culture. As such, 
organizational safety culture is perceived as a concept with integrated parts 
from organizational management system practices and organizational 
culture/climate. The organizational safety culture is assumed to reflect the 
status of safety in the organization. Organizational safety, or safety culture, is 
assessed using two measurement outcome variables: risk perception and the 
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state of the safety management system (SMS). The various concepts and 
relationships shown in Figure 3 are further elaborated upon in the following 
three sub-chapters. 
3.1 Safety  culture  as  an  organizational  integrated 
concept 
Within the field of organizational safety, the climate concept was first 
introduced by Zohar in 1980 (Zohar, 1980). In more recent publications, 
Zohar relates safety climate to an overall organizational climate made of 
shared perceptions among employees concerning the procedures, practices, 
and kinds of behavior that are rewarded and supported with regard to a 
specific strategic focus. When the strategic focus involves the performance of 
high-risk operations, the resultant shared perceptions define safety climate 
(Zohar, 2010). Although climate and the underlying culture may have a 
particular referent as safety, they embrace and are influenced by more than a 
single unit or function in the organization. An organization has multiple goals 
and multiple policies that are all manifested in organizational behavior and 
practices. The different goals are often in competing conflict, like profit and 
safety (Hollnagel, 2004; Hollnagel, 2009). For example, the crew may be 
expected to cut corners and work faster without getting crossing prevailing 
rules and regulations or jeopardizing safety. The safety climate concept 
integrates perceptions toward the organization’s total contexts as a regulatory 
framework and competitors as well as internal matters as finance, marketing, 
human resources, control systems, safety management systems, and so on. 
Consequently, when measuring climate with a particular reference, it is 
important to embrace the organization in a wider sense in order to reveal 
conflicting areas and the priority of importance. True priorities at work (e.g., 
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efficiency versus safety) have been shown to provide the strongest prediction 
of actual behavior (Zohar, 2008).  
The theoretical roots of the safety culture discussion can be traced back to 
Barry Turner and the introduction of the manmade disaster model (Pidgeon & 
O'Leary, 2000; Turner, 1978). In the manmade disaster model, an accident is 
defined not by its physical impact, but in sociological terms, as a significant 
disruption or collapse of the existing cultural beliefs and norms regarding 
hazard. These cultural beliefs and norms are assumed to be formally laid 
down in rules and procedures or more tacitly taken for granted and embedded 
within working practices. This is also related to managerial and organizational 
practices.  
Andrew Pettigrew (1979), whose background is in anthropology and 
sociology, relates the cultural concept to the everyday tasks and objectives in 
organizations as a product of social processes connecting the past, present, 
and future. In many ways, Pettigrew’s definition encompasses Turner’s 
definition. According to Pettigrew (1979), culture is related to the less rational 
and instrumental tasks in an organization as well as the more expressive social 
tissue that give those tasks meaning, such as the meaning of having a safety 
policy, if procedures should be followed only when safety inspectors are 
present, or if efficiency is the real area of priority and the safety-first policy 
only serves as a function for external stakeholders. It is argued that, in order 
for people to function within any given setting, they must have a continuing 
sense of what reality is all about in order to be acted upon. In this setting, 
culture is the system of such public and collectively accepted meanings with 
regard to safety, operating for a given group at the time (Pettigrew, 1979).  
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One of the most influential anthropologists of modern time, Clifford Geertz, 
regards culture as “webs of significance” spun by man and in which man are 
suspended. According to Geertz (1973), cultural scientists should try to 
interpret those webs in search of meaning and explanation. Geertz (1973) 
concluded that culture is most effectively treated as a symbolic system. By 
isolating the elements of the symbolic system, specifying the internal 
relationship, the whole system may be characterized in general. Symbols are 
the surface expression of the underlying cultural structure. Pettigrew (1979) 
also emphasized symbols, languages, ideologies, beliefs, rituals, and myths as 
an important part in the codification of meaning and emergence of normative 
patterns. For example, in accordance with requirements of the ISM Code, 
shipping companies have safety policies. From a cultural perspective, policies 
such as safety first are not important in themselves. The importance stems 
from how such policies, as a symbol, make sense for the organizational 
members. A safety-first policy may be perceived as a statement aimed to 
attract customers or directed toward other external stakeholders. In the case of 
the Bow Mariner, it is likely that the company safety policy would be given 
meaning as a façade maintained toward external stakeholders, which can 
explain the actual safety-degrading behavior on board. The vessel did hold a 
valid ISM certificate and documentation, but during normal operations they 
were not acted upon and complied with. This understanding of culture also 
establishes a relation between culture and climate—namely, that cultural 
beliefs and meaning given to organizational factors are reflected in actual 
behavior. In this particular case, the symbolic system is explained by the gap 
among safety policy, guidelines, and actual behavior. 
One of the most widely used organizational culture frameworks is probably 
that of Edgar Schein (1992, 2004), a framework that built upon Pettigrew’s 
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cultural theory. This framework explains culture at three levels: (1) artifacts—
visible organizational structures and processes that are difficult to measure but 
are felt and heard by individuals who enter a new culture; (2) espoused 
values—norms, standards, and moral principles usually measured through 
questionnaire surveys; and (3) basic underlying assumptions—unconscious 
taken-for-granted beliefs, perceptions, thoughts, and feelings, which may be 
understood by ongoing observations and participation. Schein (1992, p. 12) 
formally defined culture as:  
a pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned 
as it solved its problems of external adaption and internal 
integration that has worked well enough to be considered 
valid and, therefore, to be thought to new members as the 
correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those 
problems.  
Schein regards culture as shared assumptions expressing consistent, clear, and 
organization-wide consensus. However, in looking for organization-wide 
consensus, important areas of conflict will be disregarded and lost. What is 
regarded and learned as valid patterns of shared assumptions depends upon 
how the group is defined, which in turn opens up for the existence of various 
groups and subcultures within an organization.  
Regarding the Bow Mariner, it is natural to assume that the group of Greek 
officers and the group of Filipino crew differ with regard to what is shared, 
which also brings about the notion of subcultures. In general, it is assumed 
that subcultures are found within the shipboard departments’ deck, engine, 
and galley. Analyses of other levels in the organization may give different 
results, as the group may be defined as the whole fleet or as all shipping 
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companies. A cultural trait identified at the industry level may be related to 
manning policies and the extended use of manning agencies and contract 
employment, which most regard as the only possible solution to manning—a 
solution that is taken for granted and not questioned by insiders, thereby 
determining national subcultures. When distinguishing climate from culture, 
climate is often suggested to arise from individuals whereas culture is 
suggested to arise from group or interpersonal processes (Dansereasu & 
Alutto, 1990) 
Safety culture is assumed to be influenced by and seen as an integrated part of 
an organizational culture and a product of equal processes. Organizational 
culture is a relatively stable, multidimensional, holistic construct shared by 
groups of organizational members that supply a frame of reference. It gives 
meaning to and/or is typically revealed in certain practices manifested as 
organizational climate. In the same way, Mearns and Flin (1999) described 
safety climate as employees’ perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs about risk and 
safety whereas safety culture is a more complex and enduring trait reflecting 
fundamental values, norms, assumptions, and expectations. These cultural 
elements can be seen through safety management practices, which again are 
reflected in the safety climate and in actual behavior (Mearns & Flin, 1999). 
In conclusion, most of what is true for safety culture is also considered true 
for safety climate (Guldenmund, 2000). 
3.2 Organizations, management and cultural change 
Safety management and safety culture are all about change—a change toward 
enhanced operational safety. Both Pettigrew (1979) and Schein (2004) 
regarded individuals, including entrepreneurs and leaders, as important in the 
process of creating and managing an organizational culture. According to 
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Schein, one of the most decisive functions of leadership is the creation, 
management, and sometimes even the destruction of culture. Although Schein 
regarded leaders as important in these processes, leaders are not regarded as 
the only determiner of culture. Schein also stated that culture is a result of 
complex group of learning processes only partially influenced by leaders. 
Groups (e.g., departments or vessels that operate within similar situations) 
may behave very differently from one another as the group dynamics differ. 
Schein (2004) referred to culture as those elements of a group or an 
organization that are most stable and least malleable. However, according to 
Schein (2004), the group itself needs a certain degree of stability. Any group 
with a stable membership and a history of shared learning will have developed 
some level of culture, but a group having either a great deal of member 
turnover and/or a history without any challenging events may lack shared 
assumptions. Zohar (1980) identified a stable workforce with less turnover 
and older workers as an organizational characteristic when determining safety 
climate. A stable workforce is then vital for both climate and culture. Within 
the segments of shipping that have large turnover and less group stability, it 
might be questioned if they have developed any shared basic assumptions 
(culture) or working practices (climate). 
According to Schein (2004), some barriers to the development of an 
integrated shared culture exist, including the insufficient stability of group 
membership and the insufficient shared history of practice or the presence of 
many subgroups with different kinds of shared experience. This may lead to a 
situation of ambiguity and conflict. Joanne Martin (Martin, 1992) 
distinguished three perspectives: (1) integration, (2) differentiation, and (3) 
fragmentation. Martin’s (1992) recommendation is that an organization be 
viewed from all three perspectives, as one perspective’s strengths are 
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another’s weaknesses. As a result, a greater understanding of an 
organization’s culture and how to approach cultural change may be obtained. 
From each perspective, different aspects of culture and cultural change are 
captured. This view was also supported by Alvesson (1993). 
From the integration perspective, culture is described as patterns of 
manifestations shared by all members of the organization, and the 
organization’s manager/leader is regarded as the primary source of cultural 
change. One of the most renowned representatives within the integration 
perspective is probably Edgar Schein (Frost, 1991; Richter & Koch, 2004; 
Schein 2004). According to Schein’s theory, the organization’s leader is 
regarded as being able to create and manage the culture in pre-given 
directions. The development of subcultures is regarded as undesirable side 
effects appearing when the organizations grow and mature. In such a 
situation, Schein argued that the leader’s effort should focus on integrating the 
variety of subcultures. 
From the differentiation perspective, cultural manifestations are described as 
sometimes inconsistent when consensus occurs only within the boundaries of 
subcultures, which often is regarded as being in conflict with each other. With 
regard to influence and change, greater importance is assigned to the 
environment, and teams of leaders are ascribed to have secondary influence to 
cultural change. Nick Pidgeon (1998) considered the importance of 
subcultures, questioning whether a unified culture may be designed within a 
large organization and arguing that existing subcultures should be given 
attention regarding how they differ in (safety-related) priorities, perceptions, 
and interpretations of emerging safety problems. How these aspects interact 
with each other, existing power relations, and the like is of equally great 
importance (Pidgeon, 1998).  
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While both the integration and differentiation perspectives focus on what is 
shared and accounts of planned and directed goals change, the fragmentation 
perspective regards ambiguity as the essence of culture. In this perspective, 
culture is something that is constantly fluctuating, and no stable organization-
wide or subcultural consensus is supposed to exist. Cultural change is seen as 
being in a constant flux, where the power of change is usually seen as being 
diffused broadly in the environment and among organizational members. The 
ambiguity is supposed to emerge from the complexity and unpredictability in 
the organization and society; the fragmentation perspective does not assume 
that the organizational members have similar reactions to these ambiguities. 
Karl Weick and the theories of high reliability organizations (HRO) are well 
known within this field (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007).  
Within shipping, subcultures, conflicts, ambiguity, stress, and 
misunderstandings are likely to be present due not only to the lack of stability 
of membership, but also to an insufficient shared history of practice. This 
relates to both the specific work situation, but also, amongst others, to 
nationality. National cultures are known to differ in aspects such as power 
distance and the degree of human inequality, uncertainty avoidance, and how 
they adapt to unstructured situations as well as how they integrate into a group 
with regard to individualism versus collectivism (Hofstede, 2001). In 
addition, value of life, safety standards, and risk perception are known to 
differ between nationalities. Geert Hofstede perceived culture as mental 
programming—a pattern of thinking, feeling, potential acting, and unwritten 
rules of the social game that distinguishes the members of one group of 
people from others. A certain culture is learned through the lifetime. What is 
acquired in early childhood and once established is difficult to change 
(Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005). Hofstede argued that layers of culture (e.g., 
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organizational culture) acquired later in life tend to be more changeable. 
Organizational acquirements and practices—the visible part of culture—are 
regarded as faster and easier to change.  
Based on the previous discussion, it is concluded that organizational safety 
culture and behavior are subject to change by organizational practices and 
structures, which includes safety management systems. Furthermore, 
individuals in the organization (e.g., their leaders) do have a mediating effect 
upon the formation of an organizational safety culture.  
3.3 Organizational culture and safety management 
Safety management systems have two interrelated main functions: to avoid 
accidents and improve safety. Theories of accident causation and safety 
management have progressed over time (Borys, Dennis & Legget, 2009). H. 
W. Heinrich is considered to be a pioneer within safety management and 
accident causation (Heinrich, Roos & Petersen, 1980) from the first age of 
safety—namely, the technical age. With reference to the shipping industry, 
the first development of SOLAS belonged to a technical age; the introduction 
of the ISM Code represented a transition to the age of management systems 
and culture. The age of human factors occurred in between, in which the view 
of human error considered the interaction of human and technical factors 
when exploring the causes of errors and accidents (Borys et al., 2009). 
As previously highlighted, traditional safety management systems (SMS) 
described in the ISM Code fall along a linear causality where attempts are 
made to predict and prevent future incidents by reflecting upon previous 
experience related to empirical safety control. The traditional SMS contains 
several subsystems. First, a system for reporting and collecting experience 
data from the vessel itself is required, followed by a system of data processing 
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(i.e., summarization and analysis) in order to reveal causal factors and 
perform trend analyses, which form the basis for the development of safety 
measures. Both identification of causes and remedial actions are closely 
intertwined with how the organization addresses technological, 
organizational, and individual factors. Irrespective of this, one critical system 
requirement is the reliability and accuracy of input data (i.e., near miss and 
accidents reports). As long as the input is reliable, the overall system 
presupposes the possibility of revealing a root cause and develops efficient 
measures in order to control operational safety (Kjellén, 2000). Although the 
fundamental rationale of safety management has changed little over the years, 
the rationale for the understanding of human error and causal factors, root 
causes, and adequate safety measures has changed. However, quite 
surprisingly, recent research also points to insufficient scientific evidence on 
the effectiveness of systematic safety management to make recommendations 
either in favor of or against them (Robson et al., 2007). Thus, the obvious 
question is why: Is the reason found within the theoretical rationale of safety 
management or within organizational understanding and applications of the 
systems or is the reason found elsewhere?  
The application of traditional safety management is questioned with a 
distinction between small-scale accidents and larger more infrequent accidents 
(Rundmo, 1996). According to Rundmo (1996), the empirical safety control, 
in which measures are developed through the analysis of past events, is only 
applicable for frequent and small-scale accidents such as ordinary work 
accidents. When it comes to medium-size and more infrequent accidents (e.g., 
groundings and collisions) and large-scale accidents with very low 
probabilities (e.g., the capsize of the Herald of Free Enterprise and the fire at 
the Scandinavian Star; see Table 1), traditional safety management is not 
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considered to be applicable. Such accidents are often too unique and complex 
to grasp, and it will not be possible to single out some isolated underlying 
causes or develop measures that cover all involved risk—a risk that in the first 
place is considered too complex to understand. Others, such as Scott Sagan 
(1993) and Charles Perrow (1999), questioned the possibility of foresight and 
preventions of accidents through empirical safety management.  
Within the age of human factors, human error is regarded as primary cause of 
accidents. In more recent theories and subsequent ages of safety, human error 
is seen as a consequence of faults deriving from other parts in the organization 
or environment, complexity, interactions, and/or organizational culture. A big 
difference between human error as a cause and human error as a consequence 
is seen in the characteristics of remedial actions. With human error cited as 
the cause of failure, the tendency for safety measures is to seek to control 
human behavior with inter alia procedures and checklists. Then, when the real 
cause is found to lie elsewhere in the organization, such measures may not 
clearly be the answer to the underlying problem and incidence of failure, and 
accidents will continue to occur. The following sections shed light on these 
issues from the theoretical perspective of accident causation and prevention. 
The Man Made Disaster model 
Barry Turner is presumably among the first to regard latent conditions as a 
primary cause in accident causation. With the development and introduction 
of the Man Made Disaster model, accidents and disasters are proposed to 
develop through a long change of events leading back to root causes like lack 
of information and misperception among individuals (SINTEF, 2003). Turner 
argued that this is a result of an organizational culture where information and 
interpretations of hazard signals fail. Thus, a typical accident can be traced 
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back to initial beliefs and norms—culture and climate—that do not comply 
with existing operational reality. From this perspective, accident development 
is viewed as a process, often over years, developing from an interaction 
between human and the organizational arrangements of the socio-technical 
system (SINTEF, 2003). With reference to accidents such as the capsize of 
Herald of Free Enterprise, a common understanding of the crew—given by 
the management of the organization—was a general understanding that the 
vessel should leave some minutes ahead of schedule, even if it involved 
putting pressure on those who did not move fast enough. The inherent risks of 
such a practice were not questioned. From the Man Made Disaster 
perspective, systematic safety management should deal with these 
breakdowns in the interpretation of information. For example, are some 
danger signals or causes systematically disregarded or misunderstood? As 
with the Bow Mariner, why did none of the involved stakeholders (e.g., 
charterers, vetters, inspectors, and flag state) manage to reveal the degrading 
shipboard safety situation?  
As such, existing cultural beliefs and norms are the essence of the Man Made 
Disaster theory. According to Turner, such cultural beliefs and norms might 
be formally laid down in rules and procedures or more tacitly taken for 
granted and embedded within working practices. An accident is then assumed 
to occur because of inaccuracy or inadequacy in the accepted norms and 
beliefs and of a discrepancy between the way the world is thought to operate 
and the way it really operates (Pidgeon & O'Leary, 2000). When 
acknowledging the weaknesses in traditional safety management and failure 
of foresight, these institutional barriers to effective learning should, according 
to Pidgeon and O’Leary (2000), be addressed. The aim for efficient safety 
management should be to let all organizational members develop a safety 
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imagination that breaks the pattern of becoming overly fixated with prescribed 
patterns, simplification, and ignorance. Pidgeon and O’Leary (2000) 
presented seven guidelines for fostering a safety imagination: (1) attempt to 
fear the worst, (2) use good management techniques to elicit varied 
viewpoints; (3) play the “what if” game with potential hazard; (4) allow no 
worst case situation to go unmentioned; (5) suspend assumptions about how 
the safety task was completed in the past; (6) approach the edge of a safety 
issue with a tolerance of ambiguity, as newly emerging safety issues will 
never be clear; and (7) force oneself to visualize “near miss” situations 
developing into accidents. It is argued that such safety imagination is a critical 
facet of organizational learning and an effective safety culture.  
Normal Accident Theory 
The Man Made Disaster theory also highlights how system vulnerability 
arises from unintended and complex interactions between contributory 
preconditions (Pidgeon, 2000), which may be linked to Charles Perrow’s 
theory of normal accidents (NAT). However, in contrast to Barry Turner, 
Perrow regards some systems to be to complex and interactive to avoid 
organizational accidents completely. In such systems, safety management is 
regarded as futile as accidents are doomed to happen due to the system 
characteristics.  
The development of NAT started with Perrow’s exploration of the 1979 
accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant. During this investigation, 
Perrow was struck by the fact that the present accident literature 
overwhelmingly blamed the operators (Perrow, 1999). Perrow then looked 
into accident reports from various industries, such as mining, aircraft, and 
marine accidents, and evolved the alternative theory that risk is a result of two 
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dimensions—interactions and complexity—rather than human error. It is 
argued that the operator is free from blame as the overall system, interactions, 
and interdependencies of events are incomprehensible for a critical period of 
time. Like Rundmo (1996), Perrow distinguishes between small-scale, 
frequent personal accidents and other medium-sized accidents and larger-scale 
accidents. Risk is, according to Perrow (1999), regarded as something 
designed into organizations in the form of complex systems with tight 
couplings. The paradox is, when barriers and other safety measures are built 
into the system to increase safety, often it is the complexity that is increased at 
the cost of safety. Perrow (1999) regards such error-prone organizations as 
impossible to manage safely in the long run, thereby resulting in the notion of 
normal accident. In the maritime setting, Perrow (1999, p. 230) described the 
risk-inducing complexity as follows:  
The ship itself, with its power plant explosive mixture, 
steering apparatus, and draft in shallow channels is important, 
but so are other ships, the insurance industry, the fragmented 
shipping industry, attempts are regulation, rules of the road, 
dangerous cargoes, national jealousies and interests, and, of 
course the horrendous environmental problems of fog, ice, 
and storms.  
In his analysis, Perrow also pointed to conflicting organizational goals, 
production pressure, and organizational pressure related to risk taking, 
authoritarian structure on board, and inappropriate leadership. One of 
Perrow’s (1999) main points was to regard all human constructions (e.g., 
vetting, class, regulatory bodies, flag state, insurance, manning companies) as 
systems and not as collections of individuals or representatives of ideologies. 
Dangerous accidents lie in these systems based on how the different parts fit 
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together and how they interact. From this point of view, safety management is 
about reducing the system complexity and/or loosening the couplings to 
reduce interactivity. From the perspective of NAT, Turner’s notion of “safety 
imagination” is a dead end for organizational safety as long as complexity, 
incomprehensible interdependencies, and tight couplings are present. 
High Reliability Organizations Theory 
The High Reliability Organizations Theory (HRO) developed as a result or a 
continuance of Perrow’s rather pessimistic message—namely, that accidents 
are inevitable in some systems or organizations due to their characteristics 
(Roberts, 1990). The concept of safety culture constitutes a central difference 
between NAT and HRO. Whereas NAT argues that in some systems accidents 
are inevitable, HRO argues that even in the most vulnerable and error-prone 
systems, safety culture has characteristics that can counteract the inherent 
system risk.  
In many ways, HRO is in line with the arguments given by Turner, Pidgeon, 
and Perrow. HRO recognized that everything that may fail during operations 
has not yet been experienced; therefore, a system based on experience 
feedback (as the ISM code) is doomed to fail on its own premises. HRO also 
recognizes that not all incidents may be deduced to detect all possible failure 
or error modes. Recognizing that the world is complex, unstable, unknowable, 
and unpredictable, the HRO perspective maintains reluctance to the 
simplification inherent in traditional risk assessment. Both procedures and 
checklists may represent simplification of measures when a complex, 
unstable, unknowable, and unpredictable working situation is attempted to be 
controlled by preplanned prescriptions. This view is shared by Perrow, and 
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both NAT and HRO are skeptical towards those who heavily rely on risk 
assessment.  
In HRO, more attention is given to the real work going on in frontline 
operations. By empowering those doing the actual work, operators have the 
possibility to solve the situations themselves, based on their own experience 
and knowledge. This is a contrast to traditional safety management from the 
era of human factors with a focus on the control of human behavior. Within 
the HRO paradigm of HRO, frontline personnel operate by using pre-planned 
descriptions, but it is accepted that in real situations deviations will occur. 
One of the HRO’s key points is mindfulness, which is related to the concept 
of safety culture and similar principles such as Turner’s safety imagination. 
Mindfulness is understood as a combination of alertness, sensibility, 
flexibility, and adaptability. This perspective argues that unexpected events 
should be handled by creating a mindful infrastructure by following five main 
principles: (1) continuously tracking small failures, (2) resisting 
oversimplification, (3) being sensitive to operations, (4) maintaining 
capability for resilience, and (5) monitoring the shifting locations of expertise. 
The violation of these principles is regarded as a setback toward the more 
traditional approach, where simple diagnoses are accepted, frontline expertise 
is overridden by faith in risk analysis, and safety measures are developed 
detached from operations. The HRO view implies that the operators gain more 
responsibility, so other parts of the organization have to give them the 
possibility to act. In other words, control is taken from the upper levels of the 
organization in favor of lower levels. 
Within HRO, safety culture is seen as essential in managing risk. All of 
Johanne Martin’s three perspectives of safety are adopted: “Each form of 
culture handles ambiguity differently: Integration denies it, differentiation 
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selectively clarifies it, and fragmentation accepts it. In a mindful culture, all 
three forms of culture are present” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007, p. 112). HRO 
does not reject the fact that organizational members have shared values and 
beliefs. However, with regard to safety these shared patterns are not regarded 
as vital for the outcome. The shared orientations are accommodated 
differently in all situations, and the chain of events and patterns of interactions 
between people fall under the influence of situational conditions as stress, 
misunderstandings, interpretation, and others conditions specific to each chain 
of event. From an HRO perspective, more weight is placed on fragmentation 
than on differentiation and more on differentiation than on integration. 
Managing risk and safety culture 
James Reason (Reason, 2001) developed a widely used practical definition 
and approach to safety culture. Barry Turner and the Man Made Disaster 
model provided much of the conceptual foundation for Reason’s work 
(Pidgeon & O'Leary, 2000). Reason’s approach to safety management and 
safety culture is also to a large degree adopted by the HRO perspective 
(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). Based on the organizational culture literature, 
Reason (2001) differs between two theoretical stands: those who regard 
culture as something an organization has and those who regard culture as 
something the organization is. Reason favors the former approach and thus 
regards culture as something changeable and manageable by organizational 
practices.  
Like Turner, NAT, and HRO, Reason is also concerned about the 
organizational factors that trigger an accident. According to Reason (2001), 
accidents by their nature are not directly controllable, as many of the causal 
influencing factors lay outside organizational control and influence. As such, 
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rather than struggling vainly to exercise direct control over behavior, 
accidents, and incidents, organizational managers should measure and 
improve the processes of underlying factors, such as training, procedures, 
planning, budgeting, goal conflicts, and others. Thus, an efficient SMS system 
should help identify those conditions most needing correction and not be 
limited to non-compliance of global rules. Attention should also be directed 
toward the quality of these global rules (e.g., accuracy, relevance, availability, 
and workability of procedures). The information reported into the system 
should embrace organizational factors as well as local workplace factors and 
unsafe acts. The cultural factor is linked to commitment, competence, and 
cognizance within the organization as a whole. 
Reason (2001) regards safety culture as a cornerstone in efficient safety 
management in order to get the needed operational information. He identifies 
safety culture using four critical subcomponents: (1) a reporting culture, (2) a 
just culture, (3) a flexible culture, and (4) a learning culture. Together, these 
interact to create an informed culture. According to Reason, an informed 
culture is one that collects operational experience data that are characterized 
by an organization’s climate in which members feel free to report without 
experiencing negative, unfair, or in other ways meaningless consequences. 
Attention is also given to how the interpretation of information and outcome 
is influenced by the overall company policy. Reason is more preoccupied with 
organizations’ internal organizing than how safety is influenced by other 
organizations and macroeconomics than by national and international 
conditions such as politics, laws and regulations. 
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The theory of Practical Drift – why organizations fails 
Safety culture in shipping is often depicted side by side with compliance to 
prevailing procedures and other safety measures. However, if compliance is to 
be a valid key performance indicator, it is presupposed that these safety 
measures are appropriate for the actual action. The development of 
standardized measures fitting all real-life situations are a challenging if not an 
impossible task considering the complexity and unpredictability of most 
situations. This is also pointed out by NAT and HRO. The Practical Drift 
Model (PDM) provides an explanation for how and why organizations 
experience such gaps among standardized measures, real situations, and 
actions, referred to as practical drift (Snook, 2000). PDM combines HRO and 
NAT in two ways, emphasizing how different degrees of mindfulness will 
depend on different situations and contexts. During their lifetime, 
organizational systems develop both tight and loose couplings, which they 
shift in between—tight to loose couplings and back again—as the various 
sub-units within the operative part of the organization alternate between a low 
and high degree of interdependence. The model also captures both contextual 
and temporal factors when explaining why incidents and accidents occur, 
along with practical drift from the global rules, such as standards, procedures, 
and checklists. 
Standardized rules are often designed according to organizational lifecycle, 
where the governance structure is top-down oriented. Using organizational 
safety management systems, organizational managers put large effort into 
developing extensive routines and procedures in order to make the 
organization robust and resilient against future unforeseen events. When 
designed, tight couplings and rule-based action of logic is assumed to 
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characterize the organization. This, in contrast to an operational situation, is 
assumed to be loosely coupled, and the real world does not act in accordance 
with the organizational design. When organizations experience that 
unforeseen events do not occur as expected, the attention toward the 
limitations and inadequacy in routines and procedures become a part of 
everyday life and practice and are therefore more relaxed. Others (e.g., 
Hollnagel, 2004) point to real-life work processes that are irregular and 
unpredictable in contrast to work regulations—either explicitly by procedures 
and instructions or implicitly by rules, standards, or good practice. Another 
issue arises when these rules are developed detached from the operational 
situations (e.g., in shipping by shore personnel); consequently, accuracy, 
relevance, availability, and workability of the rules may be low. Moreover, 
company policy may favor efficiency over safety. 
As a result, the sharp end operators—when aware of this situation—will be 
able to break the strict rules without fear of sanctions or punishment. On a 
local basis, breaking strict rules may actually get the job done quicker and 
more efficiently. The operator may be “rewarded” for achieving additional 
goals in the organization. During such a process of de-coupling, the 
organization will become increasingly free from global rationality. 
Subcultures with their own logic of action based on experiences and tacit 
knowledge develop, and the operators accordingly drift further away from a 
rule-based system to a more task-based system. 
According to PDM, accidents and incidents occur when the system suddenly 
and stochastically becomes tightly coupled, as with the Bow Mariner, 
Scandinavian Star, and Herald of Free Enterprise. In such situations, the 
involved operators are forced to act on the assumption that all others act in 
accordance with the original rules and procedures initially designed. The 
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operators become trapped in a game in which trusting their own logic of 
actions is the only solution while they must simultaneously base their decision 
on the assumption that others are following the general rules.  
After an unwanted event, the outcome is often even more tightly designed 
control criteria. James Reason describes such an approach to safety 
management as a person-oriented approach, which may also be perceived as 
belonging to a blame culture, implying crew shortcomings as the cause of 
error. With human error cited as the cause of failure, the tendency is for safety 
measures to seek to control human behavior by developing more procedures 
and checklists. When the real cause is found to lie elsewhere in the 
organization, such measures may clearly not be the answer to the underlying 
problem and incidence of failure, and unwanted events will continue to occur. 
Global rules may be perceived as less and less meaningful; thus, constantly 
relying on them will further undermine the safety system as more procedures 
are violated and the local units drift even further apart from global rationality. 
Less reporting of experience data could also be a consequence in the longer 
run.  
3.4 Safety culture and measurable outcome variables 
The IAEA has built its concept of safety culture upon Edgar H. Schein’s 
three-level model and regards safety culture as both attitudinal as well as 
structural relating to both the organizations and the individuals (IAEA, 1991). 
Based on this conceptual definition, INSAG and IAEA regard systematic 
safety management, which belongs to the first layer in Schein’s model (i.e., 
artifacts), as a tool for promoting a strong safety culture and achieving a good 
safety performance. This may be measured in the second layer, espoused 
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values, using a questionnaire survey. The third layer, basic assumptions, may 
be captured by observation. 
Using previous research within the oil industry, Rundmo (1996) demonstrated 
that risk perception and risk behavior are significantly correlated, but also 
relatively independent from each other. The association between risk 
perception and risk behavior is then caused by the fact that the same predictor 
affects both variables. Crew risk perception and other subjective assessments 
are suggested as good indicators of the safety level, but not as predictors for 
risk behavior. It is further suggested that employees’ behavior to a great 
extent is constrained by the conditions under which they work. When the 
working conditions are not perceived to be satisfactory, employees know that 
the occupational risk is higher; they feel more unsafe, which will affect their 
risk perception (Rundmo, 1996). Risk perception as a measurement variable is 
supported by Zohar (1980), who used climate research to assume that an 
individual’s perception focuses on the organizational environment, 
organizational control system, and safety management system. 
Drawing from the Man Made Disaster theory, safety culture is the product of 
cultural beliefs and behavioral norms regarding hazards, which are laid down 
in the organizational control system and thus reflected in procedures and 
guidelines. This is in accordance with Schein (1992, 2004), who regards 
organizational control systems (e.g., safety management systems) as a 
manifestation of basic underlying cultural assumptions. In this respect, 
companies approach to safety management is a manifestation of the 
underlying beliefs and thoughts on how safety management should be 
performed. Pettigrew (1979) relates the cultural concept to how everyday 
tasks and objectives in the organization are expressed as well as their 
meaning, including how the organizational members comprehend the 
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importance of the organizational control system and derived safety measures 
in relation to other directions given by the company. This approach aligns 
with Geertz’s (1973) work referring to the social processes where meaning 
and sense making arise. Social processes are influenced by crew composition 
and human resource policies. Personal beliefs and values are also antecedents 
to behavioral norms. Traditional cultural researchers also regard beliefs and 
values as less changeable as they are acquired through a lifetime and therefore 
deeply rooted within the individual. However, Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) 
argue that beliefs and values learned through an organizational context are 
more changeable as they are acquired at a later stage of life. The 
organizational context and organizational control system are assumed to 
directly impact behavioral norms.  
When managing behavioral norms by means of an organizational control 
system, Kjellen (2000) defined the system as one that provides the 
information needed for safety and signaling related to health and safety 
matters. In this regard, Reason (2001) regarded safety culture as the 
cornerstone for ensuring the information flows as needed. Reason also 
addressed the safety management system as a whole, with regard to how the 
incoming experience data are analyzed and processed into safety measures. 
From this, the state of the safety management system is regarded as a 
measurement outcome variable.  
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4 Research methodology 
This chapter describes the research methods applied in this thesis. Based on 
the discussion in Chapter 3, climate will not be separated from culture, but in 
theory and research methodology the recommendation from both perspectives 
will be taken into consideration. This synthesis of qualitative and quantitative 
methods is regarded as important in order to understand how culture is created 
through social processes while quantitative methods simultaneously say 
something about how widespread certain patterns of behavior and perceptions 
are within the industry and statistical associations. The application of a multi-
method approach is also supported by others. According to Cooper (2000), the 
triangulation of different methods allows the researcher to take a multifaceted 
view of safety culture, so that the interrelationships among psychological, 
behavioral, and situational factors can be examined with a view to establish 
antecedents, behaviors, and outcomes within the specific contexts. 
Triangulation allows the employment of each method’s strengths in order to 
overcome the others’ weaknesses. Both Rousseau (1990) and Schein (1992, 
2004) identified that different layers of culture are amenable to different 
research methods. For example, the fundamental content of culture is assumed 
to be unconscious and highly subjective. The organizational members’ basic 
assumptions, values (what is important), and beliefs (how things work) as 
well as culture’s social construction are difficult to assess without interactive 
probing. Moreover, the organizational members’ fears and defenses are 
difficult to elicit without interaction, which gives reason for an ethnographic 
methodology. On the other hand, the organizational members’ patterns of 
behavioral norms (how things are done) are far more accessible to observation 
from outsiders and respond to structured instruments and quantitative 
methods.  
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According to Geertz (1973), cultural analysis is (or should be) guessing at 
meanings, assessing guesses, and drawing explanatory conclusions from 
better guesses. However, the previously described examples illustrate how 
such guesses might be wrong if not related to individuals’ own experiences 
and national, situational, and/or historical context. Street Corner Society is a 
method of participant observation where becoming native, without being too 
attached, is a part of the research strategy (Whyte, 1991). In accordance with 
Street Corner Society, the researcher lives with the community in order to 
understand the nature of the field, learn to understand the group, and build 
trust and credibility. Whyte also demonstrated how such qualitative studies 
may be expressed and presented in a more quantitative format. Whyte has 
become a major spokesman for the advantages of integrating research 
methods, including those typically associated with quantitative research 
(Bryman, 1991). As such, there is no adversative relationship between cultural 
field studies from an anthropological perspective representing qualitative 
methods and the quantitative methods typically from the psychological 
perspective. 
From the author’s own experience, the ethnographic approach has been 
valuable not only to understand, but to correct misunderstandings. For 
example, when conducting the first field studies, one Philippine mate 
discussed her former Norwegian captain, who refused any crew members to 
whistle on the bridge. Both the Philippine mate and I interpreted this as an 
indication of authoritarian leadership. However, months later, after getting a 
better understanding of seamanship in a national historical context, I found 
that this interpretation was wrong and in fact related to superstition, which is 
quite common among the older generation of seafarers. In the days of sails, 
the seafarers needed wind, and they whistled to call for the wind. Nowadays, 
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with engine propulsion, wind is no longer wanted as wind causes waves. 
Thus, whistling is not allowed as it calls for the wind. In other situations, 
misinformation may be a result of deliberately withholding information as the 
group being researched does not trust the researcher. In another field study, I 
observed that all engine crew wore helmets in the engine room, as required. 
However, after one week at sea, once I had become familiar with the group, I 
learned that usually no one wore their helmets. They only applied the rules 
when they had a third party on board—an outsider. 
Apart from this, also favoring an integrated use of methods, cultural 
interpretation, and theoretical development is suggested to follow its own 
unplanned course in the search of grasping and analyzing “the web of 
significance” and structure of symbols and meaning, plunging more deeply 
into the same ideas. These theoretical formulations do not make much sense 
or hold much interest apart from the context of interpretation. Indeed, a safety 
culture study carried out within the anthropological tradition alone could have 
brought descriptions, interpretations, and understanding of how safety is 
interwoven with symbols and cultural elements on a single vessel or in one 
department. However, the developed theories would not make any sense 
outside that unit. Thus, within the organizational aim of enhancing safe 
operations in general, this approach would not be very useful.  
4.1 Quantitative research and questionnaire survey 
A quantitative design incorporating a questionnaire is used to develop an 
understanding of the manifestation of culture and to give direction for the 
subsequent qualitative studies. In order to grasp the underlying dimension of 
safety culture through the use of questionnaire, a high level of instrument 
quality—namely, reliability and validity—is required.  
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The starting point of every questionnaire is item generation, concerning which 
questions and themes should be included. This stage is also related to content 
validity. Although Hinkin (1995) suggests a strong theoretical framework as a 
starting point, followed by a sorting process allowing for the deletion of 
conceptually inconsistent items, Guldenmund (2007) suggests two different 
approaches for questionnaire development. First, a descriptive model of the 
construct can be used as a starting point—namely, a normative or theoretical 
approach. Second, theories and results of previous research can be used in 
combination to construct a new questionnaire, which is a more pragmatic 
approach.  
However, some inherent difficulties exist in both of these frameworks. First, 
if starting with a theoretical approach, a lack of theoretical consensus may 
result in different themes, scales, and items depending upon the researchers’ 
theoretical stand. Second, as a result of the first point, previous research may 
be difficult to use due to, inter alia, the variety of themes, scales, and items 
used. Moreover, when established theory is derived from empirical research, 
the theory itself may be misleading due to the vast amount of far-from-
validated measurements in use. Hale (2000) perceived part of the problem as 
being induced by the tendency for each researcher to start from scratch by 
developing his or her own instrument. Hardly any scales have been reused in 
the same form in more than one study, and they can therefore not be 
systematically refined and improved by combined research efforts across 
several research groups. It is important to keep in mind that the cultural 
disagreements and differences related to epistemology, ontology, and 
methodology, to a great extent, may explain the many different measurements 
in use.  
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Theory plays a key role in how measurement is conceptualized, and the lack 
of theoretical consensus poses a clear challenge to researchers. Under such 
circumstances, it is especially important to be mindful of measurement 
procedures and development. In addition, it is considered impossible to reach 
theoretical progress without adequate measurement (Hinkin, 1995). As 
described here, the situation within the field is complicated, and some 
important questions are raised regarding whether the methodological 
disagreements derive from a lack of theoretical consensus or if theoretical 
consensus is lacking due to methodological differences and the use of flawed 
measures. In order to overcome some of these problems, a previously 
developed instrument was used in this thesis  
Questionnaire development 
In order to examine safety culture, a questionnaire developed by Studio 
Apertura, a constituent centre of The Norwegian University of Science and 
Technology (NTNU), in collaboration with the Norwegian DNV and the 
research institution SINTEF, was used. Their development was based on a 
theoretical review and an evaluation of eight preexisting questionnaires—four 
developed in Norway, two in Denmark, and two in the United Kingdom. The 
evaluation was carried out according to five criteria: (1) foundation 
(theoretical foundation, documentation, and premises for application), (2) 
thematic width, (3) practical experience of use, (4) the ability to describe and 
measure safety culture, and (5) the ability to be used at multiple levels 
(individual, group, team, company). A more thorough description of the 
development is available (Antonsen & Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige 
universitet. Institutt for sosiologi og statsvitenskap, 2009; SINTEF, 2003; 
Studio Apertura, 2004). The questionnaire was previously used to survey 
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safety culture on board supply vessels and found to be acceptable for use 
within merchant shipping. The full questionnaire and letter of introduction are 
included in Appendix 1. 
Survey sample and respondents’ demographics 
The research population is Norwegian-controlled dry cargo and liquid carriers 
above 500 gross tons. A total of 150 target group vessels were randomly 
selected from the 953 vessels within the Norwegian Shipowners’ 
Association’s list of members for 2005. The target group of 150 vessels 
represented approximately 15% of the overall population, which was 
considered to be large enough to be representative of the population as a 
whole (Neuman, 2000). A sample of 10% is recommended, but some 
withdrawals were expected; thus, a 5% margin was included in the original 
sample. The sample was stratified with regard to status of the vessel’s flag 
register (white, grey, or black listed flag) and type of vessel (general cargo, 
bulk carrier, oil tanker, gas tanker, or chemical tanker).  
Following the initial selection, telephone calls were made to each company to 
ask for their participation. Thirty-one companies, with a total of 83, vessels 
agreed to participate while 45 companies with 67 vessels in total declined. 
Reasons for not participating included:  
 Being unable to contact the company despite repeated efforts (23 
vessels, 16 companies). 
 The vessel was not owned by a Norwegian party and therefore was not 
defined as Norwegian controlled (15 vessels, 8 companies).  
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 Ship management was outsourced to a non-Norwegian country and 
therefore was not defined as Norwegian controlled (14 vessels, 8 
companies). 
 The company refused to participate (12 vessels, 10 companies). 
 The remaining vessels were sold (3 vessels, 3 companies).  
The population was later redefined, and vessels managed from a non-
Norwegian country were not considered to be Norwegian controlled.  
In total, 1,574 questionnaires were distributed to 83 tankers and bulk/dry 
cargo carriers; 76 vessels from 29 companies returned a total of 1,262 forms, 
resulting in an individual response rate of 80.2%, a vessel response rate of 
91.5%, and a company response rate of 93.5%. The questionnaires were 
returned from 40 liquid bulk carriers (liquid tanker) and 36 dry bulk carriers 
(dry cargo); 63% of the respondents were employed on a liquid tanker and 
37% on a dry cargo vessel. Twenty-two nationalities were represented, with 
the majority from the Philippines (65.5%), followed by Norway (9.2%), 
Poland (8.1%) and Russia (5.5%). Unfortunately, no company with vessels 
flying a black-listed flag was willing to participate. 
The further validation process (results are included in the articles in part II) is 
based on the following premises and methodological guidelines. 
Validity and reliability through theoretical conceptualization 
The starting point when developing a questionnaire and scales is conceptual 
definition, which specifies the theoretical basis. A questionnaire is normally 
comprised of several dimensions or constructs represented by several partly 
overlapping items, called multidimensional scales. When generating the item 
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pool, each item making up a construct should reflect the latent variables 
underlying the theme (i.e., the different features or dimensions of the safety 
culture concept). In order to truly reflect the underlying feature, the items in 
each dimension should ideally have a common cause (i.e., local management) 
or consequence (i.e., work practices). Thus, an underlying assumption is that 
the items reflecting one single construct are unidimensional. In other words, 
within each measured dimension, items are strongly associated with each 
other while simultaneously representing a single dimension of the concept. 
Three reasons for using a multi-item measure instead of a single-item measure 
are noted. First, an individual item is not reliable due to a considerable 
random measurement error. Second, an individual item lacks precision and 
can only categorize people into a relatively small number of groups. Third, an 
individual item lacks scope, and it is very unlikely that a single item may 
represent a complex theoretical concept (DeVillis, 2003; Gliem & Gliem, 
2003; Hair, 1998; Shevlin, Miles & Bunting, 1997; Spector, 1992). Summing 
up, single items are considered to be less valid, less accurate, and less reliable 
than multi-item constructions. It is also suggested that a scale should consist 
of a minimum of three items in order to be robust (Pett, Lackey & Sullivan, 
2003). However, due to collinearity, the use of multiple items could represent 
a problem in regression models and when independent variables are created 
by summing items in a scale. Such an additional method represents a 
procedure that does not control for the effect of measurement error. 
Regression parameter estimates may be attenuated or increased (Shevlin et al., 
1997).  
When ensuring the conceptual definition, the primary concern is content 
validity, which is a requirement for construct validity (Hinkin, 1995). Content 
validity is the degree to which elements of the measurement are relevant to 
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and representative of the underlying safety culture concept. Determining 
whether the scale or item-set has good content validity can be done from a 
number of sources of relevant theory, empirical literature, and expert 
judgment. Construct validity concerns the degree to which inferences can 
legitimately be made from the operationalized constructs in the questionnaire 
to the theoretical concepts on which those operationalizations were based. 
When using multidimensional scales, both the convergent validity of the 
respective subscales (i.e., the degree to which the items within a particular 
subscale measure the same unidimensional construct) and their discriminant 
validity (i.e., the degree to which the items in different subscales measure 
different rather than the same construct) need to be considered. Both content 
and construct validity are concerned with how the measurement fits with the 
theoretical foundation and power of generalization—namely, external 
validity. When the objective of a study is to establish a causal relationship 
(i.e., using regression analysis), internal validity is of particular consideration, 
referring to the confidence placed on the assessed cause-effect relationship. 
The internal validity of the conclusions reached depends on the reliability and 
validity of the questionnaire or scales used (Neuman, 2000; Raubenheimer, 
2004). 
Other aspects that should be taken into consideration are whether the items are 
measuring a perception or an attitude. Perceptions are considered more 
volatile and mostly oriented toward the current workplace conditions, whereas 
attitudes are considered to be less open to change, more durable, and 
developed through experiences both inside and outside the workplace. Cooper 
(2000) cautions against the use of measurements that include attitude scales 
due to the risk of muddying the construct. Previous research has shown that 
attitudinal questions have more positively skewed responses than the 
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perceptional questions and may therefore influence the analytical results. 
Moreover, Cooper (2000) indicated that the mix of attitudinal-perceptual 
questions is one explanatory reason that different factor structures emerge 
across research groups. 
Measurement errors threaten the validity of the conclusion about the 
relationship between the constructs. Method bias has both a systematic and a 
random component, with the systematic error in particular being considered a 
major problem. One source of method bias is apparent when the same 
measurement is used for all constructs, making it difficult to assess the 
strength of the bias. The direction also varies, and the observed relationships 
may be either inflated or deflated. Potential sources of common method biases 
are produced by a common source or evaluator (e.g., social desirability, 
consistency motive acquiescence, or positive and negative affectivity) 
whereas method effects are caused by an item’s characteristics (i.e., 
complexity, ambiguity, scale format, and negatively worded items). Method 
effects are caused by item context produced by the measurement context 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). Podsakoff et al. (2003) presented several approaches 
to addressing this problem. However, others regard the common method 
biases as an urban legend, claiming that the supposed effect on correlations is 
overstated (Spector, 2006). Spector (2006) further pointed to the fact that, as 
long as there is uncertainty related to the presence and size of a possible bias, 
applying methods, inter alia statistical methods, in order to control the bias 
effect might produce biases itself, as one might control for something that 
does not exist. However, being aware of the possible problems makes it easier 
to consider them during the process of developing a valid measurement. 
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Validity and reliability through factor analysis 
When data are collected, factor analysis is a common method for validation of 
the questionnaire’s conceptual definition. Factor analysis defines the 
underlying structure of the interrelationship (correlation) between the 
variables in the questionnaire data by defining a set of common underlying 
dimensions known as factors. However, not only do the constructs share that 
they are facets of the same concept, but correlations could also be—due to 
similarities in measurement—common source and/or common method 
(DeVillis, 2003; Podsakoff et al., 2003). If the data are not biased, the 
extracted factors comprise internally consistent and correlated items that 
externally differ from the other factors. Thus, the extracted factors are 
assumed to have discriminant and convergent validity. The convergent 
validity is further assessed by the means of scale analysis and inter-item 
statistics.  
For the method of factor analysis to be appropriate, a certain sample size is 
required. Preferably, the sample size should be 100 or larger. As a general 
rule, it is suggested to have at least five times as many observations as there 
are variables to be analyzed. Some even propose 20 cases for each variable. 
Small sample sizes or low variable-case ratio lead to higher chances of 
“overfitted” data (i.e., deriving factors that are sample specific with little 
generalizability) (Hair, 1998). Hair (1998) also pointed out that correlations in 
small samples could be deemed significant and appear in the factor analysis 
just by chance. In addition, if no items are substantially correlated, factor 
analysis is not applicable. The method’s applicability is commonly tested by 
Barlett’s test of sphericity, which should be significant, and Kaiser-Mayer-
Olkin (KMO), which should exceed 0.60 (Hair, 1998). 
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Factor analyses can be done from an exploratory or confirmatory perspective. 
Exploratory techniques are often more useful early in the validation process, 
while confirmatory techniques are far more common when the instrument in 
question has been previously validated. The most common method for 
extracting factors is Principal Component Analysis (PCA), which is 
considered suitable when the research purpose is data reduction or 
exploration, but should not be used in causal modeling. When the research 
purpose is theory confirmation and causal modeling, Common Factor 
Analysis (CFA) (e.g., Principal Axis Factoring [PAF]) is most suitable (Hair, 
1998). An important tool for interpreting factors is factor rotation (Hair, 
1998). Varimax rotation is the most common method for interpretation. 
However, the varimax rotation method, which belongs to the group of 
orthogonal rotation techniques, may be problematic to use. Orthogonal 
techniques assume that the underlying factors are independent, but from the 
theoretical perspective dimensions of, for example, safety culture, they are not 
regarded as independent but as an integration of various sub-facets. To 
validate a questionnaire, CFA is recommended with an oblique rotation 
technique. Oblique techniques allow for correlation between factors and are 
preferable when the researcher’s aim is to obtain several theoretically 
meaningful factors or constructs (Field, 2005; Hair, 1998; Pett et al., 2003). 
Moreover, confirmatory analysis is recommended when the final objective is 
structural equation modeling (SEM) analysis (Hoyle, 1995).  
Each item’s, or variable’s, “fit” with the underlying dimension is represented 
by factor loading. Factor loadings range from 1 to -1; the closer to 1, the 
better the representation of the underlying dimension. The definition of a 
significant loading depends upon the sample size. A small sample size 
requires higher loading than a large sample. In addition, variables’ 
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communalities should be assessed. Communality refers to the total amount of 
variance an original variable shares with all other variables included in the 
factor analyses. Variables with low loadings and low communalities should be 
considered for deletion (Hair, 1998). By one rule of thumb in CFA, loadings 
should be 0.7 or higher to confirm that independent variables identified a 
priori are represented by a particular factor. However, such high loadings (≥ 
0.70) are not typical, and real-life data may not meet this criterion. Thus, 
some researchers—particularly for exploratory purposes—use a lower level 
such as 0.4 for the central factor and 0.25 for other factors (Raubenheimer, 
2004). On the other hand, factor loadings must be interpreted in light of 
theory and their practical significance, not by arbitrary cutoff levels alone. In 
addition, items with multiple significant loadings at various factors should be 
deleted, as this is a sign of multidimensionality (Hair, 1998) and, thus, not 
discriminant valid. In a multidimensional scale, it is recommended that a 
minimum of three items load significantly in each factor. The more items 
there are per factor, the more likely is it that the factor will replicate as 
originally constructed (Pett et al., 2003; Raubenheimer, 2004). When using a 
validated questionnaire, the extracted factors should be similar to the 
theoretical construct as operationalized.  
Factor correlation analysis is often done in order to check construct validity, 
which is viewed as the extent to which an operational measure truly reflects 
the underlying safety culture concept as well as whether it operates in a 
consistent manner.  
Validity and reliability through scale analysis 
Various statistics can be selected in order to estimate the reliability of scale 
and items, including alpha models, split-half models, Guttman models, and 
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parallel and strict parallel models. Cronbach’s alpha is extensively reported as 
the most commonly accepted measure for internally consistency reliability 
(Hinkin, 1995; Shevlin, Miles, Davies, & Walker, 2000). Internal consistency 
(convergent validity) is statistically tested by Cronbach’s alpha coefficient 
and inter-item statistics. Although no consensus exists with regard to the 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient, usually a value above 0.7 is considered 
acceptable, although some advocate for a level of 0.8 or better, especially 
when a new scale is being evaluated (Netemeyer, Sharma & Bearden, 2003; 
Raubenheimer, 2004). Others suggest that when dealing with psychological 
constructs, values below even 0.7 can, realistically, be expected because of 
the diversity of constructs being measured (Field, 2005).  
Although high reliability is generally cited as evidence of good psychometric 
properties of a scale, it is noted that Cronbach’s alpha value on its own should 
be used with caution (Shevlin et al., 2000). The value depends upon the 
number of items in the scale and is a function of, inter alia, the inter-item 
correlation and the item-total correlation. Thus, the inter-item statistics should 
also be examined. Inter-item statistics, or convergent validity, are related to 
the extent to which different scale items assumed to represent a construct 
converge on the same construct. Convergent validity is the degree to which 
multiple attempts to measure the same concepts agree, which may be tested 
by the item-total correlations. Rules of thumb suggest that the item-total 
correlation should exceed 0.5 (Hair, 1998) or 0.4 (Field, 2005) and the inter-
item correlation should exceed 0.3 (Hair, 1998), but not 0.8. An inter-item 
correlation exceeding 0.8 suggests that items are duplicates of one another 
(Pett et al., 2003). Moreover, Shevlin et al. (2000) argued that a high estimate 
of Cronbach’s alpha may indicate the presence of systematic error, such as 
scales deviating from unidimensionality. In such cases, extraneous variables 
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can make a substantial contribution to inflating the Cronbach’s alpha value 
rather than the actual dimension being measured. Indeed, when the factor 
loadings of the dimension being measured are low, the presence of systematic 
errors can greatly inflate the estimate of Cronbach’s alpha, especially with 
large sample sizes (Shevlin et al., 2000). These findings substantiate the 
importance of reporting item statistics so that the presence of 
unidimensionality can be evaluated, along with factor loadings and cross 
loadings.  
Causal relationship through structural equation modeling 
Structural equation modeling (SEM) is applied to test the causal relationship 
between the components deriving from factor analysis. Through SEM 
analysis, it is possible to estimate multiple and interrelated dependence 
relationships. SEM is focused on testing causal processes inherent in theory. 
Moreover, this method has the ability to represent unobserved concepts, as 
safety culture, in these relationships and account for measurement error in the 
estimation process (Hair, 1998). The structural relations between tested 
variables are specified with both a theoretical and empirical foundation. 
SEM is an extension of both factor analysis and regression analysis. The 
method serves purposes similar to multiple regressions, but in a way that takes 
into account the modeling of interactions, nonlinearities, measurement error, 
and correlated error terms. SEM also considers when the independent 
variable(s) as well as the dependent variable are measured with multiple 
indicators, such as when extracted using factor analysis. Hence, the 
advantages of SEM compared to multiple regressions include more flexible 
assumptions. SEM analysis also opens up the possibility to explore multiple 
relationships simultaneously, where regression analysis only examines a 
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single relationship at the time, holding all other variables constant (Hair, 
1998). 
The final model is evaluated with goodness-of-fit criteria assessing the overall 
model. Assessing the goodness-of-fit is not as straightforward as with other 
multivariate dependence techniques (e.g., multiple regressions) as no single 
test best describes the “strength” of the SEM model. Instead, a number of 
goodness-of-fit measures have been developed; when used in combination, 
the results are assessed from three perspectives: overall fit, comparative fit to 
a base model, and model parsimony. However, there is no consensus of what 
accurate levels of fit are, as none of the measures (except the chi-square 
statistics) have an associated statistical test. According to Hair (1998), several 
guidelines have been suggested, but ultimately each researcher must decide 
whether the model fit is acceptable (Hair, 1998).  
4.2 Qualitative research design  
The term qualitative research refers to any kind of research that produces 
findings not arrived at by means of statistical procedures or other means of 
quantification. Although some of the qualitative data may be quantified, as 
with census data, the analysis itself is a qualitative one (Strauss & Corbin, 
1990). The most prominent qualitative research techniques employed in this 
study are: (1) document study, (2) case studies, (3) interviews, (4) 
participatory observation, and (5) participation in maritime forums. 
Document study 
Document study is an indirect method of data collection that does not require 
participation of the subjects involved. Official maritime accident investigation 
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reports (CPEM, 1999; Danish Maritime Authority, 2009; Justis-og 
politidepartementet 1991; National Transportation Safety Board, 1990; United 
States Coast Guard, 2005) are studied in order to understand how safety 
culture, safety management, and context interact and influence the course of 
events.  
In addition, administrative safety management documentation has been 
studied in the four different companies selected for the case study (further 
information about these cases follows). This includes safety meeting minutes, 
reported events, root cause analyses, procedural manuals and checklists, and 
other available relevant documentation. Analyses were performed with the 
intention of understanding the companies’ approaches to safety management 
and priority areas. Of particular interest were safety information data 
analyses—namely, how the experience information was categorized and their 
approach to identifying causes in cases of near-miss, incidents, and accidents. 
Such analyses occurred with reference to the previous mentioned ages of 
safety and to which degree technical, personal, and underlying organizational 
causes were identified. The analyses were also seen in relation to safety 
measures and changes done upon the processed information—namely, if 
changes aimed at introducing more control in the form of procedures and 
checklists or if changes were done in other levels of the organizational 
structures and policies (e.g., manning policies). This part of the document 
analysis was complemented with interviews.  
The document studies have given valuable insights into understanding how 
safety culture, safety management, and context interact and influence 
accidents. These studies also provided a better understanding of shipping 
companies’ approach to safety management. They have enabled the study of 
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past events and issues to identify changes over time; however, some 
limitations exist. The documents are not representative; therefore, findings 
cannot be generalized. Which documents were made available depended upon 
each company; thus, a full comparative study between cases could not be 
performed. In addition, all documentation should be considered as biased as it 
represents the view of its authors (Sarantakos, 1998) 
Case studies 
Case study research involves studying individual cases—in this case shipping 
companies—in their natural environment for a long(er) period of time, 
employing a number of methods of data collections and analyses. Four case 
studies were carried out in two tanker companies and two dry cargo 
companies. The statistical results from survey data analyses were used as 
criteria for selecting cases and focus area—namely, mixed crew nationality 
and ship management. Thus, a better understanding of the structure, 
processes, and complexities underlying the statistical results were achieved. 
Administrative document studies (as previously described), interviews, and 
participatory observation were performed along with seminar participation. 
The information gathered is used to illustrate, explain, and expand the 
quantitative findings. However, some of the drawbacks with case study as a 
method are poor representativeness and poor replicability (Sarantakos, 1998).  
Interviews 
In contrast to document studies, interviewing requires direct interaction with 
the respondents and heavily relies on their involvement, participation, and 
contribution. Both formal and informal interviews were performed. Open 
formal interviews were carried out with shore-side personnel working in 
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selected case companies within the department of safety management and/or 
manning. When available, top-level management was also interviewed. The 
interview process had to be adapted to the subjects’ availability; thus, 
individual interviews were conducted in some cases and group interviews in 
others. The scope of the interviews also changed over time as a better 
understanding of the industry was acquired. Therefore, the first interviews are 
more superficial in character then the last. All interviews were recorded. 
When interviewing the sailing personnel, a more informal and ethnographic 
approach was selected. Safety issues, behavioral norms, violation of 
standards, and the like are sensitive issues. Most crews are not Norwegian and 
do not enjoy fixed employment; thus, many fear losing their job from being 
open about the situation. Most interviews conducted in the field studies were 
done as a part of daily conversations after a trusting relationship had been 
established. None of these interviews were recorded. 
Participatory observation 
Participatory observation at sea was also carried out. During the study, vessels 
from various companies sailed for different periods of time, ranging from one 
to two weeks.4 During the field studies, I participated in daily work activities 
such as ballast tank cleaning, mooring operation, loading, and acting as watch 
keeper at night. However, in a 24-hour society, leisure time is also of great 
importance. During my spare time, I participated in leisure activities and 
games. I experienced that spending time with the crew was essential to 
                                                     
4 The shipping industry is known to be a highly transparent industry. Thus, to ensure that all participants 
remained unidentifiable, the number of vessels sailed is not included.  
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gaining their trust, and the first days no questions of a more sensible character 
were asked. When interacting with the crew, informal interviews were carried 
out as part of the daily conversation. Both interviews and observations aimed 
to understand how the ship management influenced the work on board and to 
understand team and group processes from within the group. Although the 
crew knew about my research area in more general terms, research questions 
were never explained in detail to avoid biases.  
Participatory observation has the advantage that group processes and 
management practices may be observed in their natural environment. In 
addition, it is possible to retrieve firsthand information that respondents are 
unable or unwilling to offer during formal interviews (e.g., deliberate 
violations of safety standards). However, one limitation is that participatory 
observation can only be employed with smaller groups; thus, findings cannot 
be generalized. Although behavior is directly observed, the method does not 
offer frequency of behavior. The method is also exposed to observer bias, 
selective perception, and memory and offers no control measure regarding 
bias, attitude, and opinion of the observer. In particular, the latter were 
experienced during the field study, especially when working with lower-paid 
crew from the third world originating from poor conditions. I had much 
empathy for this group. Being aware of my own bias gave me some control 
over the situation in order to remain objective. 
Participation in maritime forums 
Participation in maritime forums and seminars as a method was used for two 
reasons: (1) to gain an understanding of the maritime context and 
interrelationships and (2) to ensure quality assurance of results. Inspired by 
William Foote Whyte and the Street Corner Society, an ethnographic 
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approach was adopted to gain an understanding of the research area and build 
up credibility and trustworthiness. As a part of this, the maritime aspects 
became integrated into my own social life as well as my research. Early in the 
study, I reallocated myself from my institute’s economical and administrative 
department, where I was originally employed, to the department of nautical 
sciences. Along the road, I also became chairman of the Nautical Institute 
Norway Branch, an international organization working to improve the safety 
and efficiency of shipping. I then became an official member of the 
Norwegian delegation participating in IMO meetings. Thus, by carrying out 
research at the maritime industry, I became a part of the industry itself.  
Several presentations of my results have been given at national and 
international conferences, both for governmental and non-governmental 
industrial stakeholders and company conferences. Feedback from the 
audience has been used to interpret statistical results and define critical areas 
for further investigation. As with participatory observation, going native 
was—and still is—an area of concern. 
4.3 Applied methods and statistics in articles 
An overview of methods for data collection and statistics applied in the 
different papers is presented in Table 2. Although not explicitly stated in all 
articles, all quantitative results are interpreted in a qualitative framework. 
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Table 2.  
Overview of Methods for Data Collection and Statistics 
  Article Id. 
Data collection  1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Maritime document study  x x x x x x 
 Field study at sea  --- --- x x --- x 
 Shore interviews  --- --- x x --- x 
 Maritime/safety related conference attendance  --- --- --- x --- x 
 IMO attendance  --- --- --- --- --- x 
 Survey comments  x --- x --- --- x 
 Survey quantitative data  x x x x x x 
Analysis        
 Exploratory factor analysis (EFA)  x x x x x x 
 Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA)  x --- --- --- --- --- 
 Cronbach’s alpha  x x --- --- x --- 
 Correlation (Pearson’s r)  x x --- --- x --- 
 Inter-item, item-total statistics  x x --- --- x --- 
 Analysis of variance (ANOVA)  --- x --- --- --- --- 
 Linear regression analysis  --- x --- --- --- --- 
 Logistic ordered regression analysis  --- --- --- --- x --- 
Development of factors used in analysis        
 Summarized items from extracted factor 
structure 
 x x --- --- --- --- 
 Transformed standardized factor scores  --- --- --- --- x --- 
 Summarized items based on theoretical 
relationship 
 --- --- x x --- x 
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5 Research results 
This section summarizes each article, including the objective, applied method, 
main results, conclusions, and interrelationships. All articles are related to the 
three research questions developed for the purpose of this thesis: 
 What characterizes safety culture and safety management within the 
shipping industry? 
 What is the relationship between safety culture and safety performance 
within the shipping industry? 
 What characterizes shipping companies’ application of the safety 
management concept? 
Finally, a structural model testing the causal relationship among the latent 
dimensions of safety culture is presented. 
5.1 Summary and results of article 1 
Oltedal, H. A., & Engen, O. A. (2009). Local management and its impact on 
safety culture and safety within Norwegian shipping. In S. Martorell, C. 
Guedes Soares & J. Barnett (Eds.), Safety, Reliability and Risk Analysis: 
Theory, Methods and Applications (pp. 1423-1430). London: Taylor & 
Francis Group.  
The objective of this article was threefold: (1) explore and analyze the 
shipboard characteristics of safety culture; (2) elaborate upon which factors 
affect the shipboard safety culture; and (3) use the results to set the direction 
for future studies. The first two objectives are stated in the article.  
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The article first states the theoretical approach to safety culture, along with the 
methodological framework. Safety culture is perceived as a reciprocal 
interrelated fusion of three main elements. The first element is internal 
psychological factors, including each individual’s attitude and perception 
toward safety, work situation, and organization. This element was measured 
using a questionnaire. In addition, formal and informal interviews were 
performed to get a more comprehensive understanding of what is happening 
inside people’s heads. The second element is observable safety-related 
behavior, or what individuals are actually doing on board. Safety-related 
behavior, which is perceived to be partly determined by the first element (i.e., 
psychological factors), was also measured by a questionnaire, in which 
individuals reported their own behavior in working situations. In addition, 
participatory field studies were conducted to observe actual behaviors. 
Behavioral patterns are regarded as a manifestation of shipboard culture and 
of a culture existing on a higher level in the organization (i.e., organizational 
factors). Finally, the third element is organizational factors (e.g., employment 
policy, safety management policy, approach towards efficiency versus safety), 
which were measured by case studies and interviews. However, the 
questionnaire also comprised questions related to organizational factors. In 
this approach, the contextual influence is also important. Distinctive 
characteristics of the shipping context are, inter alia, life and work on board as 
a total institution and a 24-hour society. 
A mixed method approach was applied, where retrieved data were integrated 
into the interpretation, although this was not explicitly stated in the article. 
Consequently, psychological measures traditionally referred to as safety 
climate and safety culture traditionally explored by qualitative methods were 
not distinguished. In this article (and the others), statistical data were all 
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interpreted in a qualitative framework. It was recommended that the 
questionnaire not be used as a single method; thus, it was referred to as a 
safety culture questionnaire.  
The statistical approach was based on a combination of exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analyses, using the method of principal component. The 
exploratory factor analyses were carried out with orthogonal varimax rotation. 
In the confirmatory factor analysis a one-factor solution on each construct was 
performed. Based on a comparison of the exploratory and confirmatory factor 
analyses, five factors were found to be valid: (1) crew interaction, (2) 
reporting practices, (3) competence, (4) local management, and (5) working 
situation (proactive work practices).  
The qualitative data indicated that the shipping companies’ crewing strategy, 
which includes employment terms, rotation systems, and policy toward 
shipboard management, are interrelated with how safety culture is manifested 
on board. Considering seafaring as a 24-hour society and the geographical 
distance between the on-shore organization and the vessel may affect both the 
quality of those systems and plans developed on shore and their 
implementation on the vessels. Thus, ship management was identified as a 
key factor to a sound safety culture along with the on-shore crewing strategy.  
5.2 Summary and results of article 2 
Oltedal, H., & Wadsworth, E. (2010). Risk perception in the Norwegian 
shipping industry and identification of influencing factors. Maritime Policy & 
Management, 37(6), 601-623.  
Based on the findings from the first article, the second paper aimed to assess 
the relationship among shipboard safety, safety culture, and shore-based 
Research results 
81 
organizational factors, using risk perception as a proxy variable for the 
general safety level on board. The objective of this article was to assess the 
relationship between risk perception and the dimensions of safety culture.  
With regard to assessing the relationship between risk perception and safety 
culture, the article introduced risk perception as a dependent variable, thereby 
expanding the trinity methodological framework presented in the first article 
(i.e., person, behavior, and situation) with a measurable dependent variable. 
Risk perception has been found to be adequate as a dependent variable, as 
previous research indicates that risk perception and risk behavior are strongly 
correlated. It is suggested that risk perception is a good indicator for safety 
level in general, which is constrained by the situation and context. 
Explorative principal component analysis with varimax rotation was applied 
in order to explore the latent dimensions of safety culture. Eight factors were 
identified, providing a good representation of the concept of shipboard safety 
culture: (1) competence, (2) interpersonal relationship (crew interaction), (3) 
shore orientation, (4) ship management (local management), (5) proactive 
work practices, (6) feedback, (7) demand for efficiency, and (8) reporting 
practices. Furthermore, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was carried 
out to explore any associations between the demographic (nationality, age, 
department, and vessel type) and organizational (work description) variables 
as well as both dependent variables (i.e., risk perception and the independent 
safety culture dimensions). A linear regression analysis (OLS) was 
subsequently conducted to assess the associations between risk perception and 
the dimensions of safety culture, controlling for any potentially influential 
demographic and organizational factors.  
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Based on the results, the overall safety in respondents’ working situations was 
perceived to be very high, which may indicate a relatively good safety 
standard. The ANOVA analysis showed significant differences between age 
groups in the dimensions of interpersonal relationship and shore orientation. 
The type of vessel indicated significant differences on the dimensions of 
competence, local management, and feedback. Those working on dry cargo 
vessels perceived the feedback on reported experience data to be better than 
those working on liquid tankers. However, those working on liquid tankers 
had a better perception of their own level of competence and their local 
management than those working on dry cargo vessels. Finally, work 
description (i.e., teamwork versus individual) showed significant differences 
on all dimensions of safety culture. Crews working on a team perceived the 
dimensions of competence, interpersonal relationship, local management, 
feedback, and reporting practices to be better than those working on an 
individual basis. Crews working on a team also felt less demand for efficiency 
and perceived the shore side of the company to be more safety orientated. 
The regression analysis indicated that local management, working practices, 
and reporting practices have a positive association with risk perception while 
demand for efficiency has a negative association with risk perception. The 
working situation has a positive association when work is performed on a 
team in contrast to when work is performed on an individual basis. None of 
the demographic data were significantly associated with risk perception. 
For future research, it was suggested to further examine the characteristics of 
teamwork along with the concept of group identity. It would also be of 
interest for future research to examine risk perception both in general and in 
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relation to potential differences among nationalities, along with differences 
among white, grey and black listed flags of registration. 
Given that the overall research topic in the current thesis concerns safety 
management on dry cargo vessels and liquid tankers, the remaining articles 
address safety management within dry cargo vessels and liquid tankers in 
greater detail, starting with liquid tankers. The third article also suggests 
differences with regard to safety management within the two sectors. 
5.3 Summary and results of article 3 
Oltedal, H. A. (2010). The use of safety management systems within the 
Norwegian tanker industry—Do they really improve safety? In R. Bris, C. 
Guedes Soares, & S. Martorell (Eds.), Reliability, Risk and Safety: Theory 
and Applications (pp. 2355-2362). London: Taylor & Francis Group.  
The aim of this article is twofold: (1) describe safety management within the 
liquid tanker sector and (2) identify factors that influence safety management 
performance.  
The theoretical rationale of traditional safety management systems was 
introduced for the first time in this article. Traditional safety management was 
presented as a system containing four sub-systems: (1) reporting and 
collection of experience data from the vessel; (2) data processing, 
summarizing, and analysis; (3) development of safety measures; and (4) 
implementation. The topic of focus was presented in a situational context 
where safety concerns need balance to ensure profits and economical 
concerns. Safety management as such is related to the International Safety 
Management (ISM) code. This article was the first to explicitly state that it 
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adopted a multi-method approach combining surveys, case studies, field 
studies, interviews and other qualitative information, although all the 
concerned articles are based on a multi-method approach. 
With regard to the statistics and factor analysis, the survey items were 
grouped as they relate to the information flow in a safety management 
systems—more precisely: (1) crew’s reporting practices, (2) analysis and 
follow up by shore side, (3) procedures and checklists, and (4) perceived 
balance between commercial pressure and safety concerns. Explorative 
principal component analysis was carried out in each group in order to 
examine the items’ interrelationships. Shore-side development of safety 
measures was also analyzed, although most findings stemmed from the 
qualitative data.  
The results indicated a situation with substantial underreporting of experience 
data from the vessels. Such underreporting may be explained by the crew’s 
fear of negative consequences, a complicated reporting system, and a lack of 
understanding of the overall safety management system. The development of 
measures tends to focus on controlling human actions, often in the form of 
excess use of procedures and checklists. This situation was traced back to a 
person-oriented approach in safety management. Moreover, procedures and 
checklists are often perceived as being problematic to use in daily shipboard 
operations. In order to turn such a situation around, it was suggested that the 
seafarers’ experience be taken seriously, with regard to both reasons for 
underreporting and their experience with new measures. On board, the ship 
management was identified as a factor strongly influencing the shipboard 
situation, and it is suggested that the shore side pay more attention to that 
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element. Other organizational factors that were suggested to influence the 
situation included employment conditions and crew stability.  
5.4 Summary and results of article 4 
Oltedal, H. A., & Engen, O. A. (2010). Tanker versus dry cargo—The use of 
safety management systems within Norwegian dry cargo shipping. In J.M. 
Ale, I.A. Papazoglou, & E. Zio (Eds.), Reliability, Risk and Safety (pp. 2118-
2125). London: Taylor & Francis Group. 
As the overall research topic in the current thesis concerns safety management 
on both dry cargo vessels and liquid tankers, this article focused on safety 
management within the dry cargo sector in order to compare the findings with 
the liquid tank sector. The aim of this article was to (1) describe safety 
management within the dry cargo industry, (2) identify factors that may 
influence safety management performance, and (3) compare the current 
situation within the dry cargo to the liquid tanker industry. This was the first 
article to provide a description of the two sectors (i.e., liquid and dry cargo) 
with the purpose of conducting comparative exploration and analysis. The two 
sectors were introduced in order to make each sector’s major safety 
challenges visible. 
This article served as a follow-up to the third article and, thus, followed a 
similar structure related to the information flow of a traditional safety 
management system. Although a multi-method approach was applied, only 
areas in which statistical data were available for both sectors were presented 
and analyzed—namely, (1) crew’s reporting practices, (2) procedures and 
checklists, and (3) perceived balance between commercial pressure and safety 
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concerns. An explorative principal component analysis was carried out at each 
group in order to examine the items’ interrelationships. 
This article pointed to a central custom-related difference between the two 
sectors. Although customers of dry cargo shipping have fewer safety-related 
requirements, the tanker sector is extensively embedded in the Norwegian oil 
industry, which explains the extended focus on safety in general, safety 
management, attitudes, etc., within the tanker industry compared to dry cargo. 
Underreporting of minor incidents and near misses are more present within 
the dry cargo industry. In both sectors, reporting frequency is correlated with 
feedback given upon reported events. Although both sectors have substantial 
underreporting, our data indicated that the safety campaigns, which are typical 
for the oil industry, have some positive effects on reporting practices. 
However, within the dry cargo industry, such feedback is perceived as better 
than within the tanker sector. The analysis suggested that the shore tanker 
organization is not prepared to manage the growing workload that increased 
reporting brings about. The organization fails to obtain feedback’s motivating 
effect, which again may counteract the effect of safety campaigns. However, 
it was suggested that the dry cargo industry could benefit from such 
campaigns when it comes to increasing crews’ awareness and recognition of a 
near miss, along with a better understanding of reporting’s importance in 
safety-management systems. It was recommended that the shore side provide 
resources for the potential increase in number of reports placed and proper 
follow-up. When following up the reports, the development of new measures 
should also be considered carefully, and alternatives to the development of 
new procedures should be developed. The experiences from the tanker 
industry suggested that the development of a constantly increasing, detailed, 
and extensive procedural system may undermine safety. Moreover, the 
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analysis suggested that safety measures be initiated by internal and industrial 
need, not external demands from the customer. When externally initiated, 
safety management may be less integrated into the operational part of the 
organization. It was also suggested that this external demand is related to the 
existence of a poor procedural system. 
Both the third and the fourth articles pointed to a situation with substantial 
underreporting of experience data. Reporting is regarded as a critical 
cornerstone in formal safety management. Some influencing factors were 
suggested, and the fifth article further assessed the relations among reporting 
practices, safety culture, and organizational factors. 
5.5 Summary and results of article 5 
Oltedal, H., & McArthur, D. (2010). Reporting practices in merchant 
shipping, and the identification of influencing factors. Safety Science, 49(2), 
331-338.  
This article pursued three aims: (1) assess the relationship between reporting 
practices and safety culture, (2) explore the influence of familiarity with local 
managers, and (3) further explore differences between vessel type (i.e., liquid 
and dry cargo).  
Reporting practices are regarded as a cornerstone when working with 
systematic safety management, and this article was the first to statistically 
explore factors affecting reporting practices. A review of safety research 
within the maritime sector indicated that—although underreporting of 
experience data is regarded as a major problem within the industry—little 
research has been done. With a foundation in both theory and results derived 
Research results 
88 
from research within other high-risk sectors, barriers to experience data 
reporting were summarized in the following categories: (1) fear of 
disciplinary action or of other people’s reactions; (2) risk acceptance, where 
incidents are regarded as a part of the job or unpreventable; (3) useless, as 
reporting does not lead to any changes; and (4) practical reasons like time 
pressure or a complicated reporting system.  
In the statistical analysis, explorative principal component analysis with 
varimax rotation was carried out, followed by a scale reliability analysis. 
Seven factors were extracted and found to be valid, reflecting crews’ 
perceptions of (1) their own competence, (2) interpersonal relationships 
among the crew, (3) shipboard management, (4) work practices, (5) feedback 
on reported safety information, (6) shore orientation to safety, and (7) 
perceived demand for efficiency. An ordered logistic regression was then 
carried out in order to explore the relationships between extracted factors and 
reporting practices. In the analysis, the dependent variable reporting practices 
were measured with four possible outcomes: (1) never/seldom, (2) sometimes, 
(3) often, and (4) always.  
The results indicated that high competence, a good and open interpersonal 
relationship among the crew, safety-oriented management, execution of 
proactive work practices, and feedback on reported events all increase the 
odds of being in a higher category of the reporting frequency measure. On the 
other hand, shore orientation downgrading safety and prioritizing efficiency 
increase the odds of being in a lower category of the reporting frequency 
measure. With regard to feedback, vessel type, and management, the effect of 
these variables is dependent on the category of the dependant variable. The 
effect of both vessel and feedback is larger when moving between the higher 
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categories. Crews who have been working with their closest manager for more 
than one year tend to report more often. However, the effect of being familiar 
with one’s superior is larger when moving between the lower categories.  
None of the identified factors should be addressed in isolation from each 
other. As followed from the discussion, they are all important and mutually 
dependent. Thus, the internal relationship between the identified dimensions 
of safety culture should be further explored using, for example, structural 
equation modeling and/or path-analysis, as performed in this thesis.  
5.6 Summary and results of article 6 
Oltedal, H., & Engen, O. A. (2011). Safety Management in Shipping—
Making sense of limited success. Safety Science Monitor, submitted 
This article sought to (1) explore the gaps between the safety ambitions (in the 
form of, e.g., rules and procedures) and operational practice on board and (2) 
identify possible pitfalls when relying on safety through a system perspective 
(as described in articles three through five), without focusing on its human 
interrelationships. 
A multi-method approach combining surveys and case studies, including field 
studies and interviews, was applied. Previous articles (i.e., three through five: 
Oltedal, 2010; Oltedal & Engen, 2010; Oltedal & McArthur, 2010) all pointed 
to substantial weaknesses in current safety management; thus, this article 
explored the theoretical rationale behind traditional safety management. 
Normal Accident Theory (NAT) and High Reliability Organization Theory 
(HRO) were outlined, with an emphasis on how they explain and make sense 
of safety, risks, and accidents. The conceptual framework of the Practical 
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Drift Model (PDM), which seeks to combine NAT and HRO and explain why 
seemingly well-regulated organizations (e.g., within shipping), develop traits 
that may evolve into big accidents and disasters, was applied. The PDM 
model allows us to look for possible new explanations of the success and 
failure of safety strategies. In an effort to question what the scientific safety 
literature has offered to make sense of the gaps between safety ambitions and 
the practical outcome, some examples of gaps from our own data were 
examined more closely.  
The structure of the article followed the four stages of the PDM model, with 
each stage being supported by qualitative and quantitative data. (1) Design 
refers the stage in which organizational managers or designers develop 
extensive routines and procedures in order to make the organization robust 
and resilient against attacks and unforeseen events. (2) Engineered refers to an 
operational situation in which the routines and procedures are first applied and 
experienced to not always match the real situations. (3) Applied refers to 
situations in which the designed control measures are substituted with a logic 
of action based on individuals’ experiences and tacit knowledge. (4) Fails 
refers to a situation of change (e.g., major unforeseen event such as ship 
collisions), when individual units are forced to act on the assumption that all 
others are acting in accordance with the original rules and procedures as they 
were initially designed. The actors are then trapped in a game where trusting 
their own logic of actions is the only solution while they must simultaneously 
base their decision on the assumption that others are following the general 
rules.  
The article concluded that the industry could gain from abandoning the 
person-oriented approach, where control measures are designed to control 
human actions, often in the form of the excess use of procedures and 
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checklists. These measures developed through a traditional safety 
management system are standardized to fit all—whether in a fleet of 5 vessels 
or 100 vessels. This creates a paradox when confronting actual work 
situations, where operations are never the same. The vessels are different, the 
people, constellations of people, power figurations, weather and so on. A 
standardized measurement will therefore never align with reality. Yet human 
actions and deviations are compared to the standard and found to be 
erroneous. In an attempt to gain control, new and even more detailed 
measurements may be developed, thereby creating a vicious cycle resulting 
from the anxiety of not being in control. Organizations should abandon such 
person-oriented approaches in their search for causal and influencing factors.  
5.7 Causal  relationships  between  components  of 
safety culture 
In order to test the multidimensionality of the theoretical safety culture 
construct, a first-order confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was carried out, 
resulting in six dimensions that were found to be a reliable reflection of the 
safety culture concept: (1) company orientation, (2) local management, (3) 
crew interaction, (4) competence, (5) proactive working practices, and (6) risk 
perception. All dimensions and their interrelationships were further discussed 
in articles number 1 (Oltedal & Engen, 2009), number 2 (Oltedal & 
Wadsworth, 2010) and number 5 (Oltedal & McArthur, 2010) and are briefly 
presented below. 
Company orientation reflects the crew’s perception of the shore organization. 
A high score indicates that the company has a reactive approach and statistics 
are a major concern, whereupon the crew perceives the safety work to be a 
façade. A low score indicates that the company is proactive and cares about 
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the human consequences of hazardous situations, whereupon the crew 
perceives the company’s safety work to be a real priority area.  
Competence reflects the crew’s perception of their own training and ability to 
work safely and handle critical and hazardous situations. A high score 
indicates that crews see themselves as having a high level of competence in 
these areas; a low score indicates a low competence level.  
Local management reflects crew’s perception of their closest manager as a 
role model as well as the manager’s engagement and interest in ensuring 
safety in work operations. A high score indicates good safety management; a 
low score indicates poor safety management. 
Proactive work practices reflect performance of proactive activities, such as 
safe job analysis and hazard identification, as well as how safety is prioritized 
in daily operations. A high score indicates that proactive work practices are 
performed on a regular basis, whereas a low score indicates the infrequent 
performance of proactive work practices.  
Group interaction reflects the relationship amongst the crew, including their 
problem-solving abilities, form of communication, and sharing of safety 
information. A high score indicates the presence of a good interpersonal 
relationship amongst the crew, whereas a low score indicates that the on-
board group interaction is poor.  
Risk perception is an indicator related to the onboard safety and the crew’s 
own assessment of the probability that they or any other crewmembers will 
have an accident on board the vessel during the next 12 months. A high score 
indicates a low probability of an accident to occur; a low score indicates a 
high probability that an accident will occur. 
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In the SEM structural model (see Figure 4) the latent dimensions of safety 
culture are tested for causal relationships. Postulated causal relationships are 
grounded in both theory and empirical results. The hypothesis is that the 
shipping company’s orientations toward safety at the shore side of the 
organization influence the safety culture on board the vessel; thus, company 
orientation towards safety is set as an exogenous variable. The outcome 
measurement variable is represented by the crew’s overall risk perception. 
Each path was analyzed and evaluated; paths with no significant effect were 
removed from the model. 
 
Figure 4: Structural model testing for validity of causal structure 
All paths in Figure 4 are reasonable and consistent with the theoretical 
construct. The model shows a good fit (RMR=0.044, CFI=0.957, and 
RMSEA=0.052). The root mean square residual (RMR) represents the 
average residual value derived from the fitting of the variance-covariance 
matrix for the tested hypothesized model. In a well-fitting model, this value 
will be small (0.5 or less). The Comparative Fit Index (CFI) is a measure of 
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complete covariation in the data. CFI ranges from zero to 1.00, with values 
close to 0.95 being advised. The root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA) takes the error of approximation in the population into account. 
RMSEA values of less than 0.05 are indicative of a good fit between the 
hypothesized model and the observed data. RMSEA values as high as 0.08 
represent reasonable errors of approximation (Byrne, 2010). The standardized 
regressions weighted (Stand. Reg.) together with significance value (P) are 
presented in Table 3. 
Table 3.  
Standardized Regression Weights and Significance Value of Structural Model 
Dimension of safety culture Stand. Reg. P 
Local management. <--- Company orientation -.390 *** 
Crew interaction. <--- Local management. .494 *** 
Competence <--- Local management .169 *** 
Competence. <--- Crew interaction. .575 *** 
Proactive work <--- Local management .300 *** 
Risk perception <--- Company orientation -.256 *** 
Risk perception <--- Crew interaction. .131 *** 
Risk perception <--- Local management .122 .002 
Proactive work 
i
<--- Competence .233 *** 
Proactive work <--- Crew interaction. .194 *** 
 
Standardized total effect of each latent variable is further presented in Table 4. 
Standardized total effect is the sum of each latent dimension’s direct and 
mediated effect.  
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Table 4.  
Standardized Total Effects  
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Local management -.390 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .152 
Crew interaction -.193 .494 .000 .000 .000 .000 .244 
Competence -.177 .453 .575 .000 .000 .000 .456 
Risk perception -.329 .187 .131 .000 .000 .000 .151 
Proactive work 
practices 
-.195 .501 .328 .233 .000 .000 .362 
 
The results from the SEM analyses indicate that company orientation has a 
direct effect upon the performance of local management on board the vessel  
(-.390) as well as a direct effect on the general risk perception (-.256). When 
safety work in the company is not perceived as a genuine effort, local 
management is perceived as being less safety oriented while the risk level on 
the vessel is generally perceived to be higher. Management/leadership style, 
commitment, and visibility are also among the most commonly measured 
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dimensions in safety research in general (Flin, Mearns, O'Connor, & Bryden, 
2000). Within the maritime sector, research initiated by the Maritime and 
Coastguard Agency in the United Kingdom identified various core leadership 
qualities necessary for effective safety leadership (Maritime and Coastguard 
Agency, 2004). On board, these qualities were primarily geared toward the 
captain as a key leader of safety, but also toward lower ranks with leadership 
responsibilities. 
Local management demonstrated a direct effect upon the competence 
dimension (.169), proactive work practices (.300), risk perception (.122), and 
crew interaction (.494), suggesting that local management plays a major role 
in the development of safety culture on board. Proactive work practices 
increase the chances of revealing potentially dangerous situations; thus, 
preventive measures should be introduced in advance of operations. Error 
detection and correction are also assumed to be stimulated by teamwork 
(Kontogiannis & Malakis, 2009). The relationship between local management 
and company orientation (-.390) indicates that the company is the driving 
force for how management is performed. The relationship between company 
orientation and local management is one directional, indicating that 
experiences from shipboard management do not influence the overall 
company policy. Likewise, management-relationships are one directional, 
indicating that the management is not adapted to the shipboard situation—an 
individual is either a good manager or he/she is not. Traditionally, no 
requirements concerning formal management competence or training have 
been established within shipping. Such requirements were recently adopted by 
amendments of the STCW convention, which will put into force on January 1, 
2012. 
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Furthermore, competence has a direct effect on proactive work practices 
(.233), indicating that well-informed crews trained to handle risk are better in 
performing proactive work practices. However, quite surprisingly, proactive 
work practices have no direct effect on the general level of risk perception. 
Competence includes both training acquired on board the vessel and training 
acquired on shore. Also included are the orientation new crew members 
receive when joining the vessel, which is often referred to as familiarization 
and safety-related drills carried out on board. Within safety research, 
competence is among the top five most commonly measured themes (Flin et 
al., 2000). Minimum training requirements are covered by international 
conventions and regulations developed by IMO, with parts are required to be 
performed onboard. For example, every crew member must participate in at 
least one abandon ship and one fire drill every month. These drills should, as 
far as practicable, be conducted as if there were an actual emergency 
(International Convention for the Safety of Life as Sea, 1974, International 
Maritime Organization, 2009). On board, the captain and the ship 
management are ultimately responsible for how such drills—as well as other 
onboard training arrangements—are carried out. 
Finally, crew interaction has a direct effect upon the competence dimension 
(.575), proactive work practices (.194), and risk perception (.131). This 
relationship is also one-directional; thus, crew interaction is suggested to be a 
driving force when it comes to how onboard competence-increasing activities 
are performed as well as proactive work practices. The relationship between 
local management and crew interaction is one directional, suggesting that 
management plays a major role in how crewmembers interact, but 
management does not adjust its style to the crew’s characteristics and 
dynamics. A trusting relationship is regarded as a key factor in forming a 
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safety culture (Reason, 2001). The importance of group interaction and 
teamwork has also been suggested as influencing accidents to a greater extent 
than individual unsafe acts (Barnett, Gatfield & Habberley, 2010; Mitropoulos 
& Cupido, 2009). 
5.8 Summing  up  and  presentations  of  main 
conclusions 
The main conclusions drawn from the research indicate that the shore side of 
the company is the driving force for onboard safety culture. Thus, undesirable 
onboard working practices may be traced back to shore-side organizational 
decisions. The onboard conditions are influenced by the shore side in three 
ways: (1) the organization’s manning policy (e.g., contract arrangements, mix 
of nationalities, and rotation systems), which establish the premises for the 
cultural development; (2) the approach to safety management, which lay the 
foundation for the reporting culture and system efficiency; the industry to a 
large degree is person oriented, with excessive use of standardized measures; 
and (3) shipboard management has a major mediating influence as the shore-
side organization’s contribution as a support function sets the stage for 
shipboard management performance. All three areas are further discussed in 
the following chapter. 
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6 Discussion 
This chapter presents a discussion of the overall results from all articles 
included in this thesis. The discussion is related to the research questions 
given in the introduction: 
1. What characterizes safety culture and safety management within the 
shipping industry? 
2. What is the relationship between safety culture and safety performance 
within the shipping industry? 
3. What characterizes shipping companies’ application of the safety 
management concept? 
At the international level, safety management within shipping is carried out 
through the delegation of authority from the UN to IMO, delegating 
responsibility for developing and maintaining workable safety regulations. 
Each coastal state is responsible for the enforcement of maritime regulations, 
while each flag state is responsible for ensuring compliance with international 
regulations. The results of this study indicate that the structure of the 
administrative authorities has some deficiencies as some maritime 
administrations may be involved in shipping activities without fulfilling their 
safety responsibilities. In many instances, they are unable to detect real safety 
threats on board when performing inspections. However, the shipping 
companies have the primary responsibility for the safe operations of ships and 
the welfare of the crew. Safety management is regulated through the ISM 
Code, which was developed by the IMO. One of the intentions behind the 
ISM Code has been to develop a safety culture within shipping. Study results 
indicate several deficiencies related to both the industry’s application of safety 
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management and the underlying theoretical rationale. It is important to 
emphasize that there are variations within companies. 
Articles 3 and 4 indicated that the application of safety management in 
relation to culture is associated with two areas. First, safety culture is 
associated with a reporting culture. A vessel with a high reporting frequency 
is regarded as having a good safety culture. Reporting emphasizes what has or 
could have gone wrong, while experience data and suggestions for 
improvement are less emphasized. This restricts the crew’s ability to learn and 
improve. The qualitative results point to several situations where less serious 
episodes (e.g., a misallocated knife) has been reported while more serious 
episodes (e.g., gas on deck) have not. Reasons for not reporting include fear 
of being blamed by the ship management or shore organization. The review of 
investigation reports shows that human error is still identified as the major 
cause of maritime accidents, which impedes the possibility of revealing 
underlying organizational causes. An inherent intention of the ISM Code was 
to move the shipping industry application of safety management from the age 
of human factors to the age of organizational factors. This study indicates that 
the application of the code still operates within the era of human errors, 
resulting in safety measures aiming to control human performance through 
procedures and checklists. Second, a safety culture is associated with 
compliance with the developed safety measures, but without questioning 
whether or not the given safety measures are adequate for the situation. 
Depending upon the type of operation, the crew is expected to relate to safety 
directives given not only by their own company, but also by the operator, 
charterer, and customer. In many instances, these directives are not applicable, 
are incompatible, or do not reflect the onboard operation. Better integration of 
operating personnel’s experience and expertise could improve this situation as 
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safety measures in some cases are developed by people with no seagoing 
experience. The overall study results indicate that such weaknesses are related 
to the shore side of the organization. The SEM analyses support the 
relationship between shore-side and shipboard practices. In his thesis, Soma 
(2005) found that safety is a quality of the ship owner rather than the vessel.  
Within the industry—especially within the liquid tanker sector—reporting and 
compliance are attempted by safety campaigns aimed at altering the crew’s 
attitudes. However, according to the theoretical discussion, personal attitudes 
are less amendable by such means. Despite the campaigns, the results indicate 
that a substantial underreporting of experience data occurs. It could be time to 
focus attention on shore-side personnel. Launching safety campaigns aimed at 
shore-side personnel would enable them to gain a better understanding of their 
own roles as a support function and how their practice affects operational 
practice—not only with regard to safety management per se, but also 
concerning the influence of other parts of the organization (e.g., commercial 
pressure and crew resource management). 
Another drawback is standardization. Measures are generally standardized to 
fit all vessels within a company fleet. The shore personnel fail to understand 
the diversity created by situational circumstances in operations, crew 
constellations, the vessel’s technical condition, and so on. Accordingly, the 
crew bypasses the problem with standardization and develops their own 
deviating working practice. In particular, article 6 dealt with this subject. 
These processes may be seen in relation to Snook’s theory of practical drift 
(Snook, 2000). Formal instructions given by the company are complied with 
on paper, but onboard the vessels working practices are adapted to the 
situation. However, as the crew at this point uses their experience and tactical 
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knowledge to ensure safe operations, deviations from standardized procedures 
should not uncritically be put on par with unsafe operations.  
The standardization of safety measures is necessary in relation to crew 
organization and lack of crew stability. Life and work on board are known to 
be a highly formalized, hierarchical, and authoritarian organization, with a 
clear chain of command, clear communication lines, levels of authority, and 
clearly defined tasks and activities that are more or less the same on all vessel. 
Such organization makes it possible to handle crew as changeable 
components. Indeed, within the industry, such an organizational structure is 
necessary in order to handle the lack of crew stability. However, the lack of 
both crew stability and standardization may be problematic for other safety 
reasons as well. A lack of crew stability may be a barrier to change, and safety 
management is all about change—changes of work practices and attitudes and 
others; thus, crew may not see the benefit of their efforts. By the time 
necessary changes are highlighted, crew have most likely signed onto another 
vessel, where they might experience the same problems. Shipboard 
management may be problematic as the ship’s management is not familiar 
with each crewmember’s capabilities and limitations; by the time they finally 
get to know them, the crewmember changes vessel. Finally, crewmembers 
lack familiarity with the specific ship, the rest of the crew, and the 
management. The influence and importance of crew stability is discussed in 
articles 1, 3, 5, and 6. Crew stability also relates to team dynamics; article 2 
indicates that the onboard safety level is perceived as better when work is 
performed as a team. 
The overall study results further identified the onboard management as a 
driving force. Management and leadership as mediating factors have support 
in climate research from Zohar (1980), who found management’s attitude to 
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be of major importance in fostering a safe work environment. This is also 
supported by cultural research done by Pettigrew (1979) and Schein (1992, 
2004), who both regard individuals (entrepreneurs and leaders, respectively) 
as important in the processes of creating and managing an organizational 
culture. In articles 2 and 5, ship management was statistically associated with 
risk perception and reporting practices. The shipboard management is 
responsible for implementing prevailing regulations and company policies. 
The SEM analyses demonstrated that local management has a direct effect 
upon all shipboard dimensions of safety culture and that the quality of the 
shipboard management is influenced by the shore side of the company. 
Evidence indicates that the ship officers are getting dual instructions regarding 
safety performance as well as demand for efficiency from other parts of the 
organizations. Thus, safety and efficiency are balanced in daily operations, 
where efficiency and corner-cutting activities are rewarded in absence of 
accidents, but are simultaneously identified as causal factors when accidents 
occur. Ambiguous instructions from shore should be counteracted by a strong 
shipboard management. However, according to the results, few ship managers 
have formal management and leadership education. In addition, shipboard 
management is not evaluated by crewmembers on a regular basis. By 
recognizing the importance of ship management, the company should provide 
support in order to ensure adequate onboard management and leadership—for 
both the crew and the shore side. 
Shipping companies’ understanding of safety management has also resulted in 
more administrative work, which makes less time available for attention to 
operations. The constant development of new procedures increases the 
system’s complexity as defined by Perrow (1999), resulting in the industry 
becoming increasingly prone to accidents. The work situation is less easy to 
Discussion 
104 
understand when the procedural framework does not fit the situation and 
when each procedure is not internally coordinated with the overall framework. 
With reference to Perrow (1999), fewer procedures may simplify the system 
characteristics and increase resilience. To this end, an understanding of when 
standardized measures and procedures are appropriate should be reached. This 
is not to suggest that standardized measures and procedures should be 
completely abandoned. However, the crew should be able to trust their 
relevance and applicability, which relates to the casual rationality inherent in 
safety management systems along with limitations of foresight.  
Safety management as described by the ISM code is based upon causal 
rationality, where attempts are made to prevent future events by reflecting 
upon previous experiences. However, insufficient scientific evidence exists on 
the effectiveness of systematic safety management to make recommendations 
either in favor of or against them (Robson et al., 2007), which may be related 
to their application. As pointed out by Rundmo (1996), the application of 
traditional safety management is questioned with a distinction between small-
scale accidents and larger and more infrequent accidents (Rundmo, 1996). 
Measures developed through the analysis of past events are in theory only 
applicable for frequent and small-scale accidents, such as ordinary work 
accidents. When it comes to medium-size and larger and more infrequent 
accidents, traditional safety management is not considered to be applicable. 
Such accidents are often too unique and complex to grasp or to single out 
some isolated underlying causes. When the course of event is unclear, it is 
difficult to develop measures that cover all involved risk as the risk in the first 
place is considered too complex to be fully understood. This highlights the 
second point: the limitation of the foresight of future events. The study results 
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indicated that the shipping industry does not differ sufficiently between these 
types of events and, thus, applies the same logic independent of type of event. 
The results from the study point to a situation in which serious accidents are 
on the rise, despite the introduction of the ISM Code and systematic safety 
management. This can also be seen in relation to the different ages of safety 
and the recent development of an adaptive age. The adaptive age of safety is 
characterized by a shift from reliance on systems supported by safety culture 
to operations. The focus on operations is also in accordance with the theories 
of HRO and mindfulness. When recognizing the limitations of safety 
management systems and safety rules, which attempt to control human 
behavior, it is proposed that adaptive cultures should be embraced (Borys et 
al., 2009). Consequently, resilience engineering requires a change in 
perspective from human variability as a liability and in need of control to 
human variability as an asset in a situation getting out of control, thereby 
making it important for safe operations. Embracing variability as an asset 
challenges the comfort of management and, thus, may meet resistance from 
the industry. However, with reference to the standardization and development 
of global rules, the industry could ask whether they are made for comfort and 
to simplify the work for shore personnel or to support safety in daily 
operations. A consequence of safety management is to shift the focus to how 
crew is coping in daily operations under constantly shifting circumstances as 
well as learn from their adaption processes. This should also be seen in 
relation to the fact that most of the time, when crewmembers adapt, the 
operations are still performed in accordance with the super-eminent objectives 
(Hollnagel, 2009). In order to follow such an approach, the crew should be 
able to trust in the applicability of procedures and the safety measures that 
ought to be in place. Second, crewmembers should have the possibility to 
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develop skills, competences, and tactical knowledge in order to handle any 
unexpected, infrequent situations that cannot be prevented through traditional 
safety management and standardized measures. Third, when things do go 
wrong, organizations should remove themselves from a person-orientated 
approach in which operators are blamed. 
Safety culture encompasses not only what is done at the operational level, but 
also at all levels in the company. In order to improve safety, companies 
should look for influencing factors derived from organizational structures and 
policies. The shipping industry is known to employ crewmembers from 
various nationalities through manning agents located in each country, without 
giving the crewmembers a fixed company employment, thereby resulting in 
instability. With this in mind, one might question if some of the vessels do 
have a (safety) culture at all as they lack stability in the group. Without 
structural stability, they have not been given the possibility to develop the 
deeper and less conscious levels of cultural patterns and sense making; nor do 
they have the possibility to develop the experience and tactical skills 
necessary to handle new and emerging unexpected situations as their efforts 
are orientated toward making sense of what is unfamiliar—namely, new crew, 
new power relations, new social constructions, and the like. The study results 
indicate that loose conditions of employment affect the overall safety 
management system (e.g., in the form of more underreporting of experience 
data due to fear of negative consequences and a lack of trust). By changing 
such a manning strategy, the company could have better possibilities to create 
a positive safety culture and build competence so that the crewmembers have 
better premises for handling unsafe situations. 
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7 Concluding remarks 
This chapter includes a discussion of the major limitations for the thesis with 
regard to methods and measurements. Suggestions for future research and 
implications are also addressed. 
7.1 Methodological limitations 
The major methodological limitations concern the validity of the 
questionnaire and sample characteristics. The questionnaire did not show the 
ability to cover all aspects of the safety culture concept, which is a limitation 
affecting the overall validity of the study. Due to low reliability, several items 
and constructs were excluded from the further statistical analysis. One 
explanation is poor representative reliability across subpopulations or groups 
of people (Hair, 1998; Neuman, 2000). It may be fair to assume that some 
groups (e.g., Norwegian employees or senior officers) are better informed 
about their company’s strategic and tactical management and operations and, 
therefore, are better placed to answer some of the questions related to the 
company. A second issue concerns the constructs itself. DeVillis (2003) 
focused on the fact that the items constituting a construct or dimension should 
share a common cause or consequence. Some of the questionnaire constructs 
did not meet this latter requirement. 
Biases could also be produced by national differences, languages, and 
response style. In a cross-national study, Harzing (2005) found that English 
language survey versions tended to be more homogenized, potentially 
obscuring cross-national differences. McCrae (2001), who studied 
Norwegians and Filipinos, did not find such differences. Given that 
questionnaire language could potentially bias the results, the questionnaire 
was also made available in Norwegian, Polish, and Tagalog. Taking this into 
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consideration, cross-cultural comparisons of results are not performed in the 
current study. In addition, indicated differences at the organizational level 
(e.g., between type of vessel and employment terms) should not be 
overestimated. 
The survey data are representative of vessels flying a white and grey flag 
only, as those registered under a black listed flag did not want to participate. 
As participation was voluntary on behalf of the company, it is assumed that 
those participating do, in general, emphasize safety in their operations; thus, 
the results are biased in a positive direction. Moreover, the survey data are 
only representative of members of the Norwegian Shipowners’ Association.  
The possibility exists that the results are subject to the common method bias 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003) due to the data deriving from a common source (e.g., 
a common scale for different questions). Potential statistical remedies have 
been suggested. Spector (2006) is skeptical of the merits of such approaches. 
He argued that—given that it is not possible to know the existence or extent 
of any possible bias—treating it could in fact introduce more bias than what 
existed in the first place. He recommended using a multi-method strategy so 
that results do not rely exclusively on the results of one questionnaire. In the 
current research, case studies, interviews, participatory, and field studies were 
used to validate the data.  
As with the survey data, a question of validity arises to the qualitative data. In 
order to be certain that the elements of culture identified by qualitative 
methods, Hopkins (2006) recommended consulting the members of the 
culture. If the members of the culture fail to recognize the description of their 
culture, the description must be called into question. Accordingly, all results 
in this thesis were also presented to several people working within the 
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industry; they expressed that they believe the results to be giving an accurate 
representation of the situation. 
7.2 Theoretical limitations 
The principal objective of this thesis has been to examine the role of safety 
culture for safety management and vice versa. Limitations also follow from 
the theoretical stand and research perspective. By focusing on cultural 
influences on safety management, other areas of equal importance give way. 
Research with other perspectives (e.g., professional culture, national culture, 
or a sociotechnical approach) would bring about different results. For 
example, technological changes have unquestionably left their mark on both 
operational safety and the organizational structure of the industry. The 
shipping industry has, since the early 1960s, steadily adopted the automation 
and integration of new technology (Alderton, 2004). Yet despite the 
introduction of new technology partly intended to increase safety by, for 
example, reducing human error, new technology may also be the cause of new 
and emerging risk (Schager, 2008). This could be a mismatch between 
ergonomic aspects and the human information processing system, 
overreliance in technology that may fail, loss of operational skills and 
experience necessary for handle critical and unexpected situations, or changes 
in the social and organizational system.  
7.3 Future research 
With estimation that 75% to 96% of marine casualties are caused by some 
form of human error (Anderson, 2003; Rothblum, 2000; Wagenaar & 
Groeneweg, 1987), human error is possibly overemphasized as a causal 
explanation for accidents at sea. Research on organizational and structural 
factors in shipping accidents indicates that the human element is identified as 
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a causal factor without addressing the relationship to underlying 
organizational and structural factors. Still, the need exists to trace the human 
factors to conditions resulting from decisions taken at higher organizational 
levels (IMO, 2010b). A new investigation into accident reports can possibly 
identify other organizational and structural factors related to shipping 
accidents. If reviewed and analyzed according to, for example, the accident 
model developed by James Reason (2001), latent organizational influences, 
local workplace factors, preconditions for unsafe acts, and unsafe acts can be 
identified. With new findings discussed in light of theories developed by 
Snook (2000) and Hollnagel (2009), among others, alternative explanations 
can be put forward, such as how frontline personnel make sense of 
organizational safety communications and adapt their work practices through 
social relations and psychological mechanisms, thereby moving safety 
management and research into the new era of the adaptive age (Borys et al., 
2009; Hollnagel, 2009; Snook, 2000). The adaptive age embraces adaptive 
cultures and resilience engineering and requires a change in perspective from 
human variability as a liability and in need of control to human variability as 
an asset and important for safety. Efforts could also be made to better identify 
and measure the social processes among workers, along with further 
exploration of the relationship among management, leadership, and safety-
related matters Thus, better insights into how behavioral norms interact with 
and are formed by the social life on board could be achieved. 
7.4 Final remarks 
This thesis has explored the safety culture and safety management within 
shipping in relation to current theories of safety management and safety 
culture. The major limitations of the research along with implications for 
Concluding remarks 
111 
safety practitioners and researchers—previously addressed in this thesis—can 
be summarized as follows. 
Survey: Parts of the applied questionnaire showed several deficiencies, and 
results may be biased due to common method, psychometric properties, 
language, and characteristic with the sample, which may affect the validity of 
the conclusions. Future research should strive to develop an instrument in 
order to reduce such biases. 
Research model: The strengths and limitations of both qualitative and 
quantitative research should be acknowledged, and future research should be 
open to a multi-method approach. 
Safety researcher: As the theories of safety management are developing over 
time, safety researchers should strive to develop a better understanding of the 
limitations of current safety management systems and be open to research 
within the prevailing adaptive age. 
Safety practitioners: In practical applications of safety management, one 
should rely less on safety through standardized measures and experience data. 
This includes understanding the difference between events where such 
measures are applicable and unexpected events where it is adequate to support 
competence-promoting activities so that the operators have the ability to adapt 
their behavior to new situations. The human inferential capacity in handling 
unexpected situations should not be underestimated in relation to technology. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we will discuss the safety culture 
within the Norwegian shipping industry with tankers 
and bulk carriers, and identify which organizational 
factors may affect this particular safety culture.  
In Norway, shipping has for several centuries 
been the principal trade, and Norway as a maritime 
nation has roots way back in the Viking age. Today 
Norway is one of the five largest shipping nations in 
the world, after Greece, Japan, Germany and China. 
In the third quarter of 2007 the Norwegian foreign-
going fleet comprised 1,795 ships, the highest 
number ever in Norwegian history, of which about 
49 percent are flying under the Norwegian flag 
(Nærings- og handelsdepartementet 2007). The 
remaining 51 percent may register in any of the 
world's more than 150 flag states. Norwegian 
shipping companies employ some 57,000 seamen 
from more than 60 different nationalities and of 
which about 30 percent are Norwegian 
Nationals(Norwegian Shipowners' Association ) The 
crew may be recruited and managed by the shipping 
company itself, or by one of the world's many 
professional crew hiring companies. Within the 
Norwegian fleet, most sailors are contract-
employees working on different vessels during each 
enrolment, which results in continually shifting 
working groups. The situation today is a result of a 
structural change dating back to the 60s and 70s 
when technical development allowed for bigger 
vessels with more automation and monitoring, along 
with the need for reorganization to improve 
efficiency. This resulted in a cut in the crewing 
level. Later in the 80s a global recession caused 
further structural changes; flagging-out, use of 
external crewing agencies and  signing on crew from 
developing countries and lower wages (Bakka, 
Sjøfartsdirektoratet 2004).  However, the shipping 
industry is today facing new manning related 
challenges as there is a global shortage of 
manpower, this is due to three main challenges: 
First, it is less attractive nowadays to work in the 
shipping industry. Second, the recruitment for ship 
crews has been slow. This has resulted in the third 
situation where the liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
shipping sector is drawing crew from the tanker 
industry, and the tanker industry in turn is drawing 
people from the dry bulk sector. 
In 1894 the British Board of trade carried out a 
study which showed that seafaring was one of the 
world's most dangerous occupations, and it still is 
(Li, Shiping 2002). Regulations in order to reduce 
the risk at sea were introduced about 150 years ago. 
These regulations initially encompassed measures to 
rescue shipwrecked sailors, and further requirements 
for life-saving equipment, seaworthiness and human 
working conditions. Traditionally the safety work 
has focused on technical regulations and solutions 
even though experience and accident statistics 
indicate that most of the accidents at sea somehow 
were related to human performance (Bakka, 
Sjøfartsdirektoratet 2004). However, a few very 
serious accidents at sea that occurred in the late 80’s 
resulted in a change towards how safety was 
organised, and more focus was given to the human 
barriers and how the seafarers’ working conditions 
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were affected by organisational and managerial 
factors – both on shore and at sea. Along with this 
the term safety culture started to gain a foothold also 
within shipping. The idea of safety culture within 
shipping was officially introduced on the 4th 
November 1993 by the adoption of a new resolution, 
the present SOLAS Convention 1974 Chapter IX, 
entitled “Management for the Safe Operation of 
Ships and for Pollution Prevention”, also known as 
the International Safety Management Code (ISM 
Code) (Le Meur 2003). 
 
Hence, the main purpose of this paper is to 
elaborate the following questions: 
 
− What characterises safety culture on tankers and 
bulk carriers? 
− Which factors affect the safety culture on board 
vessels? 
 
With reference to shipping, this article will more 
concretely analyse crewing strategies such as 
outsourcing of crewing management and the 
extended use of contract employment instead of 
permanent employment. Our hypothesis is that these 
conditions may contribute to an unfavourable and 
error-inducing working environment, i.e. poor 
communication between shore management and the 
ship management and the remaining crew, 
unworkable procedures, lack of loyalty to the 
organisation, dysfunctional interaction, fear of 
reprisals, which again counteract the development of 
a safety culture.  
2 APPROACH TOWARDS SAFETY CULTURE 
There seems to be no clear consensus concerning the 
ontological, epistemological, and methodological 
questions related to the topic of safety culture. The 
main differences seem to be  
 
 
(1) Definition of the scope of safety culture and the 
relationship between culture and climate.  
(2) Which methods are regarded as most suitable for 
measurement.  
(3) The relationship to other organisational (safety-
related) aspects (Cooper 2000, Guldenmund 2000, 
Neal, Griffin & Hart 2000, Peterson, Ashkanasy & 
Wilderom 2000, Sorensen 2002, Yule 2003).  
 
 
However, it is not the scope of this paper to 
problematise the concept of safety culture. As a 
point of departure we will apply Schein’s definition 
of organisational culture: 
“A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the 
group learned as it solved its problems of external 
adoption and internal integration, that has worked 
well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to 
be taught to new members as the correct way to 
perceive, think and feel in relation to those 
problems“(Schein 2004).  
Further we have decided to use a methodological 
framework presented by Cooper (2000), and the 
application of this framework will be discussed 
below. Cooper (2000) introduces a reciprocal model 
of safety culture that allows the multi-faceted and 
holistic nature of the concept to be fully examined 
by using a triangular methodology approach, 
depicted in figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Reciprocal safety culture model (adopted from 
Cooper, 2000) 
 
 
Cooper’s (2000) model contains three elements:  
 
 
(1) The subjective internal psychological factors i.e. 
attitude and perceptions.  
(2) Observable on-going safety related behaviour.  
(3) The organisational situational features.  
 
 
According to Cooper (2000) these elements reflect 
those accident causation relationships found by a 
number of researchers, such as John Adams, Herbert 
William Heinrich and James Reason. The 
investigation of several serious shipping accidents 
such as Herold Free Enterprize (Department of 
Transport 1987), Exxon Valdes (National 
Transportation Safety Board 1990) and 
Scandinavian Star (Justis- og politidepartementet 
1991)is also congruent with their findings. The 
Herold Free Enterprize accident was partly caused 
by members of the crew not following best practice, 
but was also due to managerial pressure from the 
organization’s upper level to sail as early as 
possible, along with other mistakes made by the on-
shore management. Two years later when the US 
tanker “Exxon Valdes” grounded, the accident 
investigation determined several probable causes 
linked to human errors induced by managerial faults 
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in the upper levels of the organisation. At the vessel, 
the third mate failed to properly manoeuvre the 
vessel, possibly due to fatigue and excessive 
workload. The master failed to provide a proper 
navigation watch, possibly due to impairment from 
alcohol. At the onshore part of the organisation, the 
shipping company fails to supervise the master and 
provide a rested and sufficient crew for the “Exxon 
Valdez”. In addition to this effective pilot and escort 
services were lacking. The following year, in 1990, 
there was a fire on the passenger liner "Scandinavian 
Star". In the aftermath of this accident the 
investigation brought into focus organisational and 
managerial faults with regard to a lack of 
competence and training, but also weaknesses in the 
wider social-technical system. These weaknesses 
consisted of ownership separated from management, 
unsatisfactory control routines by the flag state and, 
in general, an overall maritime system with a lack of 
transparency. Further, Cooper’s (2000) three 
elements will be outlined more in detail, starting 
with safety related behaviour. 
2.1 The importance of safety related behaviour 
Herbert William Heinrich work (published in 1931 
Industrial Accident Prevention) is the basis for the 
theory of Behaviour-Based Safety (BBS), which 
holds that as many as 80-90 percent of all workplace 
accidents are caused by human error and unsafe acts 
(Tinmannsvik, 2008). Schein’s (2004) definition of 
culture does not clearly address observable 
behaviour patterns, but behaviour is regarded to be 
partly determined by a person’s perceptions, feelings 
and thoughts. However, Schein (2004) regards 
behavioural patterns as a manifestation of a culture 
existing at a higher level in the organisation, and not 
as culture itself. When it comes to BBS, the current 
theories posit that safety culture, and a reduction of 
accidents may be achieved through continuous 
attention to three domains:  
 
 
(1) Environmental factors such as equipment, tools, 
physical layout procedures, standards, and 
temperature.  
(2) Person factors such as people’s attitudes, beliefs, 
and personalities.  
(3) Behaviour factors, such as safe and at-risk work 
practices, referred to as the Safety Triad (Geller 
2001).  
 
 
When adopting this approach humans are seen as a 
cause of accidents, whereupon interventions to 
enhance safety are aimed at changing attitude or 
behavior (i.e. poster campaigns, training, procedures 
and so on, or changing the technology they operate). 
This orientation towards risk and safety management 
has traditionally been and still is adopted from the 
majority of the shipping companies. The BBS-
approach has been criticised for placing too much 
responsibility on the people operating the systems, 
assuming that they are responsible for the outcome 
of their actions (Dekker & Dekker 2006). An 
alternative view is to recognise human error not as a 
cause of accidents, but as a consequence or symptom 
of organisational trouble deeper within the 
organisation, arising from strategic or other top level 
decisions. This includes resource allocation, crewing 
strategy and contracting (Dekker, Dekker 2006, 
Reason 2001, Reason, Hobbs 2003). An organisation 
is a complex system balancing different, and often 
also conflicting, goals towards safety and production 
in an aggressive and competitive environment 
(Rasmussen 1997), a situation that to a large extent 
is current within shipping. The BBS approach 
towards safety often implies that more automation 
and tighter procedures should be added in order to 
control the human actions. However, the result may 
be that more complexity is added to the system. This 
in combination with the organisation's struggle to 
survive in the competitive environment, leads to the 
system becoming even more prone to accidents 
(Perrow 1999) (Dekker & Dekker 2006, Reason 
2001, Reason & Hobbs 2003) However, the concept 
of focusing on the human side of safety is not 
wrong. After all, the technology and production 
systems are operated, maintained and managed by 
humans, and as the final barrier towards accidents 
and incidents they are most of the time directly 
involved. The  proponents of the BBS approach 
argue that behaviour control and modification may 
bring a shift in an organisation's safety culture, also 
at the upper level, but this is most likely if the focus 
is not exclusively addressing observed deficiencies 
at the organisation's lower levels (DeJoy 2005). 
DeJoy (2005) calls attention to three apparent 
weaknesses related to the BBS approach:  
(1) By focusing on human error it can lead to victim-
blaming.  
(2) It minimises the effect of the organisational 
environment in which a person acts.   
(3) Focusing on immediate causes hinders unveiling 
the basic causes, which often reside in the 
organisational environment.  
Due to this, we will also include the organisational 
environment in the safety culture concept, as 
proposed by Cooper (2000). 
2.2 The relation to organisational factors 
When human error is not seen only as a cause of 
accidents, but as a symptom and consequence of 
problems deeper inside the organisation, or what 
Reason (2001,2003) refers to as latent organisational 
factors, emphasis is placed on weaknesses in 
strategic decisions made at the top level in the 
organisation. These strategic decisions may reflect 
an underlying assumption about the best way to 
adapt to external factors and to achieve internal 
integration, and if they are common for most 
shipping companies an organisational culture may 
also be revealed.(Schein 2004). Schein (2004) also 
stresses the importance of leadership. The top 
management influences the culture as only they have 
the possibility of creating groups and organisations 
through their strategic decisions. And when a group 
is formed, they set the criteria for leadership and 
how the organisation will support and follow up 
their leaders. The leaders, at all levels on shore and 
at the vessel, are also key figures in the development 
of a safety culture. It is their task to detect the 
functional and dysfunctional elements of the existing 
culture, and to channel this to the upper levels of the 
organisation. In return, the upper levels of the 
organisation should give their leaders the support 
necessary in order to develop the desired culture.  
3 METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Cooper’s (2000) framework put forward the 
importance of methodological triangulation in order 
to grasp all facets of the cultural concept. The 
internal psychological factors are most often 
assessed via safety climate questionnaires. Our 
approach is to start with such a survey in order to 
gain insight into the seafarer’s perceptions and 
attitudes related to safety, along with self-reported 
work behaviour related to risk taking, rule violation 
and accident reporting. The survey also includes 
questions related to crewing strategy, which opens 
up the possibility of assessing the relationship 
between the organisational situation and actual 
behaviour. The survey results are used to determine 
which organisational factors are most likely affect 
the safety culture, and to define research areas for a 
further qualitative study. 
3.1 Development of questionnaire items 
The survey instrument was developed by Studio 
Apertura in collaboration with DNV and SINTEF. 
The development was based on an evaluation of 
seven already existing questionnaires in comparison 
with various theoretical views of the safety culture 
concept (Studio Apertura 2004). Minor adjustments 
were made after a pilot for use within the tanker and 
bulk carrier sector. This resulted in a questionnaire 
with constructs and accompanying number of items 
as presented in table 1. All items were measured on 
a 5 point likert scale ranging from strongly disagree 
to strongly agree, or very seldom/never to very 
often/always. 
 
 
Table 1. Questionnaire constructs and number of items 
Construct            Number of items 
Top management’s safety priorities   3 
Local management         7 
Procedures & guidelines       7 
Interaction            18 
Work situation          8 
Competence           5 
Responsibility & sanctions      7 
Working environment        9 
Reporting practices         10 
 
3.2 Questionnaire sample 
A total of 1574 questionnaires were distributed to 83 
randomly selected Norwegian controlled tankers and 
bulk carriers. All vessels were flying a flag on the 
Paris MOU white or grey list. 76 vessels returned a 
total of 1262 completed forms, which gives an 
individual response rate of 80% and a vessel 
response rate of 91.5 %. The survey was carried out 
in 2006. 
3.3 Statistical analysis 
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS) v.15.0 was used to perform all of the 
analysis, which included descriptive statistics, 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA), confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) and bivariate correlation 
analysis. 
With regard to the EFA, the principal component 
analysis with Varimax rotation was carried out. The 
factors were extracted based on the three following 
analytical criteria: (1) Pairwise deletion, (2) Eigen 
value more than 1, and (3) factor loading more than 
0.50. Of the extracted factors, all factors with 2 or 
fewer items were removed, based on the notion that 
a factor should be comprised of at least three items 
to be robust (Pett, Lackey & Sullivan 2003). A 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), using a one-
factor solution for each construct, has also been 
performed. The advantage of the CFA is that it 
allows for more precision in evaluating the 
measurement model (Hinkin 1995), and the results 
were compared with the EFA for providing validity 
evidence based on the hypothesis that a valid 
instrument should produce similar results. 
Each factor was then evaluated using the Kaiser-
Meyerto-Olkin (KMO) parameter, and only factors 
with KMO value at 0.60 or above were included in 
the further analysis (Hair 1998).  
This was followed by a scale-reliability test. For 
that purpose, the Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient of 
internal consistency was calculated, and evaluated 
along with inter-item statistics. Cronbach’s Alpha is 
a measure of scale reliability concerned with the 
proportion of a scale’s total variance that is 
attributable to a common source, presumed to be the 
true score of the latent construct being measured. In 
our case that will be the safety culture. Usually a 
value above 0.7 is considered acceptable, although 
some advocate an alpha level of 0.8 or better 
(Netemeyer, Sharma & Bearden 2003). As the alpha 
value is a function of, inter alia, the average inter-
item correlation; the inter-item correlation and item-
total statistics have also been evaluated. Rules of 
thumb suggest that the item-total correlation should 
exceed .50, and the inter-item correlation should 
exceed .30 (Hair 1998), but it should not exceed .80. 
An inter-item correlation exceeding .80 suggests that 
items are duplicates of one another (Pett, Lackey & 
Sullivan 2003). Then the remaining items went 
through a last CFA, a five-factor solution, in order to 
provide each factor's explained variance. 
Finally, correlation analysis has been carried out 
in order to evaluate the construct validity, which is 
viewed as the extent to which an operational 
measure truly reflects the underlying safety culture 
concept, and if they operate in a consistent manner.  
Based on this analytical process, five factors (1) 
interaction, (2) reporting practices, (3) competence, 
(4) local management, and (5) work situation were 
found to be reliable and valid. The aforementioned 
factors are presented further in detail in the next 
section. 
4 RESULTS 
4.1 Results from descriptive analysis 
Regarding demographics, 21 different nationalities 
are represented. The Filipino contingent forms the 
largest group constituting 63 % of the sample, 
followed by the Norwegian group with almost 11 %, 
and the Polish which represents 9 %. The last major 
group was the Russians with 6 %. The other 
remaining 17 nationalities were represented in a 
range from 3 % to 1%.  
There is also great variation with regard to 
employment conditions. All in all, 12 % of the 
sample consists of permanent employees, of whom 
80 % are Norwegian and 16 % from the European 
Union. 91% of the Norwegians are permanent 
employee. The remaining 9% are apprentices, 
substitutes or newly employed on probation. Only 3 
% of the non Norwegian sailors are permanent 
employees. With regard to the Filipino seafarers, the 
largest nationality, 99.6 % are contract employees, 
most on 9 month contracts (62 %), followed by 6 
month contracts (27 %). The extended use of 
contract employment is reflected in their experience. 
All in all, 85 % had three years or more experience 
within shipping in general. However, 69 % of the 
sample had worked on the current vessel for only 1 
year or less. 
The employment terms were in general different 
for the captains. The captains normally do not have 
sailing periods that exceed 6 months. The most 
typical sailing period for the captains is 3 months or 
less. 
4.2 Results from factor analyses 
From the 9 theoretical safety culture constructs, a 
five factor solution was derived, (1) interaction, (2) 
reporting practices, (3) competence, (4) local 
management, and (5) work situation.. With regard to 
the “local management”, “competence” and “work 
situation” factor both EFA and CFA result in final 
solutions consisting of the same items, but with 
minor differences in factor loading. The CFA 
included three more items in the “interaction” factor 
than the EFA, and the final factor, “reporting 
practices” resulted from only the CFA.  
Four of the constructs did not pass the reliability 
tests. The first, “top management’s safety priorities”, 
was excluded due to low representative reliability 
across subpopulations. This construct also consisted 
of too few items. The remaining three constructs, 
“procedures and guidelines”, “responsibility and 
sanctions” and “working environment” were 
excluded due to low validity, mostly resulting from 
poor theoretical relationship within the items of each 
construct. 
 
For the further analysis the results from the CFA 
are used. The 5 factors in question are presented in 
Table 2 along with number of items and explained 
variance.  
 
 
Table 2 Final factors, number of items and explained variance 
Factor            Number  Explained 
              of items  variance 
Interaction            8    35,63 % 
Reporting practices         5    9.77 % 
Competence            4    7.12 % 
Local management         3    5.96 % 
Work situation          3    5.08 % 
 
 
Each factors Cronbach’s alpha value and inter 
item statistics is presented in table 3. 
 
 
Table 3.  Final factors, Cronbach's alpha and inter-item 
statistics 
Factor      Alpha  Inter-item    Item-total  
            range    range   
Interaction     .878   .360 - .606   .520 - .724 
Reporting practices  .808   .335 - .761   .491 - .668 
Competence    .839   .497 – 682   .628 - .712 
Local Management  .866   .692 - .716   .724 - 774 
Work situation   .817   .512 - .749   .554 - .739 
 
 
The alpha values range from .808 to .878, and the 
internal item statistics are all within the 
recommended levels. The five factors are therefore 
considered to be a reliable and valid reflection of the 
underlying safety culture concept.  
Further,table 4 presents the correlation 
coefficients between the factors, or safety culture 
dimensions. All correlations are significant at the 
0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
 
Table 4. Factor correlation matrix. Pearson’s r.  
         F1   F2   F3  F4  F5 
 
F1: Interaction    1   
F2: Reporting 
   Practices     .352  1 
F3: Competence    .639  .323  1 
F4: Local 
   management   .474 - ..362  .367  1 
F5: Work 
   Situation     .494  .322  ..441  .444  1 
 
 
The five safety culture dimensions correlate in a 
positive direction, which is consistent with the 
theoretical concept, and they are therefore 
considered to be a valid reflection of the underlying 
safety culture construct. 
5 DISCUSSION 
All three constructs have a good alpha level, and as 
the alpha levels are concerned with the variance that 
is common among the items, these constructs also 
reflect the areas where it is possible to speak about 
safety culture. With reference to Cooper’s 
framework towards safety culture, we will further 
discuss how the organisation's factors such as 
crewing strategy, witch includes employment terms, 
rotations system and policy towards the on board 
shipping management, may affect the on board 
safety culture and climate represented by the 
identified dimensions. The organisation's structural 
factors are all to be found within Cooper’s element 
of situation, while the identified safety culture 
dimensions are to be found within the elements of 
person and behaviour.  
Interaction is the dimension accounting for the 
largest proportion of the total explained variance, 
with 35.63 %, meaning that with regard to safety 
culture most of the variance in the original data is 
explained by this dimension. When taking into 
account how distinctive a ship is as a work place, 
this is no surprise. A ship may be characterised as a 
total institution since both work and leisure time 
happen at the same place and with few possibilities 
to interact with the surrounding world (Goffman 
1968). In such a setting the crew members are 
socialised into a common culture and rules of 
interaction. Schein (2004) refers to this as internal 
integration. The interaction climate is characterised 
by lack of stability within the crew due to different 
terms of employment. First of all, permanent 
employment seems to be reserved for the Norwegian 
sailors. Sailors of other nationalities are almost all 
contract employees. In addition, the length of 
contract varies and all crew members have different 
dates for signing on and signing off. Schein (2004) 
points out that lack of stability may be a threat to the 
possibility of developing a culture: “ (…) there must 
be a history of shared experience, which in turn 
implies some stability of membership in the group.” 
Even if the crew as a group is in constant change, 
they all have common history as seafarers. So even 
if lack of stability within the group indicates that a 
common culture should not develop on the ship, a 
common culture of how to act and interact may have 
developed amongst the seafarers, and when a new 
crewmember is signed on a new vessel, he knows 
what is expected from him. However, the question is 
if such a culture is a safe culture? Reason (2001, 
2003) emphasize that to reach a safe culture, the 
organisation should strive for an informed culture 
where those who manage and operate the system, 
both on board and on shore, have current knowledge 
about the factors that determine the safety of the 
system as a whole, which again depends on that the 
crew on board are prepared to report their errors and 
near misses, and the reporting practice is one of the 
dimensions deriving from the analyses, explaining 
9.77 % of the variance. This dimension also includes 
feedback on reported events. In order to attain good 
reporting practices, the organisation should strive to 
create an atmosphere of openness, trust and loyalty. 
Integrating into the group is also a survival 
mechanism, and every crewmember will most likely 
make an effort to integrate. If not, he would most 
likely have a hard time during his contract period 
with no possibility to leave the vessel and the other 
crewmembers. However, to compromise oneself and 
be open about one's own mistakes is not always an 
easy task, especially not in an unknown working 
environment. Something that may reinforce the 
crewmembers' fear of reporting their own mistakes 
is the ongoing practice that each crew member is 
evaluated by their senior officer / captain, and based 
on this report get recommended or not recommended 
for re-hire. Interviews have revealed that this 
evaluation practice differs. Some practise an open 
evaluation where all parts are involved, with focus 
on how to improve the evaluated crew’s 
shortcomings, and where the shore organisation 
seeks to ensure that the evaluation is conducted in as 
objective a way as possible. At other vessels, the 
evaluation is closed for insight by the evaluated and 
may also be highly subjective. Some of the 
respondents have expressed that by reporting, their 
next contract may be at stake, or they may meet with 
other negative consequences. So, lack of stability 
and constantly changing working groups may 
sacrifice a trusting and open environment, and thus 
also the sailors' commitment to safety. 
A crew committed to safety is essential, but not 
enough. Lack of competence may cause a situation 
where the crew do not identify potential dangerous 
situations, or create them. Competence, which 
accounts for 7.12 % of the total variance, is in this 
setting comprised of activities performed on board 
the vessel, and is all under the control of the captain, 
training, drills and familiarisation when signing on. 
Also, the competence dimension does correlate 
strongly with the interaction dimension with a 
correlation coefficient at .639. This indicates that a 
situation when the sailors are feeling confident with 
the nature of their task also results in a better 
interaction climate where conflicts are more likely to 
be absent. As with the interaction climate, 
competence will also be affected by the crew 
stability. A crew member that is constantly signing 
on new vessels and that has to interact with new 
crew members and leaders, uses more effort 
adapting to the new situation, working out how 
things are done at that specific vessel, the informal 
structure onboard and so on. When more stability is 
provided, more effort may be placed on upgrading 
their competence, and the competence will be kept 
within the vessel and organisation. Both the training 
activities and crewing strategy may be controlled by 
the ship management, and thus these safety culture 
dimensions are also, to a certain degree, 
controllable. 
The dimension of work situation consists of pro-
active activities as Safe Job Analysis (SJA), safety 
evaluations and the possibility they have to prioritize 
safety in their daily work. So how may the 
organisation affect this? For one, they may supply 
sufficient crew. Today many vessels are sailing with 
a smaller crew at the same time as new standards 
and resolutions like the ISM-code increase the 
amount of paperwork to be done. Both own 
observations and interviews reveal that inter alia 
check lists and SJA are done in a mechanical 
manner. This may originate from various reasons 
such as an overload of work, no understanding of the 
importance of those activities, lack of feedback or 
improper planning by the local management. 
 The local management dimension, accounts for 
5.96 % of the explained variance, and the direct 
effect of local management is relatively small. 
However, local management is considered to have 
an indirect effect on the safety climate through the 
managers, or senior officers, affect on the interaction 
climate, competence and training activities, 
reporting practices and the work situation. Again we 
wish to focus on the importance of stability within 
the work group. Most captains have a sailing period 
of 3 months or less, while most of the non 
Norwegian ratings have a sailing period of 9 months. 
Most senior officers also have a shorter sailing 
period then an ordinary rating. Then a rating 
possibly has to deal with several different leaders 
during his stay. And each captain and department 
manager's leadership style may vary, and are 
sometimes even destructive, as shown by following 
comment from a Pilipino engineer. “The only 
problem on board is the treatment of senior officers 
to the lowest rank. (..) There are some senior 
officers who are always very insulting towards jr. 
officers and rating.” Schein (2004) regards the 
leader as an important key figure in the cultural 
development. At sea the captain holds a key role. 
The captain is the one in command at every vessel, 
and according to Schein (2004) the captain’s 
orientation will affect the working climate, which 
precedes the existence of a culture. So, in a situation 
where lack of crew stability impedes the 
development of a safety culture, the role of the 
captain is even more vital. Also, it is important to 
take into account that the leadership style that is 
practised on board not only affect the sphere of 
work, but also time off. However the Captains 
themselves may not be aware of their own 
importance, or how they affect safety. Most 
Captains, or other department leaders for that matter, 
do not have managerial training or education. When 
adopting a cultural view towards safety, as in this 
research, in as opposed to a behaviour based view, 
more emphasis is placed on organisational factors. 
Decisions regarding crewing strategy, employment 
terms and managerial development programmes are 
all strategic decisions made on shore. With reference 
to Schein’s culture definition, we will argue that the 
safety culture originates within the organisation on 
shore. Based on Scheins’ definitions of culture there 
ought to exist a pattern of shared basic assumptions 
that may solve the problems the shipping industry is 
facing. Our case however has revealed an offshore 
practise characterised by extended use of contract 
employment, lack of stable working conditions on 
board the vessels, and little or no use of managerial 
training and development. This practice does not 
promote a good safety culture and is considered to 
has a negative effect on the overall safety level. 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this paper was to analyse the 
characteristics of the safety culture on Norwegian 
tankers and bulk carriers, and identify what 
organisational factors may affect the safety culture 
on board vessels. Statistical analysis identified five 
safety related dimensions on board the vessels: 
interaction climate, reporting practices, competence, 
local management and work situation. Within 
shipping the interaction climate is characterised by 
unstable working conditions. Under such conditions 
it is difficult to achieve and maintain a stable crew, 
and proper management becomes even more 
important. Also the Captain has a vital role, as he 
has the possibility to directly affect all the other 
safety related aspects through his own leadership 
style. The Captains, officers and ratings normally 
have different employment terms and shift terms. 
This may jeopardise the development of a sound 
safety culture as the crew has a poor possibility of 
developing common behaviour practices and a 
mutual understanding of how to do things right. As 
neither the Captains nor the officers normally have 
any managerial training, their leadership styles often 
affect the safety in a negative direction. The on 
board situation is to a large extend considered to be 
created by the on-shore crewing strategy and 
management policy.  
     In order to develop a sound safety culture on-
board, the shipping companies should go in new 
directions and pursue a crewing strategy which 
offers more favourable employment terms and fixed 
shifts for all nationalities, and strive for a more 
stable workforce. Another measure would be to 
accept the Captain’s and department managers’ roles 
as leaders, and offer managerial development. A 
final measure will be to develop a policy and system 
that ensure proper onboard management.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Safety management within shipping is regulated by 
the International Safety Management (ISM) code. 
The ISM code came into force on the 2 July 1998, 
as a consequence of a mounting concern about 
poor management standards within the industry. 
By implementing the ISM code, the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) seeks to better 
ensure that each shipping company pays attention 
to safety in ship operations. The code requires 
companies to establish safeguards against all 
identified risks, with functional requirements to 
develop, implement and maintain a safety 
management system (SMS). Further, the code 
requires that the SMS should be founded on 
reporting of accidents and non conformities, in 
order to develop safety measures (International 
Maritime Organization, 1994). Within the industry, 
it is well known that large variations with regard to 
companies’ adherence to the code exist. In 2007 
the Paris Memorandum of Understanding (Paris 
MoU) carried out 5,427 inspections on 5,120 ships 
in the European and North Atlantic region. One in 
five of the inspections showed ISM deficiencies, of 
which reports of non-conformities and accident 
occurrence were amongst the most common 
deficiency. This raised interest in further research 
into to how the requirements of the ISM code are 
put into practice within the industry. Hence, the 
objective of this paper is to explore safety 
management status within the Norwegian 
controlled shipping industry, by gas and liquid 
cargo carriers (tankers). The following areas for 
research will be explored: 
 
- Description of the current situation within safety 
management. 
- Identification of factors that may influence the 
safety management performance. 
2 THE THEORETICAL RATIONALE OF THE 
ISM CODE 
Safety management, as described in the ISM Code, 
is founded on a linear causality where attempts are 
made to predict and prevent future incidents by 
reflecting upon previous experience. The 
information flow in such a SMS is presented in 
Figure 1. 
The use of safety management systems within the Norwegian tanker 
industry – do they really improve safety? 
H.A. Oltedal 
Stord/Haugesund University College, Haugesund, Norway 
ABSTRACT: Since the implementation of the ISM-code, all shipping companies have been required to have 
a safety management system. This paper explores the Norwegian controlled shipping industry’s safety 
management performance with regard to incident and near miss reporting practices, data analysis, procedures 
and checklists, and the balance between commercial pressures and safety concerns. In so doing, the research 
is limited to the tanker sector, with the emphasis on the sailors' perspective. The statistical data used are 
derived from a survey carried out in 2006, supported by qualitative information deriving from two case 
studies. The results indicate several deficiencies with regard to all parts of the system. In order to work with 
safety management based on other principles, the adoption of an organizational approach towards safety 
management is proposed, as opposed to a person approach i.e. awareness of characteristics and limitations of 
human nature and taking crews' experience seriously with regard to areas such as procedural development and 
resource requirements. Also to make clear, in terms of communication and actions, that safety is the top 
priority. It is also suggested that a closer and more stable relationship towards contract employee crew would 
facilitate improved safety management. Moreover, it should be recognized that riskiness will always be a part 
of life, and that it may never be totally eliminated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As shown in Figure 1, the SMS contains several 
sub systems. First, a system of reporting and 
collection of experience data from the vessel itself 
is required. This is followed by a system of data 
processing, i.e. summarization and analysis in 
order to reveal causal factors and perform trend 
analysis, which forms the basis for the 
development of safety measures. One critical 
system requirement is the reliability and accuracy 
of input data, i.e. near miss and accidents reports. 
As long as the input is reliable, the overall system 
presupposes the possibility of developing efficient 
measures, in order to control operational safety 
(Kjellén, 2000). Another critical factor is how the 
organization reconciles commercial pressures and 
safety concerns. Safe performance and safety 
management require resources in the form of 
personnel, money and time. At the same time the 
organization need to make profits and to be able to 
compete. Safety versus efficiency may be difficult 
to balance, and are often experienced as conflicting 
goals (Rasmussen, 1997). 
3 METHODOLOGY 
A multi-method approach combining surveys and 
case studies, including field studies and interviews, 
is adopted. The survey aims to indicate the 
interrelated patterns of the sailors’ perceptions of 
and attitudes towards the SMS. The quantitative 
results aim to give a more thorough understanding 
of the overall situation, underlying processes and 
the seafarers’ experiences with the SMS. 
3.1 Case studies 
Two tanker companies were studied in late 2007 
and early 2008. In order to ensure the companies' 
anonymity, company and vessel specific 
information is retained. In both companies the 
HSQ manager and Crewing Manager have been 
interviewed. In one company the SMS data system 
was examined. In the other company all available 
statistics, experience feedback from reported cases 
and safety bulletins available for the vessel were 
examined. Two field studies have been carried out 
on one vessel in each company.  
3.2 Survey 
A total of 987 questionnaires were distributed to 44 
randomly selected vessels, of which 41 vessels 
returned a total of 768 completed questionnaires. 
This gives a vessel response rate of 93% and an 
individual response rate of 78 %. All vessels were 
flying a flag listed on the Paris MOU white or grey 
list. This survey forms part of a major safety 
culture survey carried out in 2006, performed with 
a validated instrument (Oltedal, Engen, 2008).  
In addition, 297 respondents have given written 
comments. The written comments from the survey 
are categorized in three groups as they relate to (1) 
the crews' reporting practices, (2) procedures and 
guidelines and (3) the crews' perceptions of the 
balance between safety and efficiency (Rasmussen, 
1997). 
3.3 Statistical analysis 
All statistical analysis is performed using SPSS 
version 16.0. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
with Varimax rotation and Pairwise deletion is 
carried out in order to examine the survey items' 
interrelationship, and in terms of their common 
underlying dimension. The extracted rotated 
component matrix with factor structure and 
loadings is presented. The loading represents the 
correlation between the variable and the extracted 
factor(s), with estimates ranging from 0 to 1.00. 
Items that load strongest on a given factor are 
considered to be most like the factor, and thus the 
underlying latent dimension. (Hair 1998, Pett, 
Lackey & Sullivan, 2003).  
Descriptive statistics for each item, including 
percentage frequency distribution, mean and 
standard deviation are presented. 
4 PRESENTATION OF RESULTS  
The results are presented in sections as they relate 
to the SMS; (1) crews' reporting practices, (2) 
analysis and follow up by shore side, (3) 
procedures and checklists, and (4) perceived 
balance between commercial pressures and safety 
concerns. Results relating to data analysis and 
follow up by shore side are derived from 
qualitative data only. Each section is brought to a 
close with a discussion of the presented data and 
results, where qualitative data is used as a 
framework for interpretation. 
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Figure 1 Flow of information in a safety management system 
(Source: Adapted from Kjellén, 2000) 
5 REPORTING PRACTICES ON BOARD 
5.1 Qualitative results 
Both companies from the case study have similar 
formal reporting procedures. Reports on near 
misses and incidents may be directed towards the 
reporters’ closest superior, or directly to the 
captain using a standard reporting formula. Reports 
may also be placed anonymously in a mail box, 
which is placed on the vessels. All reports are then 
registered in the computer system by a designated 
officer. When registered, the report is approved by 
the captain before it is passed on to the shore side 
for follow up.  
In the questionnaire, 41 respondents commented 
their reasons for not reporting, which have been 
categorized in following four sub groups; system 
related (n=11), blame related (n=10), (3) ship 
management related (n=9) and others (n=11), 
summarized in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1: Reasons for not reporting – survey comments 
11 resp: The reporting system itself is too complicated, 
time consuming and paper producing. 
10 resp: Experience that ship management and/or 
company are after finding someone to blame. 
9   resp: Related to ship management, i.e. management 
altering report, captain not passing report to shore. 
11 resp: Not possible to categorize, include personal 
attitude, responsibility, and practice depending on 
vessel/company specific conditions.  
5.2 Quantitative results from survey 
Survey questions related to reporting practices are 
presented in Table 2, together with question 
reference (ref) and number of respondents (n). 
 
 
Table 2: Reporting practices - survey questions 
Ref                   n 
R1: Do close calls get reported in writing?     671 
R2: Do minor incidents get reported in writing?   694 
R3: Do you receive constructive feedback from the 
company on the conditions you report?     639 
R4:  Are reports of undesirable incidents ever 
“fixed up” to cover mistakes?        642 
R5: When an undesirable incident has occurred, 
people are more preoccupied with placing blame  
than finding the cause of the incident.     733 
R6: Reporting is important to prevent the recurrence  
of accidents or incidents.          730 
 
 
Explanation for interrelationship between survey 
questions: Reporting practices (R1, R2 & R4) are 
assumed to improve if the crew gets feedback from 
the report follow up (R3), and when the 
importance of reporting and its role in safety 
management is comprehended (R6). A blame 
policy (R5) is supposed to reduce reporting (R1 & 
R2) and increase the probability of a cover up of 
own mistakes (R4) (Reason, 2001). A blame policy 
is when people are blamed for an unwanted 
situation rather than the situational circumstances. 
Descriptive statistics related to reporting 
practices are presented in Table 3, with scale 
information and coding of response alternatives 
given below.  
 
 
Table 3: Reporting practices – descriptive statistic 
  1   2   3   4   5   
Ref (%)  (%)  (%)  (%)  (%)  Mean Std 
R1 2.5  8.8  25.0   42.2  21.5  3.7   0.98 
R2 4.0  8.6  22.8  38.9  25.6  3.7  1.06 
R3 14.9  11.3  21.9  31.8  20.2  3.3  1.31 
R4 46.9  17.6  22.8  9.7  4.0  2.1  1.19 
R5 18.4  43.4  12.4  22.2  3.5  2.5  1.13 
R6 0.7  0.8  2.9  44.2  51.4  4.5  0.66 
R1 through R4: 1=very seldom/never, 2=seldom, 
3=sometime, 4=often and 5=very often/always.  
R5 and R6: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = not sure, 
4 = agree and 5 = strongly agree. 
 
 
The respondents were also asked to list their 
reasons for not reporting incidents. Each 
respondent could mark up to three of eleven pre 
specified alternatives, or write any other reason if 
not listed. The three major reasons are listed in 
Table 4. 
 
 
Table 4: Reasons for not reporting an incident – from survey 
                  Response 
                    (%) 
The incident did not have any serious consequence .  30.3 
There could be negative reactions from my co-workers. 29.8 
I am afraid that the information will be used against me. 22.8 
 
 
The factor structure matrix and loadings are 
presented in Table 5. 
 
 
Table 5: Reporting practices - factor structure and loadings 
Ref               Fac. 1 Fac. 2 
R1 Do close calls get reported in writing? .875  -.185 
R2 Do minor incidents get reported in  
writing?           .837  -.178 
R3 Do you receive constructive feedback  
from the company on the conditions  
you report?          .652  .029 
R4 Are reports of undesirable incidents  
ever “fixed up” to cover mistakes?  .052  .812 
R5 When an undesirable incident has  
occurred, people are more preoccupied  
with placing blame than finding the  
cause of the incident.       -.098  .790 
R6 Reporting is important to prevent the  
recurrence of accidents or incidents.  .174  -.409 
* Underlined loadings indicate the factor on which the item 
was placed. 
5.3 Section discussion 
The factor structure matrix indicates two 
underlying reporting dimensions. One reflecting 
desired reporting practices (factor 1) and one 
reflecting undesired reporting practices (factor 2). 
Factor 1 indicates interrelationship between the 
tendency to report and the feedback given on the 
report from the shore side (Table 5), which 
indicates that improved feedback also increases 
reporting frequency. The descriptive statistics point 
to a situation of substantial underreporting. A total 
of 36.3% of the respondents state that they never or 
only sometimes report close calls, and 35.4% that 
they never or only sometimes report minor 
incidents. In addition, feedback given on reports 
seems to be inadequate, as 48.1% stated that they 
never or only sometimes received constructive 
feedback (R1, R2 & R3, Table 3). The qualitative 
data also confirm that feedback is perceived to be 
inadequate, too general and delayed. However, the 
most frequent reason given for not reporting is that 
the incident did not have any serious 
consequences, ticked of by 30.3% of the 
respondents (Table 4). This suggests that the crew 
do not understand the purpose of reporting less 
serious incidents in order do prevent the more 
serious ones. The crew at the vessels visited also 
had major problems explaining the definition of 
close call and near miss.  
Factor 2 indicates interrelationship between the 
tendency to alter the reports to cover up own 
mistakes and a blame-policy (Table 5). A total of 
36.5% of the respondents admit to sometimes, 
often or always fixing up the reports, and 25.7% 
perceive that a blame culture is present (R4 & R5, 
Table 3). However, the tendency to alter reports is 
counteracted by the crews' understanding of 
reporting as a preventive measure, pointed out by 
item R6’s negative loading (factor 2, Table 5). As 
few as 1.5% of the respondents disagree about the 
statement of whether reporting is important to 
prevent recurrence of accidents or incidents (R6, 
Table 3.) This suggests that greater improvement 
in the SMS can be achieved abandoning a blame-
policy. This is supported by the fact that both the 
second and third most frequent reason for not 
reporting is related to blame; fear of negative 
reactions from co workers and that information 
may be used against them (Table 4). When it 
comes to negative reaction from co workers, ship 
management and the captain, the information 
retrieved from field studies suggest large variation 
from vessel to vessel, and most crew regard the 
captain as the one setting the standard on board. 
Although both companies acknowledged having 
captains who possess less leadership skills, and 
who do not practice the official company policy, 
they are both reluctant to evaluate their captains.  
Another hindrance towards reporting is the 
reporting system itself, which is perceived to be 
too complicated and time consuming (Table 1). A 
common understanding on the vessels is that the 
SMS is a paper producing system which requires 
constantly increasing administrative work, without 
having a proportionate effect on safety. The field 
studies have revealed situations where 
administrative tasks have been carried out at the 
expense of time spent focusing on practical work 
and operational challenges.  
6 ANALYSIS AND FOLLOW UP BY SHORE 
SIDE  
6.1 Qualitative results 
Both companies stated that they operate a no-
blame policy, but did acknowledge that the no-
blame policy did not always get through to the 
crew. In their experience, the no-blame policy is 
put in to practice differently on the various vessels, 
and that this may depart from their official policy. 
However, when going through the reports, it is 
noted that report analysis most often stopped with 
the crew as a cause, with explanations as “lack of 
safety awareness” and “bad attitude”. Situations 
involving known technical mal functioning and 
unfortunate situational circumstances such as bad 
weather have also been explained by human error 
as root cause. Safety is monitored with the use of 
metrics such as lost-time injuries, sick leaves and 
number of reports, all metrics that may be traced 
back to the individual.  
6.2 Section discussion 
The case studies indicate that the companies apply 
a person model in their follow up. A person model 
views people as free agents capable of choosing 
between safe and unsafe behavior, and therefore 
unsafe behavior is seen as voluntary actions and as 
a cause. In an alternative organizational model, 
human error is seen more as a consequence than a 
cause, induced by latent conditions in the system at 
large (Reason, 2001). There are several draw backs 
with the person model. First, when human error is 
seen as a cause, the crew may perceive this as 
placing blame. As mentioned in section 5, a 
blaming policy is suggested to aggravate the 
reporting practices on board. A second drawback is 
related to developments of safety measures. In the 
person model, when human error is seen as a 
cause, safety measures tend to attempt to control 
human behavior by, inter alia, procedures and 
checklists. And when the real cause is to be found 
elsewhere in the organization, the measures may 
have limited effect. When measures have little or 
no effect upon the error producing factors, error 
continue being involved in incidents and accidents. 
This situation may develop to a vicious blame 
cycle, where in the next situation crew get even 
more blame as they have already been warned 
(Reason, 2001). 
7 PROCEDURES AND CHECKLISTS 
7.1 Qualitative results 
Within the tanker sector there is an extensive use 
of procedures and checklists. It is custom that crew 
have to deal with procedures and checklists from 
own company, charterer, customer and oil 
installation. Of which all are different but at the 
same time standardized to fit all.  
Officers at both vessels do regard procedures 
and check lists as valuable for safety reasons 
within certain limits. Procedures and checklists are 
also seen as problematic as there are too many of 
them, too detailed and too standardized. The crew 
experience that less standardization and a 
possibility to accommodate procedures and 
checklist in accordance to the ship specific 
situation would improve safety more. Problems 
with completing checklists and following 
procedures are mostly experienced during hectic 
operation, such as calling at and leaving port.  
In the questionnaire, 62 respondents made 
written comments related to procedures and check 
lists. The comments have been categorized into 
following three sub groupings; (1) procedure 
quality (n=33), (2) commercial pressure (n=11) 
and (3) others (n=18). The results are summarized 
in Table 6. 
 
 
Table 6 procedures and checklists – survey comments 
33 resp: Procedures and checklists are not applicable and 
do not reflect the situation on board: too detailed, 
too many, and look like they have been developed 
by people with no sea going experience. 
11 resp: Procedures are being breached due to commercial 
pressure. 
18 resp: Other, i.e. the relevance of training and work 
specific situations. 
7.2 Statistical results from survey 
Survey questions related to the perception of 
procedures are presented in Table 7, with question 
reference (ref) and number of respondents (n). 
 
Table 7: Procedures - survey questions 
Ref                   n 
P1  The procedures are helpful in my work.    755 
P2 I have received good training in the company's 
procedures.              757 
P3 We have the opportunity to influence and form  
the procedures.             739 
P4  I feel that it is difficult to know which procedures  
are applicable.             750 
P5  The procedures are difficult to understand or are  
poorly written.             751 
 
 
Explanation for interrelationship between 
survey questions: Good procedures are supposed to 
be helpful in the work (P1). It is assumed that 
procedures are more easily put into operational 
practice if the user has received training in how to 
understand and apply the procedures, and the 
safety role they play (P2). They are also assumed 
to be more workable if they reflect the reality of 
the working process. That is ensured through 
involving the crew in the development of 
procedures, and by paying attention to crews' 
experience (P3). If these factors (P2 & P3) are not 
present, the procedural system may be perceived as 
confusing and difficult to relate to (P4 & P5) 
(Reason, 2001). 
Descriptive statistics related to reporting 
practices are presented in Table 8, with scale 
information and coding of response alternatives 
beneath. 
 
 
Table 8: Procedures – descriptive statistics 
  1   2   3   4   5   
Ref (%)  (%)  (%)  (%)  (%)  Mean Std 
P1  0.9  1.2  4.9  52.5  40.5  4.3  0.70 
P2  1.1  2.9  6.1  55.9  34.1  4.3  0.76 
P3  3.4  13.4  16.2  53.5  13.5  3.6  0.99 
P4  15.6  45.7  16.5  19.3  2.8  2.5  1.06 
P5  16.6  54.2  12.9  15.2  2.1  2.3  0.99 
P1 through P5: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = not 
sure, 4 = agree and 5 = strongly agree. 
 
 
The respondents were also asked to list their 
reasons for not following procedures. Each 
respondent could mark up to three of seven pre 
specified options, or write any other reason if not 
listed. The three most frequent reasons are listed in 
Table 9. 
 
 
Table 9: Reasons for not following procedures 
                  Response 
                    (%) 
The work will be done faster.         47.3 
The procedures do not work as intended.     44.4 
There are too many procedures.        36.8 
 
 
Factor analysis also included item R5 “When an 
undesirable incident has occurred, people are 
more preoccupied with placing blame than finding 
the cause of the incident” Our hypothesis is that 
organizations inclined to focus at the human as a 
cause, as in a person model (Reason, 2001), are 
also more inclined to react by adding more 
procedures, which may result in a procedural 
system difficult to relate to (P4 & P5, Table 7). 
Factor structure matrix and loadings are presented 
in Table 10. 
 
 
Table 10: Procedures – factor structure and loadings 
Ref               Fac. 1 Fac. 2 
P4  I feel that it is difficult to know which  
procedures are applicable.     .815  -.060 
P5  The procedures are difficult to  
understand or are poorly written.   .806  -.165 
R5 When an undesirable incident has  
occurred, people are more preoccupied  
with placing blame than finding the  
cause of the incident.       .560  -.054  
P1  The procedures are helpful in my  
work.            -.147  .776 
P2  I have received good training in the  
company's procedures.      -.206  .739 
P3  We have the opportunity to influence  
and form the procedures.      .041  .685 
* Underlined loadings indicate the factor on which the item 
was placed. 
7.3 Section discussion 
The factor structure matrix indicates two 
underlying dimensions related to procedures. One 
is reflecting poor procedures (factor 1) and one 
reflecting helpful procedures (factor 2).  
Factor 1 indicates an interrelationship between 
the use of a person model in follow up (R5) and 
how easily the procedural system is comprehended 
(P4 & P5, Table 10). In all, 25.7% perceive blame 
as more important than finding the cause of an 
incident (R5, Table 3), 22.1% find it difficult to 
know which procedures are applicable and 17.3% 
finds them difficult to understand or to be poorly 
written (P4 & P5, Table 8). 
On the other hand, factor 2 indicates that 
procedures are perceived as helpful when training 
is provided and the users get involved in the 
development process (P1, P2 & P3, Table 10). 
Although 93% of the respondents regard 
procedures as helpful (P1, Table 8), qualitative 
information suggests the situation to be more 
nuanced. In the survey, 33 respondents commented 
that the procedures and checklists are not 
applicable and do not reflect the situation on board. 
Moreover, they are felt to be too detailed, too 
numerous, and look like they were developed by 
people with no sea going experience (Table 6). 
Also, two of three major reasons given for not 
following procedures are that the procedures do 
not work as intended and that there are too many of 
them, stated by 44.4% and 36.8% respectively 
(Table 9). This is considered as another drawback 
related to the person model, anexity-avoidance. 
Anexity-avoidance describes an organization 
which has discovered a technique to reduce risk, 
and who repeat it over and over again regardless of 
its effectiveness, like constantly adding yet another 
procedure in response to unwanted incidents 
(Reason, 2001). With regard to procedure 
development, the crews should, as professionals, 
be involved in the process, and their experience 
taken seriously. However, both companies are 
using multinational contract employee crew, which 
may make involvement difficult. Contract 
employment may cause more crew instability, and 
when crewing is outsourced the company is more 
disconnected to, inter alia, training and skills 
upgrading programs. The field study reveals that 
mostly top officers are involved in procedural 
development. Procedures and checklists are 
experienced as being more difficult to follow 
during hectic operations such as loading, 
discharging and entering port, and are, in these 
situations, also most often deviated from. Also, 
ship inspections on behalf of flag states, port states, 
and classification societies and so on, take place at 
port and increase the crew's workload. On average, 
each tanker is inspected 11 times per year. A total 
of 50 hours is allocated for these inspections 
however this does not include preparation time 
(Knapp, Franses, 2006). It is known that some 
vessels may experience up to 40 inspections per 
year from their customers alone (Guest, 2008). 
However, the top reason for not following 
procedures is to do the work faster, stated by 
47.3% of the respondents (Table 9), which brings 
us to the next section: the balance between 
commercial pressures and safety concerns. 
8 BALANCE BETWEEN COMMERCIAL 
PRESSURES AND SAFETY CONCERNS  
8.1 Qualitative results 
Both companies stated their main priority as safety. 
However at sea, the sailors often experienced 
commercial pressure and efficiency to be the shore 
sides’ priority. This experience is supported by real 
situations with direct pressure from shore. Most 
comments related to efficiency pressure are also 
related to the on board manning level. 
In the questionnaire, 118 respondents have 
commented on these issues. The comments have 
been divided into following sub groups; crewing 
level (n=33), demand for efficiency (n=35), rest 
hours (n=30) and others (n=10). The results are 
summarized in Table 11. 
 
 
Table 11 Balance between commercial pressures and safety 
concerns – survey comments 
33 resp: The number of crewmembers is too low compared 
to work tasks, which are constantly increasing in 
quantity especially administrative. 
35 resp: High demand for efficiency and time pressure, 
especially when calling for and leaving port. 
30 resp: Rest hours are not followed, mostly due to low 
crewing level and high work load. 
10 resp: Not possible to categorize. Comments as “sorry, I 
am tired” and “I fell asleep on the watch”. 
8.2 Quantitative results from survey 
Survey questions related to crew’s perception of 
their priority of safety versus efficiency are 
presented in Table 12, together with question 
reference (ref) and number of respondents (n). 
 
 
Table 12 Balance between commercial pressures and safety 
concerns - survey questions 
Ref                   n 
SE1 The management doesn’t care how we do our  
work as long as the work gets done.      736 
SE2 I am confident that my company always  
prioritizes the crew’s safety.        754 
SE3 The on-shore top management in my company 
prioritizes safety before economy.      756 
SE4 I experience that safety is more a façade than a 
real priority area.            736 
SE5 Do you ever feel forced to continue your work  
even if safety may be threatened?       745 
SE6 Do you have the possibility to prioritize safety  
first in your daily work?          761 
SE7 The number of crewmembers is not sufficient  
to ensure safety on board.         744 
 
 
Explanation for interrelationship between survey 
questions: The priority of safety versus efficiency 
is supposed to be communicated from the 
organization's top management (SE3) down to the 
lower levels of the organization (SE2), which are, 
ideally, aligned (Reason, 2001). However, 
deviation from official policies and goals may be 
experienced (SE1, SE4). The level of stress 
experienced is interrelated with crewing level. 
Crewing constitutes a major part of operational 
expenditures, and how safety is prioritized may be 
reflected in the on board crewing level (SE7), 
which again influences the crew's opportunity to 
prioritize safety in their daily work (SE5, SE6). 
Descriptive statistics related to the priority of 
safety versus efficiency are presented in Table 13, 
with scale information and coding of item answers.  
 
 
Table 13 Balance between commercial pressures and safety 
concerns - descriptive results 
  1   2   3   4   5   
Ref (%)  (%)  (%)  (%)  (%)  Mean Std 
SE1 27.9  46.5  12.6  9.1  3.9  2.2  1.05 
SE2 0.9  2.0  6.5  45.0  45.6  4.3  0.76 
SE3 2.0  5.3  8.5  47.8  36.5  4.1  0.91 
SE4 19.7  35.7  9.0  26.8  8.8  2.7  1.29 
SE5 43.5  24.2  26.8  3.6  2.5  2.0  1.01 
SE6 0.3  0.7  4.5  31.9  62.7  4.6  0.64 
SE7 20.6  35.2  16.8  21.0  6.5  2.6  1.21 
SE1 through SE4 & SE7: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree,  
3 = not sure, 4 = agree and 5 = strongly agree. 
SE5 & SE6:1=very seldom/never, 2=seldom, 3=sometime, 
4=often and 5=very often/always. 
 
 
Factor structure matrix and loadings are 
presented in Table 14.  
 
 
Table 14 Balance between commercial pressures and safety 
concerns – factor structure and loadings 
Ref               Fac. 1 Fac. 2 
SE1 The management doesn’t care how we  
do our work as long as the work gets  
done.            .690  -.308  
SE7 The number of crewmembers is not  
sufficient to ensure safety on board.  .676  -.093 
SE5 Do you ever feel forced to continue  
your work even if safety may be  
threatened?          .647  -.169 
SE4 I experience that safety is more a  
façade than a real priority area.   .625  .035 
SE2 I am confident that my company  
always prioritizes the crew’s safety.  -.112  .819 
SE3 The on-shore top management in my 
company prioritizes safety before  
economy.           -.081  .771 
SE6 Do you have the possibility to prioritize  
safety first in your daily work?    -.135  .583 
* Underlined loadings indicate the factor on which the item 
was placed. 
8.3 Section discussion 
The factor structure matrix indicates two 
underlying dimensions related to the balance 
between commercial pressure and safety concerns 
(Table 14). One is reflecting when commercial 
pressure and efficiency is perceived to be of 
priority (factor 1) and the other when safety 
concerns are of priority (factor 2).  
Factor 1 indicates a relationship between the 
perception that management does not care how 
they work as long as it is done, and low crew level 
(SE1 & SE7, Table 14). Shortage of crew when 
compared to work load and demand for efficiency 
is also the most commented issue at the survey 
(Table 11). In all, 27.5% of the respondents 
perceive the crewing level as too low to ensure 
safety on board (SE7, Table 13). As seen in factor 
1, the consequence is that 32.9% of the crew feel 
forced to continue work even if safety is 
threatened. Also, safety is perceived as a façade by 
35.6% (SE5 & SE4, Table 13). When safety is seen 
as a façade, we expect that safety management 
related work is also mistrusted, which again may 
affect the willingness to report.  
On the other hand, factor 2 indicates that when 
the top management in the company manages to 
communicate safety as priority, the crew also 
prioritizes safety in their daily work (SE2, SE3 & 
SE6, Table 14). If safety is to be a priority, it is not 
enough simply to have an official statement of 
safety; it must be supported by actions. Such 
actions should include providing the crew with 
whatever manpower  or equipment they deem 
necessary to carry out their responsibilities safely; 
emphasizing measures which are low cost will not 
be sufficient. 
9 CONCLUSION 
Statistical analysis and qualitative data indicate 
that SMS within the Norwegian tanker industry 
have several deficiencies. Firstly, there is a 
substantial under reporting of experience data from 
the vessels. And reports that are placed may be 
intentionally altered to not include a correct 
description of the events. The situation may be 
explained by the crew’s fear of negative 
consequences, a complicated reporting system and 
a lack of understanding of the overall safety 
management system. When it comes to shore side's 
follow up and data analysis, the findings indicate a 
person orientated approach. This is resulting in 
underlying latent causes not being revealed and 
contributes to the perception of an organizational 
blame policy. Moreover, when applying a person 
oriented approach, measures developed tend to aim 
at controlling human actions, often in form of 
excess use of procedures and checklists. 
Procedures and check lists are perceived by the 
crew as being problematic to use in their daily 
work. This may be explained by lack of crew 
involvement in the development process, that 
crews' experience not being taking seriously and 
poor opportunities for local adjustments to each 
vessel. This again may lead to more frequent and 
deliberate breaching of procedures, which again 
affects the willingness to report, as the system is 
not understood in terms of its contribution to good 
safety management. This is an undermining and 
safety degrading vicious circle. To break out of 
such a cycle, following four facts regarding human 
nature and error should be recognized (Reason, 
2001). Firstly, human actions are almost always 
constrained by factors beyond an individual’s 
immediate control. Secondly, people cannot easily 
avoid actions which they did not intend to perform 
in the first place. Thirdly, error has multiple causes 
including personal, task related, situational and 
organizational. And finally, within a skilled, 
experienced and largely well intentioned 
workforce, situations are more amenable to 
improvement than people. With reference to the 
latter, the field studies revealed several episodes 
where experience and good seamanship gave 
solutions to situations that deviated from the 
ordinary. Under such circumstances, with 
experienced crew on board, an organizational 
approach towards safety may be more appropriate. 
Also, we suggest that employment conditions and 
crew stability are influential factors. Trust, good 
safety management and proper safety practices are 
all things which evolve over time, as a result of 
close interaction and experience feedback between 
all organizational members. Safety as priority has 
to be communicated with a united voice 
throughout the organization, supported by 
evidential actions. The crew needs to be provided 
with the required recourses, and support if work is 
delayed due to safety reasons. Each vessel, even 
within the same fleet, is different with regard to 
factors such as structural condition, crew 
experience and competence. In such peculiar 
situations, standardized measures may be 
experienced as poorly fitted, and safety could be 
managed more efficiently if crew were given the 
opportunity of making local adjustments. Finally, 
in a SMS, all of its parts are equally important and 
mutually dependent. Amendments should pertain 
to the system as a whole, and not be limited to 
individual components. 
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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to identify the factors determining the reporting 
frequency of experience data e.g. incidents and accidents. The empirical setting is the 
Norwegian controlled merchant fleet. Data were collected from a survey carried out in 
2006, where 1,262 questionnaires were gathered from 76 vessels. The data were 
subjected to explorative factor analysis, method of principal component and varimax 
rotation. Seven factors, representing latent dimensions of safety culture, were 
extracted. Internal consistency (Cronbach Alpha) and scale reliability were found to 
be acceptable. The factor scores were used in an ordered logistic regression to 
examine the factors‟ relationships to reporting practices. The results show that 
enhanced safety related training, a trusting and open relationship among the crew, 
safety oriented ship management, performance of pro-active risk identification 
activities and feedback on reported events all are significantly related to higher 
reporting frequency. On the other hand, demand for efficiency and lack of attention to 
safety from shore personnel, are significantly related to lower reporting frequency. 
The results also show a significantly lower reporting frequency among those who 
have worked with their local manager less than 1 year. Bulk and dry cargo vessels 
also show significantly lower reporting frequency than those working on liquid bulk 
carriers. 
 
Keywords: Reporting practices; safety management; safety culture; ordered logistic 
regression; shipping; seafaring 
1 Introduction 
Information about incidents, near-misses, operational failures and successes are 
crucial when taking a proactive approach to safety. Such information is often 
collected and processed into basic data for remedial actions through the use of a 
formal safety management system, which constitutes a cornerstone of organizational 
learning (Kjellén 2000, Reason 2001). Within the maritime industry, at the 
international administrative level, guidelines for formal safety assessment systems 
have already been developed. In these, identification of potential hazards is the first 
step (International Maritime Organization 2007a). At company level, safety 
management is regulated by the International Safety Management (ISM) code, which 
requires shipping companies to have a system of reporting and collecting experience 
data (International Maritime Organization 2002). Although various systems for safety 
management do exist, safety management per se is not only a system property. It is 
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not sufficient simply to have a system for the collection of safety related data. The 
system efficiency is determined by its human interrelationships (crew, shore 
personnel, analysts and others). A fundamental pillar of safety management is that 
information reported into the system is reliable and reflects the actual situation in 
working operations. Thus, under-reporting of safety related events constitutes a major 
threat to the efficiency and utility of a safety management system.  
 There is an extensive literature considering reporting practices and the factors 
which influence these. Particular interest has been shown in high-risk sectors such as 
civil aviation and nuclear power plants. Attention has also been given to road and rail 
transportation, health care and oil & gas related activities. Although the importance of 
reporting practices in determining the outcome of a safety management system has 
been acknowledged in the literature, little attention has been given to the topic within 
merchant shipping. This is somewhat surprising given that seafaring is regarded as a 
high-risk occupation (Anderson 2003, Hansen, Pedersen 1996, Håvold 2005, Roberts, 
Marlow 2005). 
 A few studies which examine merchant shipping have been retrieved by 
searching through the Science Direct database for peer review publications. The 
findings indicate a culture of under-reporting of safety information, which represents 
a shortcoming in the their safety management (Psarros, Skjong & Eide 2009, Oltedal 
2010, International Maritime Organization 2007b, Ellis, Bloor,Michael, 
Sampson,Helen 2010). An analysis of accident data from the Lloyd's Register 
FairPlay (LRFP) and the Norwegian Maritime Directorate (NMD) for vessels 
registered in Norway, suggests that only 30% of accidents experienced were reported 
(Psarros, Skjong & Eide 2009). Own research indicates that 36% of ship board tanker 
crew never or only sometimes report near-misses or minor incidents (Oltedal 2010). 
Within the dry cargo sector, around 40% state that they never or only sometime report 
a minor incident or near-miss (Oltedal, Engen 2010). Differences in reporting 
practices between dry cargo and tanker vessels are also suggested by others (Ellis, 
Bloor,Michael, Sampson,Helen 2010).  
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) expresses an awareness of the 
under-reporting of safety information, and highlights that this must be improved 
(International Maritime Organization 2007b). 
 
1.1 Theoretical foundation 
Although various safety management models exist (see (Kjellén 2000), of 
fundamental importance in all of them is the collection of safety information from the 
operational productions system, used with intention the intention of preventing future 
accidents and other unwanted episodes. A model of a safety management system is 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 
Safety management system (adapted from Kjellen 2000) 
 
 
 
 Figure 1 shows the flow of information in a safety management system. The 
shaded areas represent the safety information system, that is, the part of the safety 
management system which provides information needed for decisions and signalling 
related to safety matters. Reporting and the collection of data on, for instance, 
operational accident risk by means of self reported accidents, incidents and near-
misses is regarded as a critical function of the overall system. Information processing 
and the development of remedial actions all depend on the reliability and accuracy of 
the reported information (Kjellén 2000). 
 
When it comes to the under-reporting of safety related events, Kjellen (2000) 
uses behavioural theory to explain different propensities to report. Behavioural theory 
is primarily used to explain why people deliberately violate safety rules. It focuses on 
the consequences of behaviour and how these consequences affect people‟s judgments 
in relation to recurring situations, and their ingrained action patterns in these 
situations. For instance, when performing an operation, people may have two action 
alternatives to choose between: one which is considered safe and one considered 
unsafe. Experience shows that people are inclined to choose the unsafe alternative 
when this alternative provides a consequence regarded as positive, such as saving time 
or other resources. When people in turn get positive feedback for their efficiency, 
deliberately violating safety rules becomes a valuable skill, and over time a part of the 
organizational culture. This safety-efficiency trade-off has also been noted by other 
researchers, for example (Hollnagel 2009). The reporting of an incident or accident is 
often a time consuming activity, and it  is therefore reasonable to  expect that demand 
for efficiency will lead to less reporting, as well as an increase in situations that 
should have been reported in the first place.  
Another factor influencing people's propensity to report is how the 
organization handles blame and punishment (Reason 2001). Reason (2001) 
emphasises the importance of organizations developing a just culture. In a just culture, 
there is an atmosphere of trust in which people are encouraged or even rewarded for 
providing essential safety related information, but in which there is also a clear line 
between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. For example, if efficiency by unsafe 
acts is knowingly accepted during normal operations, the operator should not be 
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blamed and punished when that very same action is a causal factor in an unwanted 
event.  
Feedback of the results to the reporter is considered a motivating factor, as the 
individuals understand the relevance of reporting and see that is taken seriously. 
However, feedback on reported events in the form of constantly developing new 
procedures may also be perceived as blame, as it is signalling that the operator did 
something wrong. Such a person oriented approach also has another drawback. When 
searching for human error, the organization often does not look behind the operators 
when looking for causal factors, which could be found elsewhere in the organization 
such as, for instance, a pressure for efficiency.  
Reporting practices, how the organization handles, blame, punishment and 
feedback, and the general functionality of the organization‟s safety management, are 
regarded as key elements in an organization‟s safety culture (Reason 2001). 
Management characteristics and leadership, at all levels in the organization both 
shore-side and ship-board, are regarded as major enablers and barriers with respect to 
the development of an efficient safety culture (Maritime and Coastguard Agency 
2004), and thus also an adequate reporting culture. 
1.2 Previous research 
The under-reporting of safety related information has been identified as a 
problem in several industries. For example, it is suggested that up to 68% of all 
workplace accidents and injuries are not captured in the national injury surveillance 
systems, which were set up by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) in the United States 
(US)(Rosenman et al. 2006). Others suggest that 81% of injuries experienced remain 
unreported (Probst, Brubaker & Barsotti 2008). Within the health industry, barriers 
against reporting include fear of reprisals, lack of confidentiality, time constraints and 
lack of post-reporting feedback (Espin et al. 2007).  
Although Psarros (2009) concludes that under-reporting constitutes a major 
problem within the maritime industry, the reasons for non-reporting are not addressed 
(Psarros, Skjong & Eide 2009). Neil et al. (2010) suggest that under-reporting is more 
frequent on general cargo vessels compared to others. However, these conclusions are 
drawn based on differences in aggregate data in administrations, and not reporting 
practices directly. Barriers against reporting are not reliably identified, however 
differences in national / cultural risk perception have been suggested (Ellis, 
Bloor,Michael, Sampson,Helen 2010).  
A recent cross-industrial review indicates that a fear of blame and punishment 
(legal, organizational or from co-workers) is the most commonly cited barrier to 
reporting (van der Schaaf, Kanse 2004). The International Maritime Organization also 
addresses fear of being thought blameworthy or of being disciplined, embarrassment, 
fear of legal liability, and so on, as the main barriers towards reporting (International 
Maritime Organization 2007b). Schaaf (2004) has also identified other common 
barriers such as: a lack of follow-up, managerial issues such as no commitment or 
distrust, time demands, a paper producing reporting system and a lack of 
understanding of what constitutes a near-miss and incident. Own research indicates 
that all of these factors are present within the shipping industry (Oltedal 2010). 
Moreover, Schaaf (2004) reports that a 'macho' environment may discourage 
reporting, and that injury in such environments is regarded as a part of the work. 
Based on his review, Scaaf (2004) identifies four main categories of reporting 
barriers: 1) fear of disciplinary action (as a result of a „„blame culture‟‟ where those 
who commit an error are punished) or of other people‟s reactions (embarrassment); 2) 
risk acceptance (incidents are part of the job, cannot be prevented, the „macho‟ 
perspective); 3) useless (perceived attitudes of management taking no notice, not 
likely to do anything about it) and 4) practical reasons (too time-consuming, too 
difficult). 
1.3 The objective of the paper. 
It is evident that the under-reporting of safety information and risk, is a 
problem within the merchant shipping industry, yet we have not been able to find any 
research which empirically explores which factors affect the on-board reporting 
practices. As stated earlier, a considerable amount of research has been undertaken 
looking at reporting practices and the factors influencing it within other industries. 
However, working within merchant shipping is in many ways different from shore-
based activities. Life and work on board is a 24-hour-a-day activity, where the crew 
has little opportunity to interact with the surrounding society. Most of the sailors are 
contract employees, comprised of multiple nationalities, with a typical sailing period 
of 9 months at a time. Also, due to its global nature, the industry is highly exposed to 
competition. (Oltedal, Engen 2009). We have therefore identified a need for more 
research on the factors influencing reporting practices in the setting of merchant 
shipping.  
The objectives of the study are: 
 
1) To determine the structure of safety culture in Norwegian controlled merchant 
shipping by liquid tankers and bulk carriers using exploratory factor analysis. 
2) Explore the relationship between on board reporting practices and safety 
culture factors. 
3) Check for differences in reporting practices and familiarity with their local 
manager. 
4) Check for differences in reporting practices between type of vessel; liquid 
tanker versus bulk / dry cargo carrier. 
 
2 Method 
2.1 Survey samples and administration 
The survey forms part of a PhD-research project which explores the relationship 
between ship-board safety culture and management on Norwegian controlled liquid- 
and drybulk cargo vessels, with a second goal of looking for differences between the 
two vessel classes.  
The sample was randomly selected from the Norwegian Ship-owners‟ 
Association‟s list of members for 2005, and the sample was stratified with regard to 
type of vessel (general cargo, bulk carrier, oil tanker, gas tanker and chemical tanker). 
Initially, 150 vessels were selected, which constitutes about 15% of the population. 
Following the initial selection, telephone calls were made to each company to ask for 
their participation. Thirty one companies agreed to participate with 83 vessels. Forty 
five companies with 67 vessels declined to participate.  Reasons for not participating 
included:  
 
 Being unable to contact the company despite repeated efforts (23 vessels, 16 
companies). 
 The vessel was not owned by a Norwegian party, and therefore not defined as 
Norwegian controlled (15 vessels, 8 companies).  
 Ship management was outsourced to a non Norwegian country, and therefore 
not defined as Norwegian controlled (14 vessels, 8 companies). 
 The company refused to participate (12 vessels, 10 companies). 
 The remaining vessels were sold (3 vessels, 3 companies).  
 
The population was redefined, and vessels managed from a non-Norwegian 
country were not considered Norwegian controlled.  
On an international basis, the various flag states‟ performances are assessed on 
standards of safety, environment and social performance and are maintained and enforced 
by flag states, in full compliance with international maritime regulations. Based on their 
performance, the flag states are then categorized into three sub groupings; the white list 
(good performance), the grey list (mediocre performance) and the black list (poor 
performance) (MARISEC 2008). It turned out that companies operating vessels flying 
a black listed flag declined to participate in the study. Thus, the sample is 
representative only for vessels flying a white and grey listed flag. 
The results of the study were based on self-completed questionnaire data. In total, 
1,574 questionnaires were distributed to 83 tankers and bulk carriers. 76 vessels from 
29 companies returned a total of 1,262 forms, which gives an individual response rate 
of 80.2 %, a vessel response rate of 91.5 % and a company response rate of 93.5%. 
Each vessel received a package with individual questionnaires and a sealable return 
envelope. On each vessel, the safety delegate received instructions regarding 
administration, purpose and anonymity. Vessels not returning any questionnaires were 
reminded up to four times. The survey was administrated during the spring/summer of 
2006.  
2.2 Questionnaire development 
The questionnaire was developed by Studio Apertura (2004) (a constituent centre of 
The Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), in collaboration with 
the Norwegian DNV and the research institution SINTEF (2003)) as a part of a 
programme for research in risk and safety in transport (RISIT) founded by The 
Research Council of Norway. The main part of the questionnaire was made up of 10 
sections representing the following dimensions of safety culture: top management‟s 
safety priorities, local management, procedures and guidelines, interaction, work 
situation, competence, responsibility and sanctions, working environment, learning 
from incidents, and description of the organization. All these constructs were 
measured on five point Likert scales ranging from `strongly disagree‟ to `strongly 
agree‟, or from `very seldom/never‟ to `very often/always‟.  
 
Håvold and Nesset (2009) discuss the issue of language and response style. They 
proceed using only an English and Norwegian version of their questionnaire. McCrae 
(2001) studied Norwegians and Filipinos who completed questionnaires both in their 
own language (Norwegian/Tagalog) as well as in English. He found no significant 
differences in the mean responses. However, in a cross-national study, Harzing (2005) 
found that English language versions tended to be more homogenized, potentially 
obscuring cross-national differences. 
 
Given that forcing the respondents to answer in the official working language of 
English could potentially bias the results, the questionnaire was also made available in 
Norwegian, Polish and Tagalog. This covered the main languages in use on-board. In 
addition, during the fieldwork it became obvious that there was significant variation in 
the English-language abilities of the crew. This provides further support for the 
approach adopted here. All participants were issued with questionnaires in their own 
national language and English. They were free to choose which version to return. 
2.3 Demographics 
Questionnaires were returned from 40 liquid bulk carriers (liquid tanker) and 36 dry 
bulk carriers (dry cargo). 63% of the respondents were employed on a liquid tanker 
and 37% at a dry cargo vessel. The sample was male dominated (92.5% of the 
respondents). 22 nationalities were represented. The majority from the Philippines 
(65.5%), followed by Norway (9.2%), Poland (8.1%) and Russia (5.5%). Just over 
56% of respondents were under the age of 40. 
3 Results 
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) v.16.0 and STATA v. 
10.1 were used for the data analysis. 
3.1 Dependent variable: Reporting frequency 
The dependent variable, reporting frequency, was measured by the item: “Do 
minor incidents get reported in writing”. A total of 13% stated 'never or seldom 
report' (N=164), 20.7% stated that they sometimes did report (N=261), 31.8% that 
they often reported N=401) and 23.5% that they always reported minor incidents. The 
remaining 11.1% were missing (N=140). 
3.2 Factor analysis  
 All 1262 responses were submitted to explorative principal component factor 
analysis with Varimax rotation, in order to identify the latent underlying dimensions 
of safety culture. The data were deemed appropriate for analysis, according to the 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling value of .858, and significant Barlett‟s test. 
Factors were extracted based on the following three analytical criteria: (1) Pairwise 
deletion, (2) Eigen value more than 1.0 and (3) factor loading more than 0.50. Items 
that failed to attain minimum loading of 0.5, or which loaded significantly on more 
than one factor, were omitted. This resulted in the extraction of 7 factors, explaining 
71.305% of the total variance.  
This was followed by a scale-reliability test. Each factor was evaluated based 
on the following three criteria: (1) Cronbach‟s Alpha coefficient > 0.70 (2) item-total 
correlation > 0.40, (3) inter-item correlation > 0.30, <0.80. However, these cut-off 
points are rules of thumb, and no clear consensus with regard to where the cut-off 
points exist (Hair 1998, Field 2005, Pett, Lackey & Sullivan 2003). Each item's 
theoretical significance was also taken into account.  
Factor correlations analysis was carried out to evaluate the construct validity, 
which concerns the theoretical relationship between the factors. (Hair 1998, Field 
2005). All extracted factors were found to be a valid and reliable representation of the 
underlying safety culture construct.  
Each factor's explained variance, Cronbarch‟s Alpha value, inter-item range 
and item total range are presented in Table 1. Extracted factor structure, item 
description and loadings are presented in Table 2. Loadings in bold indicate the factor 
on to which the item was placed.  
 
Table 1 
Factor scale reliability test, number of items and explained variance 
Factor  
ID 
N  
items 
Explained 
variance 
Cronbach‟s 
Alpha 
Inter-item 
range 
Item-total 
range 
F1 4 30.621 .914 .651 - .806 .781 - .821 
F2 4 10.102 .825 .453 - .680 .604 - .673 
F3 3 7.917 .867 .647 - .710 .731 - .779 
F4 3 7.296 .819 .527 - .741 .564 - .733 
F5 3 5.612 .790 .440 - .767 .470 - .732 
F6 4 5.391 .669 .262 - .405 .410 - .527 
F7 2 4.366 .852 .743 - .743 .743 - .743 
 
 
Table 2 
Seven factor rotated solution with factor loadings, and explained variance 
 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 
I have received the training that is necessary in 
order to handle critical or hazardous situations. 
.856 .165 .111 .163 .053 -.015 -.055 
I have received the education that is necessary 
in order to handle critical or hazardous 
situations. 
.855 .152 .117 .168 .078 -.034 -.070 
I have received the education that is necessary 
in order to work safely. 
.849 .246 .063 .103 .089 -.096 -.031 
I have received the training that is necessary in 
order to work safely. 
.813 .270 .097 .087 .082 -.102 -.037 
We receive sufficient safety-related information 
when we sign on / start a new sailing period. 
.191 .749 .137 .153 .042 -.138 -.039 
We receive sufficient safety-related information 
when we start a new watch. 
.239 .746 .151 .139 .106 -.097 -.016 
We solve problems and conflicts in a good 
manner. 
.232 .745 .143 .173 .016 -.080 -.098 
The working environment on board is 
characterized by openness and dialog. 
.157 .730 .124 .087 .091 -.120 -.127 
Does your closest superior follow up to ensure 
that all work on board is done in a safe manner? 
.115 .142 .848 .193 .105 -.120 -.080 
Is your closest superior a good role model when 
it comes to attending to his own and others' 
safety? 
.093 .212 .821 .104 .079 -.139 -.059 
Is your closest superior clear in his engagement 
to ensuring his co-workers' safety? 
.141 .163 .817 .182 .072 -.140 -.076 
Do you carry out a "Safe Job Analysis"/"Risk 
Analysis" before high-risk operations? 
.130 .131 .136 .871 .048 -.063 -.075 
Do you carry out a safety evaluation before new 
working methods, tools, or routines are 
introduced? 
.185 .151 .169 .840 .115 -.108 -.036 
Do you have the possibility to prioritize safety 
first in your daily work? 
.190 .288 .202 .622 .112 -.051 -.101 
Do you receive constructive feedback from the 
company on the conditions you report? 
.087 .063 .103 .029 .883 -.089 -.041 
Do you receive constructive feedback from the 
captain on the conditions you report? 
.078 .041 .152 .056 .875 -.022 -.077 
Do you get information from 
incidents/accidents on other vessels? 
.066 .089 -.020 .120 .684 -.101 -.022 
In my company, they are more preoccupied 
with the statistics than the human consequences 
of an incident. 
-.089 -.021 -.098 -.030 -.154 .784 .091 
Reporting in itself take too much time. -.115 -.078 -.059 -.177 .031 .709 .029 
I experience that safety work is more a facade 
than a real priority area. 
.070 -.104 -.063 .024 -.110 .606 .222 
When an undesirable incident has occurred, -.085 -.249 -.204 -.027 -.016 .560 .193 
people are more preoccupied with placing 
blame than finding the cause of the incident. 
Due to the captain's demand for efficiency we 
sometimes have to violate procedures. 
-.093 -.134 -.130 -.039 -.091 .228 .878 
Due to the company's demand for efficiency we 
sometimes have to violate procedures. 
-.066 -.093 -.059 -.146 -.052 .253 .865 
 
 
 
The 7 extracted factors in Table 2, representing the on board safety culture, were 
labelled as followed (label in italic):  
 
Factor 1; competence, reflecting the crews' perception of their own training and 
education, in order to work safely and handle critical and hazardous situations.  
 
Factor 2; interpersonal, reflecting the relationship amongst the crew, problem solving 
abilities, form of communication and sharing of safety information.  
 
Factor 3; management, reflecting the crews‟ perception of their closest manager as a 
role model, engagement and interest in ensuring safety in work operations.  
 
Factor 4; work practices, reflecting performance of proactive activities as safe job 
analysis and hazard identification, and how safety is prioritised in daily operations.  
 
Factor 5; feedback, reflecting feedback given to crew on reported safety information, 
and experience reports from other vessels.  
 
Factor 6; shore orientation, reflecting the shore-side part of organisations' attitude 
towards and prioritising of safety.  
 
Factor 7; efficiency, reflecting the relationship between perceived demand for 
efficiency and safe working practices.  
3.3 Ordered logistic regression 
The dependent variable “reporting frequency” has an ordinal nature, with 4 
possible outcomes (1=never/seldom, 2=sometimes, 3=often and, 4=always). It is 
possible to handle such data in a number of ways. Ordinary least squares is seldom 
appropriate for such data since it requires a continuous dependant variable. To convert 
our dependant variable to a continuous variable would require an assumption about 
the distance between each of the categories. Rather than impose such an assumption, 
we choose an alternative technique: the ordered logistic regression model. 
The ordered logit regression model can be seen as an extension of standard 
logistic regression. Standard logistic regression utilises a dichotomous dependant 
variable. For a polytomous variable, this can be extended to a multinomial logit 
model. However, this neglects the fact that the variables are ordinal, and assumes that 
they are simply nominal. The ordinal logistic regression model utilises this important 
information. In the model, m-1 equation are simultaneously estimated, where m is the 
number of categories of the dependant variable. The equations are formed by pooling 
the data i.e. category 1 versus categories 2,3 and 4, categories 1 and 2 versus 
categories 3 and 4 and then categories 1, 2 and 3 versus category 4. 
The assumption made is that the effect of the independent variables on the 
dependant variable is independent of the category. This assumption may be referred to 
as the proportional-odds assumption or the parallel regressions assumption. Like any 
assumption, it is not always met in practice. It can be tested by estimating a 
generalised ordered logit regression (which does not impose coefficient equality 
across the equations) and comparing it to the ordered logit regression using a 
likelihood ration test. We performed this test and obtained a p-value of 0.036. This 
indicates that at the 5% level of significance, the assumption of parallel regressions is 
not met. 
There are a number of options available at this stage. We can assume that the 
failure of the assumption is due to sampling variability and proceed with the standard 
logistic regression. We could also move to a multinomial logit and disregard the 
ordinal nature of the data. However, more insight can be gained by proceeding with 
the generalised logistic regression. This model allows the parameter estimates to vary 
by category. However, it may be the case that the parallel regression assumption is 
violated only with some of the included regressors. It is possible to test for this by 
imposing equality restrictions across equations on parameter estimates and testing the 
validity of these constraints using a Wald test. If there are good reasons, a priori, to 
select such constraints then these can be tested. Otherwise, a stepwise regression 
approach can be used to test which variables violate the assumption. In our case, there 
was no reason to suspect that some variables were more likely than others to violate 
the assumption. For this reason, we chose the stepwise approach. The resulting model 
is far more parsimonious than the unconstrained generalised logistic regression. The 
results are presented in Table 3. 
 
  
Table 4  
Results from the constrained generalised ordered logistic regression analysis with factor scores (FAC). 
Odds ratios are presented. 
 
Beta Odds Ratio Std. Err. z P>|z| 
FAC1 Competence 1.4949 0.1387 4.33 0.0000 
FAC2 Interpersonal 1.1971 0.1095 1.97 0.0490 
FAC3 Management 1.5573 0.1489 4.63 0.0000 
FAC4 Work practices 1.3319 0.1262 3.02 0.0020 
FAC5 Feedback 1.8090 0.2943 3.64 0.0000 
FAC6 Shore orientation 0.6094 0.0594 -5.08 0.0000 
FAC7 Efficiency 0.7581 0.0942 -2.94 0.0030 
Vessel (Tank=1) 0.5328 0.3104 -2.03 0.0430 
Management (exp. > 1 year = 1) 2.9817 0.3215 3.40 0.0010 
Deviations from Proportionality 2 
FAC5 Feedback 1.4424 0.1578 2.32 0.0200 
Vessel (Tank=1) 0.8117 0.2967 -0.70 0.4820 
Management (exp. > 1 year = 1) 0.9719 0.3092 -0.09 0.9260 
Deviations from Proportionality 3 
FAC5 Feedback 1.6840 0.2202 2.37 0.0180 
Vessel (Tank=1) 1.6483 0.3701 1.35 0.1770 
Management (exp. > 1 year = 1) 0.4595 0.3915 -1.99 0.0470 
Constants 
CONS1 1.6840 0.2792 6.05 0.0000 
CONS2 1.6483 0.2153 0.89 0.3750 
CONS3 0.4595 0.2634 -6.54 0.0000 
 
n = 473 
           
Pseudo    = 0.1561 
            154.99 p-value=0.0000 
 
 The results are presented as a set of 'base' coefficients and then deviations 
from proportionality. These deviations are calculated by taking the ratio of 
coefficients between equations (since the model is presented using odds ratios). For 
example, the parameters given under the heading "Deviations from Proportionality 2" 
are obtained by dividing equation 1 by equation 2. So, for example, the odds ratio for 
category 3 for the variable 'Vessel' can be calculated as 1.6483*0.5328=0.8782. 
Parameters which are constrained to be equal across equations are not shown. 
 The results from the model are in line with expectations. The odds ratios are in 
the expected order of magnitude and are jointly significant. The factors competence, 
interpersonal, management, work practices and feedbacks all increase the odds of 
being in a higher category of the reporting frequency measure. The two factors 
reflecting shore orientation and efficiency significantly decrease the odds of being in a 
higher category of the reporting frequency measure. Crews on tanker vessels are more 
likely to have a lower reporting frequency than those on bulk vessels. Crews who 
have been working with their closest manager for more than one year tend to report 
more often. 
 The three variables which did not meet the parallel regressions assumption 
were FAC5 Feedback, Vessel and Management. This means that the effect of these 
variables is dependent on the category of the dependant variable.  
 
3.4 Validity and limitations 
 
There is a possibility that some of the relationships reported in this section are subject 
to the common method bias (Campell and Fiske, 1959). This results from the fact that 
the data come from a common source. For example, a common scale to the different 
questions. Potential statistical remedies have been suggested. Spector (2006) is 
sceptical of the merits of such approaches. He argues that given that it is not possible 
to know the existence or extent of any possible bias, treating it could in fact introduce 
more bias than existed in the first instance. He recommends using a multi-method 
strategy so that results do not only rely on the results of one questionnaire. In this 
research, case studies, interviews, participatory and field studies have been used to 
validate the data. The results have also been presented to people working within the 
industry who have expressed that they believe the results to give an accurate 
representation of the true situation. 
4 Discussion  
The results suggest that there is a positive association between the respondent‟s 
perception of their local manager‟s leadership skills and reporting frequency 
(p>0.001, odds ratio=1.5573). A leadership style where the manager is perceived as a 
good role model ensures and follows up that all work on board is done in a safe 
manner, were positively related to increased reporting frequency. This relationship is 
also supported by other research. Perception of management, as 
management/leadership style, commitment and visibility, is the most commonly 
measured dimension in safety research in general (Flin et al. 2000). Within the 
maritime sector, research initiated by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency in the 
United Kingdom, identified various core leadership qualities as being necessary for 
effective safety leadership (Maritime and Coastguard Agency 2004). Shipboard, it 
was found that these qualities were primarily geared towards the captain as a key 
leader for safety, however also for lower ranks with leadership responsibilities. 
However, perceived gaps between desirable leadership qualities and what is currently 
being exhibited were also identified. With reference to the explosion and sinking of 
the chemical tanker “Bow Mariner” (United States Coast Guard 2005), poor 
leadership skills were on the agenda of the IMO (International Maritime Organization 
31 October 2007).  
The results also suggest increased reporting frequency for those who have 
worked with their closest superior/manager for one year or more. This “leadership-
familiarity” variable did not meet the parallel assumptions, and thus it is indicated that 
the effect is dependent on the category. Apparently the effect of being familiar with 
your superior is larger when moving from the category “never or seldom” to 
“sometimes” report (P>0.001, odds ratio=2.9817), and the effect decrease slightly 
when moving to the higher categories of “sometimes” to “often”, and “often” to 
“always”. Leadership and management do have various facets, and may be seen as 
being both social and cognitive in nature. Social skills include things such as team 
building, consideration of others, conflict resolution etc. We would suggest that such 
social skills are of particular importance within this maritime setting. Work at sea may 
be characterized as a total institution, as defined by (Goffman 1968), where both work 
and leisure time happen at the same time, with few and limited possibilities to interact 
with the surrounding world. In such settings, leadership and management style 
influences work and social life in a more all-embracing manner, including the 
interpersonal relationship among crew members. Although the research regarding 
managements importance for safety within the off-shore shipping industry is scarce, 
research from other industries has established a relationship between management, 
leadership and safety related matters (Geldart et al. 2010, Wu, Chen & Li 2008, 
Vredenburgh 2002, Zohar 1980), thus management does not only have a direct effect 
upon safety and reporting practices, but also an indirect effect by influencing the other 
factors in the model, further discussed below. 
The results also indicate that the interpersonal relationship among the crew 
influences reporting practices (odds ratio: 1.1971, P> 0.0490). With regard to 
reporting practices, interpersonal relationships relate to, inter alia, the degree of trust 
and open communication amongst the crewmembers. Reason (2001) regards a trusting 
relationship as a key factor in  getting individuals to report their own mistakes and 
experiences. Interpersonal relationships amongst crew, in practice, also reflects to 
which degree the crew shares safety related information when changing shifts, and 
more informal processes of sharing safety related information during operations. For 
both subordinated and superior and managerial positions, additional challenges may 
arise in relation to multinational-crew and unstable crewing with low stability within 
teams. When signing on a new ship, new crew will be unfamiliar with the ship 
management‟s and closest superior‟s management style as well as fellow 
crewmembers and the on-board working climate. The seafarers require time to 
familiarize and adjust to the new situation. For instance, if the ship management on 
the seafarers‟ previous vessel were blame oriented, this seafarer will most likely sign 
join the new vessel with this latest experience in mind, and be cautious about 
reporting their own mistakes for fear of being blamed or sanctioned. In time, the 
seafarer will learn how the management is oriented on that particular vessel. The 
problem is even more pronounced when the seafarer is constantly changing vessel, 
with new management each sailing period, and thus has to go through this 
familiarization process each time. The management style is known to vary within the 
sector, and poor shipboard management and leadership is identified in other research 
(Oltedal, Engen 2009, Knudsen 2003). 
The results indicate a positive relationship between competence and reporting 
frequency (odds ratio: 1.4949, P> 0.0000). Competence is among the top five most 
commonly measured themes within safety research (Flin et al. 2000), and refers to the 
perception of own skills and ability to handle critical and hazardous situations, and 
their ability to perform their work in a safe manner. In our analysis, competence is 
comprised of two sub facets, formal education and training. Minimum training 
requirements are covered by international conventions and regulations developed by 
the IMO, where parts are required to be performed on-board. For example, it is 
required that every crew member participates in at least one abandon ship and one fire 
drill every month. Also that these drills, as far as practicable, be conducted as if there 
were an actual emergency (International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
(1974), International Maritime Organization 2009). On-board, the captain and ship 
management are ultimately responsible for how such drills, and other on-board 
training arrangements, are carried out. Experience from the field shows that in this 
area there are large variations. On some vessels, if performed, the drills are arranged 
as mustering, while others are arranged for realism. Variation in on-board training 
efficiency may be a result of various situations such as a lack of time due to demand 
for efficiency. The results indicate a negative relationship between demand for 
efficiency and reporting practices (odds ratio: 0.7581, P> 0.0030). Demand for 
efficiency, caused by inter alia commercial pressure, has been one of the most 
frequent reasons for violations of procedures and checklists (Oltedal 2010), as well as 
an important influencing factor for collisions and groundings (MacRae 2009).  
However, with regard to competence, we suggest that one significant cause 
could be that the minimum requirements for leadership and managerial skills stated in 
the international conventions and regulations are inadequate (also noted by IMO in 
(International Maritime Organization 31 October 2007)). It is therefore up to each 
maritime educational establishment to decide to what degree managerial and 
leadership should be covered, or to each shipping company with regard to the 
provision of further education. Insufficient managerial and leadership skills could also 
result in time pressure and demand for efficiency through inadequate planning and 
resource management.  
We also suggest that the same relationships exist with regard to the factor concerning 
proactive work practices (leadership, managerial skills, time available and 
competence interrelationship). Work practices refers to  the degree to which the crew 
perform proactive activities like safe job analyses and safety analysis before risk 
activities, and to which degree they have the opportunity to prioritize safety in their 
daily work. Such activities increase the chances of revealing potentially dangerous 
situations, and thus increases the amount of reportable safety information (Kjellén 
2000) 
The results indicate that proactive work practices have a positive relationship with 
reporting frequency (odds ratio: 1.3319, P> 0.0020).  
Feedback on reported events is held to stimulate organizational learning, and 
thus better premises for safety improvements, by, inter alia, sharing of experience of 
near misses and incidents, as guidelines for corrective actions as well as being a 
motivator for increased reporting (Reason 2001). A positive relationship between 
reporting frequency and feedback is also shown in our data (odds ratio: 1.8090, P> 
0.0000). However, the relationship did deviate from proportionality meaning that the 
effect of feedback is dependent on the category of the dependant variable reporting 
frequency. Thus, the effect from feedback is larger when moving between the higher 
categories “sometimes” to “often”, and “often” to “always”, than when mowing 
between the lower categories “never or seldom” to “sometimes” Treatment of non-
conformance and development or remedial actions is normally done by shore 
personnel. To what degree seafaring personnel are involved in these processes varies 
within companies. Shipboard feedback is given by the captain and/or shipboard 
management, who in turn receive the information from the shore side of the company. 
Thus the quality of feedback given is not only dependent upon theship management, 
but also the shore side‟s orientation towards safety. This relationship between 
shipboard reporting practices and shore-side safety orientation is also indicated by the 
results (odds ratio: 0.6094, P> 0.0000).  When the shore side‟s safety effort is 
perceived as a facade and person orientated, it is reflected in lower reporting 
frequency.  
Finally, it is indicated that the reporting frequency is lower on dry cargo 
vessels than on tanker vessels. The relationship deviates from proportionality, 
meaning that the effect of type of vessel is larger when moving between the higher 
categories “often” to “always”, than when mowing between the lower categories 
“never or seldom” to “sometimes”. Differences between the liquid and dry cargo 
sector are further discussed in Oltedal and Engen (2010).  
5 Conclusion, limitations and suggestions for future 
research 
 
This article has studied the factors which influence the frequency of reporting of 
experience data such as data on accidents/incidents. The previous research outlined in 
the paper has shown that underreporting is a significant problem within the merchant 
shipping industry. Underreporting undermines the foundations on which any safety 
management system is constructed. If accidents/incidents are not reported then past 
mistakes cannot be learned from and the probability of future accidents/incidents 
cannot be reduced. In particular, the analysis presented in this paper is important since 
it not only identifies the significance of potentially influential factors, but also 
quantifies the relative strength of these factors. This allows a better targeting of 
budgetary resources to improve safety. 
 
In particular,the objective of this article was to assess the relationship between 
reporting practices and dimensions of safety culture, management and vessel in the 
Norwegian controlled shipping industry. The results indicated that high competence, a 
good and open interpersonal relationship among the crew, a safety oriented 
management, execution of proactive work practices and feedback upon reported 
events all increase reporting frequency. The two dimensions reflecting when shore 
orientation downgrade safety and when efficiency is given importance decreases 
reporting frequency. The three variables which did not meet the parallel regressions 
assumption were FAC5 Feedback, Vessel and Management. This means that the 
effect of these variables is dependent on the category of the dependant variable. 
Crews who have been working with their closest manager for more than one year tend 
to report more often.  
   
However, none of the identified factors should be addressed in isolation from 
each other. As the discussion made clear, they are all important and mutually 
dependent.  It would therefore be of further interest to explore the internal 
relationships between the identified dimensions of safety culture, for example with 
structural equation modelling and/or path-analysis.  
The data are representative of vessels flying a white and grey flag only, as 
those registered under a black listed flag did not want to participate. As participation 
was voluntary on the behalf of the company, we assume that those participating do, in 
general, emphasise safety in their operations, and the development of a sound 
reporting culture. However, it would be of further interest to address potential 
differences between flag of registration and safety.  
It would also be of interest to further explore the difference with regard to type 
of vessel. The differences in reporting frequency could be a result of other variables 
related to type of vessel, as for example customer specific 
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
Appendix 1: Survey questionnaire and letter of 
introduction 

Dear crew member 
In this survey I want to assess how safety is handled on Norwegian-controlled bulk cargo and tanker 
vessels and how the crew onboard perceive safety. This is part of my PhD work, which is aimed at 
improving our understanding of how various safety-related circumstances work in practice. The results 
of the survey will help your shipping company make safety-related decisions, enabling your safety to be 
better ensured.
All information that is obtained through the survey is anonymous. It will not be possible to trace any 
answers to individuals, shipping companies or vessels. My research has been financed by 
Stord/Haugesund University College and I am therefore acting independently of all shipping companies, 
public authorities and other organisations and interests. As a PhD student and researcher, my work will 
be carried out in line with Norwegian guidelines for research ethics, which among other things protect 
your right to be anonymous. Only I will handle the completed forms or have other access to the data.  
To optimise the quality of the survey, it is important that as many people as possible complete the form. 
It will take about 30 minutes to complete the form. It is also important that the questions are answered as 
frankly as possible. When you have completed the form, place it in the enclosed envelope, seal the 
envelope and deliver it directly to the vessel’s safety delegate or the chosen contact person onboard for 
this survey.
- As regards the answering of the questions on the form itself, please relate your answers to the 
circumstances onboard this particular vessel.  
- As regards comments concerning questions and suggestions for improvements, you can relate 
these to the experience you have of the sector in general.
This type of survey is very common in Norway. Both Norwegian companies and authorities want the 
safety of employees to be given the highest priority. From similar surveys we have learned that safety-
related matters often do not function as intended, and that the reason can be traced back to weaknesses 
linked to the company's management or other organisational factors. Some of the questions may be 
difficult to answer, but the aim is not to place the blame on individuals. We know for example that 
procedures can be broken without the blame resting on the individual who breaks the procedure but on 
other levels within an organisation. In such cases I want to identify the organisational reasons for 
breakdowns in procedure. Possible reasons here include insufficient involvement in the development of 
procedures, the existence of too many procedures or the adoption of dangerous procedures.
Participation in and completion of the questionnaire is voluntary. If you choose not to take part in the 
survey, please fill in the enclosed green sheet and return it in the same way as the questionnaire.
If you have any questions concerning the survey, you can contact me, Helle Oltedal, on telephone no. 
(+47) 93 82 61 87 or (+47) 52 70 26 44. 
Thank you for taking the time to fill in the questionnaire! 
Yours sincerely,
Helle Oltedal,
Stord/Haugesund University College
English version 65 1
Safety Culture Survey 
Please indicate your answer by crossing off a box for each question like this:. Mark wrong answers 
like this:   Where it is not possible to select an answer, please provide an alternative in the space 
provided for other or fill inn.
PLEASE WRITE ALL COMMENTS OR SUGGESTIONS IN ENGLISH 
 1. Background Information
A Gender: Female  1 Male 2
B Job position/title Captain  1 Mate 2 Engineer  3 AB /Seaman  4
    Electrician 5 Catering  6 Apprentice 7 Other (Fill in):_________________
C Vessel class/cargo Bulk  1 Combined   2 Shuttle tanker  3 Gas4 General Cargo  5
Chemical  6 Oiltanker   7 Other (Fill in)_______________
D Age Under 31 years
1
31-40 years  2  41-50 years  3 51-60 years 4    Over 60 years 5
E Nationality Norwegian 1 Polish  2 Filipino  3 Other (Fill in):______________
F How long have you 
been working within 
shipping? 0-2 year(s)  1 3-5 years  2 6-10 years  3 11-20 years 4   Over 20 years 5
G
How long have you been working for this shipping company?Fill in:____________
H
All in all, how long have you been working at this vessel? Fill in:____________
I Which kind of employment contract do you have?   
Permanent employee 1
9 months duration 2
6 months duration 3
3 months duration 4
Other (Fill in): 
J
How long is your ordinary work /sailing schedule at the ship? (for contract 
workers this will often be the same as the contract duration) 
(Fill in)__________________
K How long do you usually stay at home or on shore between each work / 
sailing period? 
(Fill in)__________________
L Do you normally work at the same vessel at every work / sailing period? 
Very seldom /never 1
Sometime 2
Very often / always     3
MHow is your ordinary watch system, without overtime?(for example 
Dayman, or 4-8-4 meaning 4 hours work – 8 hours off – 4 hours work) (Fill in)__________________
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2. Top Management’s Safety Priorities
Only select one answer per question
Strongly
disagree
Disagree Not sure Agree Strongly 
agree
Don’t
know
A The on-shore top management in my company 
prioritizes safety before economy. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
B I experience conflicting requirements from my 
company and the captain. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
C I experience that safety work is more a facade than a 
real priority area. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
D I am familiar with the company’s safety goal. 1 2 3 4 5 6
Comments and suggestions: 
3. Local Management
Please state your evaluation of your closest superior’s attitude toward safety. If you are the 
captain, relate the questions to the closest on-shore manager. 
A All in all, for how long have you been working with your closest superior?(Fill inn) ___________________________
Only select one answer per question
Very seldom 
/never
Seldom Sometime Often Very often 
/always 
Don’t
know
B Is your closest superior clear in his engagement to 
ensuring his co-workers’ safety? 
1 2 3 4 5 6
C Does your closest superior follow up to ensure that 
all work on board is done in a safe manner? 
1 2 3 4 5 6
D Is your closest superior a good role model when it 
comes to attending to his own and others’ safety? 
1 2 3 4 5 6
Once a 
week
Twice a 
month
Once a 
month
Once
every 2nd
month
Once
every 6 
moths
More
seldom
E How often do you participate in meetings with your 
closest superior where safety is a topic? 
1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly
disagree
Disagree Not sure Agree Strongly 
agree
Don’t
know
F My closest superior appreciates that the crew is 
willing to discuss safety-related conditions. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
G My closest superior is not afraid of admitting his 
own mistakes. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
H My closest superior has too little confidence in his 
co-workers.
1 2 3 4 5 6
I My closest superior is supportive if safety is 
prioritized in all situations 
1 2 3 4 5 6
Comments and suggestions:
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4 Procedures and Guidelines 
Only select one answer per question
Strongly
disagree
Disagree Not sure Agree Strongly 
agree
Don’t
know
A Due to the company’s demand for efficiency we 
sometimes have to violate procedures. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
B Due to the captain’s demand for efficiency we 
sometimes have to violate procedures. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
C I have received good training in the company’s 
procedures.
1 2 3 4 5 6
D I feel that it is difficult to know which procedures 
are applicable. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
E The procedures are helpful in my work. 1 2 3 4 5 6
F The procedures are difficult to understand or are 
poorly written. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
G We have the opportunity to influence and form the 
procedures.
1 2 3 4 5 6
If you don’t follow the procedures in a specific situation, what may be the reason?  Please don’t 
mark more than three options. 
A The work will be done faster. 1
B The rest of the crew does it. 2
C I feel pressured because I am overloaded with work. 3
D It improves the quality of my work. 4
E I am not familiar with the applicable procedures. 5
F The procedures do not work as intended. 6
G There are too many procedures. 7
H Others (please specify):
Comments and suggestions: 
 5. Interaction 
In relation to following questions safety will be any issue or condition that you feel may threaten or 
cause any injury or damage to yourself, your co-workers or the vessel.
Only select one answer per question
Very seldom 
/never
Seldom Sometime Often Very often 
/always 
Don’t
know
A Do you normally work with the same team members 
within your working area / working group? 
1 2 3 4 5 6
B Do you discuss safety issues with your co-workers? 1 2 3 4 5 6
C Do you ever feel forced to continue your work even 
if safety may be threatened?  
1 2 3 4 5 6
English version 65 4
Only select one answer per question
Very seldom 
/never
Seldom Sometime Often Very often 
/always 
Don’t
know
D Does the crew get positive feedback when they raise 
safety issues? 
1 2 3 4 5 6
E Can you tell the captain to ”stop”/”time out” if you 
feel that safety is threatened? 
1 2 3 4 5 6
F Can you say ”stop”/”time out” to the company if you 
feel that safety is threatened? 
1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly
disagree
Disagree Not sure Agree Strongly 
agree
Don’t
know
G The working environment on board is characterized 
by openness and dialog. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
H We solve problems and conflicts in a good manner. 1 2 3 4 5 6
I We receive sufficient safety-related information 
when we start a new watch.
1 2 3 4 5 6
J We receive sufficient safety-related information 
when we sign on / start a new sailing period.
1 2 3 4 5 6
K I am confident that my company always prioritizes 
the crew’s safety. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
L I am confident that the captain always prioritizes the 
crew’s safety. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
MIf I ask for help I will appear incompetent. 1 2 3 4 5 6
N We usually speak up to a co-worker if we notice that 
he is doing his work in a risky manner. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
O We usually speak up to the ship management if we 
notice that a co-worker is doing his work in a risky 
manner. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
P I stop work if I am not sure that safety is 
satisfactorily ensured. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
Q I feel appreciated by my co-workers. 1 2 3 4 5 6
R I feel appreciated by the ship management. 1 2 3 4 5 6
S My co-workers do their jobs in a way that makes me 
feel safe. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
T My co-workers can communicate effectively in 
English. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
U Different languages on board may represent a safety 
risk.
1 2 3 4 5 6
V Different national cultures on board may represent a 
safety risk. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
Comments and suggestions: 
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6. Work Situation
Only select one answer per question 
Very seldom 
/never
Seldom Sometime Often Very often 
/always 
Don’t
know
A Do you have the possibility to prioritize safety first
in your daily work? 
1 2 3 4 5 6
B Do you carry out a “Safe Job Analysis”/“Risk 
Analysis” before high-risk operations? 
1 2 3 4 5 6
C Do you carry out a safety evaluation before new 
working methods, tools, or routines are introduced? 
1 2 3 4 5 6
D Have you experienced situations where you need to 
expose your self to danger to get the work done? 
1 2 3 4 5 6
E Do you take a ”time-out” when unforeseen situations 
occur? 
1 2 3 4 5 6
F Do you use protective equipment in situations when 
it is mandatory? 
1 2 3 4 5 6
G Do you feel sufficiently rested to carry out your 
tasks in a safe manner on your shift?
1 2 3 4 5 6
H Is the safety documentation you need readily 
available? 
1 2 3 4 5 6
I Is the safety documentation you need up to date? 1 2 3 4 5 6
J Is anyone ever intoxicated/drunk on board? 1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly
disagree
Disagree Not sure Agree Strongly 
agree
Don’t
know
K The number of crewmembers is not sufficient to 
ensure safety on board. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
L The management doesn’t care how we do our work 
as long as the work gets done. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
MI miss feedback on the work I do. 1 2 3 4 5 6
N The on-board maintenance is sufficient to ensure 
safety.
1 2 3 4 5 6
O I am familiar with the on-board safety goals. 1 2 3 4 5 6
P I have to work much overtime to get the work done 1 2 3 4 5 6
Comments and suggestions: 
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7. Competence
Only select one answer per question
Strongly
disagree
Disagree Not sure Agree Strongly 
agree
Don’t
know
A I have received the training that is necessary in 
order to work safely. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
B I have received the education that is necessary in 
order to work safely. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
C I have received the training that is necessary in 
order to handle critical or hazardous situations. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
D I have received the education that is necessary in 
order to handle critical or hazardous situations. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
E New crew members get a thorough introduction to 
safety-related issues. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
F On our vessel we frequently carry out drills in safety 
procedures.
1 2 3 4 5 6
G What we learn in courses is not relevant in practice. 1 2 3 4 5 6
H Some of my co-workers lack experience. 1 2 3 4 5 6
Comments and suggestions:
8. Responsibility & Sanctions
Only select one answer per question
Strongly
disagree
Disagree Not sure Agree Strongly 
agree
Don’t
know
A In my day-to-day work there is no doubt about who 
is responsible for the different tasks. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
B When an undesirable incident has occurred, people 
are more preoccupied with placing blame than 
finding the cause of the incident. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
C If I violate the safety regulations, there will be 
negative consequences for me. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
D Vague responsibilities on board contribute toward 
creating hazardous situations. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
E In my opinion, the consequences for violating the 
company’s safety regulations are fair. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
F Responsibility for the safety of others is a 
motivational factor in the performance of my work. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
G I know which tasks I am responsible for if a critical 
or hazardous situation should occur. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
Comments and suggestions:
English version 65 7
9. Working Environment
Only select one answer per question 
Strongly
disagree
Disagree Not sure Agree Strongly 
agree
Don’t
know
A I enjoy my job. 1 2 3 4 5 6
B I feel sure that I will not loose my job. 1 2 3 4 5 6
C I feel that the work we do on board is too little 
appreciated by the company. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
D This company is a good employer compared to 
others. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
E I have too little influence on my working situation. 1 2 3 4 5 6
F The working situation is less physically challenging 
than 2 years ago. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
G The working situation is less mentally challenging 
than 2 years ago. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
H The safety delegates have an important role in 
ensuring safety at my work site. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
I I feel certain that I will not be exposed to an injury/ 
accident at my work site. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
Comments and suggestions: 
10. Learning from Incidents
If accidents or severe incidents happen on board, I believe they happen because…. 
Do not select more than 3 alternatives.
A The crew has a large work load. 1
B The crew does not feel enough responsibility for their tasks. 2
C The crew lacks knowledge and experience in relation to the job they are doing. 3
D There is no tradition for speaking up when someone is working in a hazardous manner. 4
E There are too many interruptions in the work. 5
F Procedures/best practice is not followed. 6
G There are inadequate instructions for using technical equipment. 7
H There are mistakes or deficiencies in the procedures. 8
I There is bad maintenance. 9
J There is defective equipment. 10
K Others (please specify):
Comments and suggestions: 
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Only select one answer per question
A During the last 2 years, have you been involved in a serious 
incident/accident? Yes 
1No 2
B During the last 2 years, have any of your co-workers been 
involved in a serious incident/accident? Yes 
1No 2I don’t know  3
If yes, please comment the last incident / accident that happened: 
C During the last 2 years, have you been involved in what 
was almost a serious incident/accident? Yes 
1No 2
D During the last 2 years, have any of your co-workers been 
involved in what was almost a serious incident/accident? Yes 
1No 2I don’t know  3
If yes, please comment the last episode that happened: 
Only select one answer per question
Very seldom
/never
Seldom Sometime Often Very often 
/always 
 Don’t 
know
E Do minor incidents get reported in writing? 1 2 3 4 5 6
F Do close calls get reported in writing? 1 2 3 4 5 6
G Are reports of undesirable incidents ever “fixed up” 
to cover mistakes? 
1 2 3 4 5 6
H Do you receive constructive feedback from the 
company on the conditions you report? 
1 2 3 4 5 6
I Do you receive constructive feedback from the 
captain on the conditions you report? 
1 2 3 4 5 6
J Do you get information from incidents/accidents on 
other vessels?  
1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly
disagree
Disagree Not sure Agree Strongly 
agree
Don’t
know
K Here it is seldom improvements are made before 
something has gone wrong. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
L Reporting is important to prevent the recurrence of 
accidents or incidents. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
MMost of all, I report incidents because I have to. 1 2 3 4 5 6
N In my company, they are more preoccupied with the 
statistics than the human consequences of an 
incident. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
O Reporting in itself take too much time. 1 2 3 4 5 6
Comments and suggestions: 
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Assume that you were involved in an incident.  Would some of the following conditions stop you 
from reporting the incident? Do not mark more than 3 alternatives. 
A There is no tradition for reporting all incidents that happen. 1
B No improvements ever happen based on the reports. 2
C The incident didn’t have any serious consequences. 3
D I am afraid that the information will be used against me. 4
E I am afraid that the information will be used again my co-
workers.
5
F This could cause the company to loose contracts. 6
I There could be negative reactions from my co-workers. 7
J I don’t feel comfortable discussing my actions/mistakes. 8
K We have too much to do and don’t have time to write reports. 9
L Mistakes I make don’t concern anyone but me. 10
M I don’t know how to report an incident. 11
N Other (please specify): 
11. Description of the Organization
How would you describe this organization?  Please provide your estimate based on the statements 
below.  Select only one box per statement.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Comments and suggestions: 
It is important to 
be creative and 
original. 
The work is usually 
performed as a 
team. 
The work is 
characterized by 
control in detail and 
overall control. 
The work is 
characterized by 
flexibility and 
democracy/influence. 
It is important to 
do what we are 
told. 
The work is 
usually performed 
on an individual 
basis.
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12. Risk perception
How would you assess the risk involved with your work?  Please provide your estimate based on 
the statements below.  Select only one box per statement..
A) All in all, how would you assess the safety in your working situation? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
B) All in all, how do feel that the level of safety has developed over the last two years? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
C) All in all, how likely is it that you will have an accident on the vessel during the next 12 
months?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
D) All in all, how likely is it that any of the other crew members will have an accident on the vessel 
during the next 12 months? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
E) How safe do you feel when you consider the risk involved with your work on board? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
F) How much do you worry when you consider the risk involved with your work on board? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Very 
bad
Very 
good
It is
much 
poorer
It is 
much 
better 
Very 
likely
Very 
unlikely
Very 
likely
Very 
unlikely
Very 
safe
Very 
unsafe
Very 
much 
Very 
little
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13. Suggestions for New Safety Actions or Other Comments
